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Organisation zwischen Markt- und Hierarchieversagen: Öffentliche Güter als neuer Steuerungsimpuls

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Die Zukunft des Öffentlichen

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In den vergangenen Jahren sind Organisationskonzepte immer populärer geworden, in denen die Schaffung marktlicher Anreizsysteme in den Mittelpunkt rückt. Ihre dominierende organisatorische Gestaltungsempfehlung sowohl in der Organisations- als auch in der Beraterliteratur lautet: „Mehr Markt in das Unternehmen“1. Jüngst bezeichnet (2002) diese Konzepte als „Glaube an die organisatorische Weisheit des Marktes im Unternehmen“. Die Realisierung interner Märkte ist mit der Idee verbunden, einen Markt dort zu rekonstruieren, wo es keinen Wettbewerbsmarkt gibt, nämlich innerhalb des hierarchischen Arrangements Unternehmen. Die Einführung vermehrt marktlicher Steuerungsmechanismen— Prinzipien der invisible hand— in Unternehmen erfolgt mit der Zielsetzung, internes Unternehmertum zu fördern und plandominierte Strukturen zu entbürokratisieren. Damit ist vor allem die Vorstellung verbunden, die Organisationsmitglieder durch marktliche Anreize zu motivieren, ihre Kenntnisse einzubringen und neues Wissen zu wettbewerbsfähigen Leistungen zu entwickeln.

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Frost, J., Queiβer, C. (2007). Organisation zwischen Markt- und Hierarchieversagen: Öffentliche Güter als neuer Steuerungsimpuls. In: Jansen, S.A., Priddat, B.P., Stehr, N. (eds) Die Zukunft des Öffentlichen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90501-3_11

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