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Tugendbasierte Theorien des Wissens und Tugenderkenntnistheorie

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Koppelberg, D. (2019). Tugendbasierte Theorien des Wissens und Tugenderkenntnistheorie. In: Grajner, M., Melchior, G. (eds) Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04632-1_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04632-1_10

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