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Framed Encounters, Disruptive Encounters: Encountering Animals Within and Beyond Human-Animal Cultures

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Animal Encounters

Part of the book series: Cultural Animal Studies ((CAS,volume 4))

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Abstract

In this chapter I argue that we do not encounter animals per se but animals that are already charged with particular significations. We are inevitably immersed in a lifeworld in which animals play a role as participants in human-animal constellations, which I denote “human-animal cultures”, that is, in habituated practices shared between different species. Therefore, we are tacitly familiar with most of the animals we encounter. Moreover, human significations of animals are framed by what Husserl calls the “anthropological world”, i.e. the constitution of significations of animals as pets, livestock, vermin etc. from a shared human socio-cultural point of view. On a regular basis, we encounter animals that appear to be nothing but mere cases of particular classifications like pets, livestock or vermin. These are “framed encounters”. Our affective responses differ according to their different social roles, we have different intuitions regarding the proper treatment of, say, dogs, cows and mice. However, as Derrida and others have pointed out, there is the possibility – prototypically described through the experience of seeing oneself seen by an Other – of encountering an animal in its singularity. These “disruptive encounters” have the potential to thwart tacitly habituated dispositions of perceiving and treating animals.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The concept of human-animal cultures will be explained in detail in Chap. 2 of this paper. Ex ante, it is important to note that these human-animal cultures represent common grounds for shared ‘cultural’ practices, mutual communication, and the joint constitution of situations that are all—contrary to traditional conceptions of culture as exclusively human—possible on an interspecies level.

  2. 2.

    For a more thorough analysis of the actuality of this differentia specifica even in recent thought see Huth (“Zwischen Mensch und Tier”).

  3. 3.

    Giorgio Agamben famously developed the concept of the “anthropological machine”: Theoretical considerations as well as relevant practices constitute an ongoing process of inclusion and exclusion that separates humans from animals along the line of alleged cognitive capacities (37).

  4. 4.

    This distinction of layers of the body has a structuralist basis. Like in Ferdinand de Saussure’s conception of language along the lines of the distinction between langue (as system or structure of a language) and parole (as event of speaking actualizing and potentially modifying the langue), we find a habitual body as the basic (and tacit) corpus of a behavioral repertoire and an actual body as the actualization of this corpus.

  5. 5.

    Husserl famously coined the concept of fungierende Intentionalität in his Ideen II.

  6. 6.

    Gallagher coins the term of a “smart perception” that refers to a rich horizon of knowledge that frames direct perception (535).

  7. 7.

    The conception ‘reiteration’ of social frames and structures is also crucial in Judith Butler (3, 91).

  8. 8.

    Particularly the recognition of subjectivity and vulnerability in animals is often implied in these categories. While the dog is seen as an “experiencing subject of a life” (as Tom Regan puts it in his groundwork of animal rights, 264) on a regular basis, even mammals like mice are often at the margins of such a recognition. I will come back to that example in the upcoming section.

  9. 9.

    Recent investigations in the phenomenon of vulnerability indicate that particularly the fragility of bodily existence provides a power of resistance against different kinds of problematic classification or oppression (Butler, Frames of War).

  10. 10.

    I refrain from delving into the debate, whether it is permissible to directly compare animal exploitation to human genocides. However, within Western normative infrastructures the comparison always has a provocative element since the concept of genocide usually designates the attempted eradication of a certain human population.

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Huth, M. (2019). Framed Encounters, Disruptive Encounters: Encountering Animals Within and Beyond Human-Animal Cultures. In: Böhm, A., Ullrich, J. (eds) Animal Encounters. Cultural Animal Studies, vol 4. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04939-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04939-1_3

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