Abstract
The present contribution argues that we should abandon the concept of responsibility altogether because it is too general and vague. Apart from that, there is frequently too much “ideological baggage” going with it. Therefore, it is proposed either to eliminate the concept of responsibility, or to concentrate on two core-notions associated with it: the notion of responsiveness and the notion of liability.
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Gil, T. (2020). Responsiveness and Liability. In: Beck, B., Kühler, M. (eds) Technology, Anthropology, and Dimensions of Responsibility. Techno:Phil – Aktuelle Herausforderungen der Technikphilosophie , vol 1. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04896-7_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04896-7_1
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