Zusammenfassung
Wenn der Kampf zwischen Glauben und Unglauben »das eigentliche, einzige und tiefste Thema aller Welt- und Menschengeschichte«1 ist, so gebührt der Religionskritik des Hobbes die grösste Aufmerksamkeit. Unter den zahlreichen Bestreitungen der Religion, der offenbarten wie der natürlichen, welche das klassische Zeitalter der Religionskritik — das 17. und das 18. Jhdt. — hervorgebracht hat, gibt es nicht viele, die an geschichtlicher Wirksamkeit, gibt es wenige, die an Entschiedenheit der Leugnung, gibt es keine, die an Radikalität der Begründung mit derjenigen, die in Hobbes’ Leviathan vorliegt, zu vergleichen wäre. Zwar ist Spinozas theologisch-politischer Traktat, wie Hobbes selbst anerkannt hat, »kühner« als der Leviathan, d. h. rücksichtsloser im Ziehen und Aussprechen von Konsequenzen; aber diese Kühnheit ist erkauft um den Preis des Verzichts auf die eigentliche Grundlegung der Kritik, die sich viel eher im Leviathan als im theologisch-politischen Traktat findet.
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Notizen
Goethes Noten und Abhandlungen zu besserem Verständnis des West-Oestlichen Divans.
C. E. Vaughan, Studies in the history of political philosophy before and after Rousseau, Manchester 1925, I 23 und 55.
vgl. besonders Ci, d und Ci I 7.
»It is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments, than Death. Now … Eternall life is a greater reward, than the life present; and Eternall torment a greater punishment than the death of Nature.« L c. 38 in princ. — vgl. auch die nächste Anmerkung.
»… ratione naturali sciri non possunt, sed revelatione tantum … esse praemia et poenas post hanc vitam; animam esse immortalem et similia.« Ci XVII 13. — »There be some that… will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death … But … there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death …, but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally…« L c. 15 (76).
Contra hanc Empusam (sc. Scholasticam θεολογγα) exorcismus, credo, melior excogitari non potest, quam ut religionis … regulae … a philosophiae regulis … distinguantur, quaeque religionis sunt Scripturae Sacrae, quae philosophiae sunt rationi naturali tribuantur. Co, d.
Co I 8.
s. bes. L c. 46 (372–374).
Wie es in derselben geschichtlichen Situation wie Hobbes und unter verwandten philosophischen Voraussetzungen Pascal tat; vgl. Pensées (ed. Brunschvicg) fr. 291 ss. und 331.
Grundsätzlich in demselben Sinne ist Spinozas theologisch-politischer Traktat als Prolegomenon zu seiner Ethik zu verstehen; vgl. meine Schrift Die Religionskritik Spinozas, Berlin 1930, 88 f. und 100f. — Ähnlich urteilt Léon Brunschvicg, De la vraie et de la fausse conversion (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1932, 20), der sagt, Spinoza mache »de l’exégèse critique de la Bible dans le Tractatus theologico-politicus une introduction au spiritualisme de l’Éthique«.
s. Strauss, Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft in ihrer Genesis.
L c. 47 (380f.).
Die erheblichen Veränderungen hat Hobbes — abgesehen von der Ersetzung der »Review and Conclusion« durch einen völlig neu geschriebenen »Appendix« — in den Kapiteln 46 und 47 vorgenommen.
vgl. hierzu Tönnies, Hobbes3, 248; J. Lips, Die Stellung des Thomas Hobbes zu den politischen Parteien der grossen englischen Revolution, Leipzig 1927, 75–82; Z. Lubienski, Die Grundlagen des ethisch-politischen Systems von Hobbes, München 1932, 253–274.
vgl. O III 508–510 mit L c. 47 (380f.).
O III 508.
So hat er insbesondere die einer Leugnung gleichkommende »Erklärung« der Trinität in L c. 16 (85) und 42 (267f.) in der lateinischen Version beseitigt.
W VII 5. — vgl. auch die (ebenfalls nach der Restauration geschriebenen) Äusserungen zugunsten der episkopalen Kirchenverfassung in W IV 364 und 407 und O I, p. XVI. Vgl. dagegen B 56 f.
Von der Retraktion der »Erklärung« der Trinität in O III 563 f. gibt dies selbst Lubienski (l. c. 212) zu, der übrigens »im allgemeinen … bei Hobbes eine ausgesprochene Anhänglichkeit zur christlichen Religion und eine große Achtung vor der Hl. Schrift« findet (217).
Aubrey erzählt: Hobbes »told me he (sc. Spinozas Tractatus-theologicopoliticus) had cut through him a barren’s length, for he durst not write so boldly.« (Brief lives, ed. Clark, Oxford 1898, I 357). Seine Äusserung nötigt dazu, jedenfalls die kühnsten Bemerkungen, die sich in Hobbes’ Schriften finden, als die seiner eigentlichen Meinung am nächsten kommenden vorzüglich zu berücksichtigen.
Da Hobbes also verhältnismässig oft im Einklang mit der Tradition stehende Behauptungen vorbringt, fällt es ihm nicht schwer, wenn er wegen seiner gefährlichen Lehren angegriffen wird, sich auf eben diese Behauptungen zu berufen. Eine Reihe von Beispielen hierfür finden sich in seiner Antikritik an Bischof Bramhalls Leviathan-Kritik; s. z.B. WIV 361.
H XIV 4.
L c.31 (195) und c.12 (56). — Ebenso urteilt Spinoza; vgl. Tr. theol.-pol. XIV (20, 33, 38) und XV (2).
B 57.
L c. 46 (367).
vgl. L c. 45 (352) und c. 46 (367).
Co, d.
W IV 426 f. und L, R (391). — Zur Rechtfertigung dieser im Interesse des Schriftglaubens vollzogenen Verwerfung der scholastischen Theologie beruft sich Hobbes ausdrücklich auf Luther, Melanchthon und Calvin; s. W V 64 f.
vgl. vor allem den Anfang und das Ende der Historia Ecclesiastica (O V 349 und 408), sowie W IV 433.
L c. 45 (352).
vgl. O III 569 und 508.
L c. 44 (331f.). — vgl. auch W IV 338.
vgl. B 63.
Ci XVI 4.
L c. 33 (203) und 43 (319).
L c. 33 (208f.).
L c. 32 (201f.) und W IV 326 f.
Ci XVII 17 f.
»… with Submission … both in this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am …« L c. 38 (241).
L c. 32 in princ, c. 34 in princ. und c. 43 sub fine.
L c. 38 (241 und 244) und R (390); vgl. auch O III 517 und 528.
the … Signification of words … in the Doctrine following, dependeth not (as in naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture … L c. 34 in princ.
Wie es bei Spinoza der Fall ist; vgl. Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas 89 f. und 259.
… though there be many things in Gods Word above Reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination. Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, wee are bidden to capitivate our understanding to the Words … L c. 32 (199). Vgl. auch c. 34 (211 und 217).
L c. 45 (352).
vgl. indessen die Bemerkung: … those texts that seem to countenance the power of Magick, Witchcraft, and Enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first sight [they] seem to bear, die sich darauf stützt, dass Zauber u. dgl. nicht möglich sind. L c. 37 (238).
You see how great the apparent contradiction is between the … texts, which being both Scripture, may and must be reconciled and made to stand together; which unless the rigour of the letter be on one or both sides with intelligible and reasonable interpretations mollified, is impossible. W V 10. — Spinoza verwirft dieses Auslegungsprinzip, das ihm durch die jüdische Tradition bekannt war, ausdrücklich (s. Tr. theol. pol. XV — §§ 4 ff. ed. Bruder) und verfährt damit in Hobbes’ Sinn radikaler als Hobbes selbst.
… in the allegation of Scripture, I have endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure, or controverted Interpretation; and to alledge none, but in such sense as is most plain, and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible … For it is not the bare Words, but the Scope of the writer that giveth the true light, by which any writing is to bee interpreted … L c. 43 sub fine. Vgl. ferner c. 43 (322 und 324), c. 44 (337 und 348) und Review (390).
Vgl. z.B. die Auslegung von 1. Cor 3, 11–12 in c. 43 (325), in der Hobbes ausdrücklich den schwierigen Teil der Stelle nach der Auslegung des klaren und leichtverständlichen Teils interpretiert.
cf. B 55.
L c. 45 (350f.)
Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it can be proved, that Angels (except when they are put for such men, as God hath made the Messengers, and Ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent, and withall incorporeall. L c. 34 (216 f.).
Concerning the creation of Angels, there is nothing delivered in the Scriptures. That they are Spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of Spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews, and Gentiles, sometimes thin Bodies; as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits Vitall, and Animall, of living creatures; and sometimes the Images that rise in the fancy in Dreams, and Visions; which are not reall Substances, nor last any longer then the Dream, or Vision they appear in; which Apparitions, though no reall Substances, but Accidents of the brain; yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signifie his Will, they are not unproperly termed Gods Messengers, that is to say, his Angels. L c. 34 (214). — By the name of Angel, is signified … most often, a Messenger of God: And by a Messenger of God, is signified, any thing that makes known his extraordinary Presence; that is to say, the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a Dream, or Vision. l. c. — Considering … the signification of the word Angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of Nature; I was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing but supernaturall apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and commandements known to mankind, … But the many places of the New Testament, and our Saviours own words, and in such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble Reason, an acknowledgment, and beleef, that there be also Angels substantial!, and permanent. But to beleeve they be … Incorporeall, cannot by Scripture bee evinced. l. c. (217). Cf. auch Ci XVII 28.
(The) significant names, Satan, Devill, Abaddon, set not forth to us any Individuall person, as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality; and are therefore Appellatives; which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles; because thereby they seem to be the proper names of Daemons; and men are the more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of Devills; which at that time was the Religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses, and of Christ. L c. 38 (246). Vgl. auch W IV 356 f. und V 210 f.
Dass das Ergebnis der Untersuchung betr. den Sinn, den das Wort »Geist« in der Schrift hat, nicht auf die Stellen Anwendung findet, an denen es heisst, dass Gott ein Geist sei, sagt Hobbes ausdrücklich in L c. 34 (211).
Vgl. L c. 38 (241, 244 und 246).
… it seemeth to me,… that Adam if he had not sinned, had had an Eternall Life on Earth … L c. 38 (241). — For if as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise, and Eternall Life on Earth, even so in Christ all shall bee made alive; then all men shall be made to live on Earth; for else the comparison were not proper. l. c. — That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the Resurrection, is the Heavens … is not easily to be drawn from any text that I can find. l. c. (242).
I find the Kingdome of God, to signifie in most places of Scripture, a Kingdome properly so named, constituted by the Votes of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their King by Covenant made with him, upon Gods promising them the possession of the land of Canaan … L c. 35 (219). Betr. Abraham s. ebenda sowie L c. 40 in princ, betr. Adam und die Christliche Verheissung s. die vorige Anm.
cf. Ci XVI 2, L c. 35 (220) und c. 40 in princ.
… by the Kingdome of God, is properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted … for their Civill Government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards God their King, but towards one another in point of justice, and towards other Nations both in peace and warre; which properly was a Kingdome, wherein God was King, and the High priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant. L c. 35 (221). — … The Kingdome … of God, is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome. l. c. (222). Vgl. auch Anm. 58.
In short, the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; … which Kingdome having been cast off, in the election of Saul, the Prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ; and the Restauration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in the Lords Prayer, Thy Kingdome come … the Kingdome of God (called also the Kingdome of Heaven, from the gloriousnesse, and admirable height of that throne) (is) a Kingdome which God by his Lieutenants, or Vicars, who deliver his Commandements to the people, did exercise on Earth … L c. 35 (222).
… it is evident, that our Saviours Kingdome is to bee exercised by him in his humane nature. L c. 41 (264).
Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and hee but a Lieutenant to God; it followeth, that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to bee like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father. L c. 41 (265). Vgl. auch L c. 41 in princ. und in fine.
L c. 38 (248f.).
L c. 41 in princ.
The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of Salvation, or being saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely, against all Evill, comprehending Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self … to be saved from Sin, is to be saved from all the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath brought upon us. And therefore in the Holy Scripture, Remission of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same thing … And it is besides evident in reason, that since Death and Misery, were the punishments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be a discharge of Death and Misery; that is to say, Salvation absolute, such as the faithfull are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our Saviour. L c. 38 (247f.).
The comparison between that Eternall Life which Adam lost, and our Saviour by his Victory over death hath recovered; holdeth also in this, that as Adam lost Eternal Life by his sin, and yet lived after it for a time; so the faithful Christian hath recovered Eternal Life by Christs passion, though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time; namely till the Resurrection. L c. 38 (242).
… our Saviour intended to prove, … the Resurrection of the Body, that is to say, the Immortality of the Man (sc. und nicht the Immortality of the Soul). Therefore our Saviour meaneth, that (the) Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a property consequent to the essence, and nature of mankind; but by the will of God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow Eternall life upon the faithfull … That the Soul of man is in its own nature Eternall, and a living Creature independent on the body; or that any meer man is Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection in the last day, (except Enos and Elias) is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole 14. Chapter of Job … is a complaint of this Mortality of Nature; and yet no contradiction of the Immortality at the Resurrection … the Immortall Life (and Soule and Life in the Scripture, do usually signifie the same thing) … hath for cause, not his specificall nature, and generation; but the Promise. L c. 38 (243 f.). — … we read plainly in holy Scripture, that God created Adam in an estate of Living for Ever, which was conditionall, that is to say, if he disobeyed not his Commandement; which was not essentiall to Human Nature … L c. 44 (336). — The Soule in Scripture, signifieth alwaies, either the Life, or the Living Creature; and the Body and Soule jointly, the Body alive. l. c. (337). — The Elect are … the sole heirs of Eternall Life: they only can die no more: it is they that are equall to the Angels … l. c. (343). — God, that could give a life to a peece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten Carkasse, into a glorious, spirituall, and immortall Body. l. c. (346). — Vgl. ferner L l App. c. I (O III 520–527) sowie W IV 350–354.
As the Kingdome of God, and Eternal Life, so also Gods Enemies, and their Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture, to have their place on Earth … for the place of the damned after the Resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old, nor New Testament, by any note of situation … L c. 38 (244). — … that which is thus (sc. in the Scripture) said concerning Hell Fire, is spoken metaphorically … l. c. (246). — Vgl. auch O III 518.
… if the Kingdome of God after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth, … The Enemy, and his Kingdome must be on Earth also. For so also was it, in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine; and the Nations round about, were the Kingdomes of the Enemy; and consequently by Satan, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church. L c. 38 (246).
… though there be many places that affirm Everlasting Fire, and Torments … yet I find none that affirm there shall bee an Eternall Life therein of any individuall person; but to the contrary, an Everlasting Death, which is the Second Death … Whereby it is evident, that there is to bee a Second Death of every one that shall bee condemned at the day of Judgement, after which hee shall die no more. L c. 38 (247).
… as the Elect after the Resurrection shall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned; so the Reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam, and his posterity were in after the sin committed … L c. 44 (343). — … the wicked being left in the estate they were in after Adams sin, may at the Resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, and have grosse and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the Resurrection, as they did before: For there is no place of Scripture to the contrary. l. c.
L c. 38 (247).
cf. Ci XVII 13 und 28.
L c. 39 (252).
… they who have no supernaturall Revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their own Soveraign … L c. 40 (254). — God is the Soveraign of all Soveraigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any Subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly Potentate command to the contrary. L c. 33 (203).
Insbesondere vom Verhalten Samuels und Davids gegenüber Saul sprechend, sagt Hobbes: »all these transactions are supernatural, and oblige not to imitation. Is there any prophet or priest now, that can set up in England, Scotland, or Ireland, another king by pretence of prophecy or religion?« W IV 331.
In this Contract of God with Abraham, wee may observe …, that at the making of this Covenant, God spake onely to Abraham, and therefore contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their wills … were before the Contract involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawfull power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them … they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive commandements of God from their Soveraign; as the family and seed of Abraham did from Abraham their Father, [and] Lord, and Civill Soveraign…. God spake onely to Abraham; and it was he onely, that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family … L c. 40 (253 f.).
l.c. (254).
(Moses’) authority…, as the authority of all other Princes, must be grounded on the Consent of the People, and their Promise to obey him. l. c. (255).
… the Covenant constituteth a Sacerdotall Kingdome, that is to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron …, after Moses should bee dead. l. c.
Moses alone had next under God the Soveraignty over the Israelites: And that not onely in causes of Civill Policy, but also of Religion: For Moses onely spake with God, and therefore onely could tell the People, what it was that God required at their hands … There was no Prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the Spirit of God, but such as Moses had approved and Authorized. l. c. (256) — Ebenso urteilt Spinoza; s. Tr. theol. pol. XVII (Bruder §§ 36–38).
l. c. (257ff.).
… we may conclude, that whosoever had the Soveraignty of the Commonwealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the Supreme Authority in matter of Gods externall worship; and represented Gods Person … l. c. (260).
… there are two parts of our Saviours Office during his aboad upon the Earth: One to Proclaim himself the Christ; and another by Teaching, and by working of Miracles, to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the Immortality Beleevers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in majesty, to take possession of his Fathers Kingdome. L c. 41 (263). — … the Kingdome of Christ is not of this world: therefore neither can his Ministers (unlesse they be Kings,) require obedience in his name. L c. 42 (268). — It is therefore manifest, that Christ hath not left to his Ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued with Civill Authority, any Authority to Command other men. l. c. (270).
… the Power of Excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the Apostles and Pastors of the Church have their Commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by Command and Coaction, but by Teaching and Direction of men in the way of Salvation in the world to come. And as a Master in any Science, may abandon his Scholar, when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but not accuse him of Injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a Teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his Disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they doe him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him. L c. 42 (278).
l. c. (277).
… the Apostles … were at first but twelve; and these were chosen and constituted by our Saviour himselfe … L c. 42 (286). — As the Apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by our Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the Assembly of Christians; … so were also the Presbyters, and Pastors … elected by the Churches … l. c. (288). — It was therefore the Assembly that elected their own Elders: the Apostles were onely Presidents of the Assembly to call them together for such Election, and to pronounce them Elected, and to give them the benediction, which now is called Consecration. l. c. (289).
l. c. (292f.).
This Right of the Heathen Kings, cannot bee thought taken from them by their conversion to the Faith of Christ; who never ordained, that Kings for beleeving in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but himself, … therefore Christian Kings are still the Supreme Pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what Pastors they please, to teach the Church…. L c. 42 (294). — Christian Kings have power to Baptize, and to Consecrate … l. c. (295). — If they please therefore, they may (as many Christian Kings now doe) commit the government of their Subjects in matters of Religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point Subordinate to them, and exerciseth that Charge in anothers Dominion Jure Civili…, not Jure Divino …; and may therefore be discharged of that Office, when the Soveraign for the good of his Subjects shall think it necessary. They may also if they please, commit the care of Religion to one Supreme Pastor, or to an Assembly of Pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honor, as of Bishops, Archbishops, Priests, or Presbyters, they will … l. c. (298).
s.o.S. 281
s. o.S. 280 f.
… if the command of the Civill Soveraign bee such, as that it may be obeyed, without the forfeiture of life Eternall; not to obey it is unjust… But if the command be such, as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to Eternall Death, then … the Counsell of our Saviour takes place, Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soule. L c. 43 (319).
The Obedience required at our hands by God,… is a serious Endeavour to Obey him … But what Commandements are those that God hath given us?… our Saviour Christ hath not given us new Laws, but Counsell to observe those wee are subject to; that is to say, the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of our severall Soveraigns … The Laws of God therefore are none but the Laws of Nature, whereof the principall is … a commandement to obey our Civill Soveraigns … L c. 43 (320).
… because wee are all guilty of disobedience to Gods law, … there is required at our hands now, not onely Obedience for the rest of our time, but also a Remission of sins for the time past; which Remission is the reward of our Faith in Christ. L c. 43 (319 f.).
The (Unum Necessarium) Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture maketh simply Necessary to Salvation, is this, that Jesus is the Christ. L c. 43 (322).
If he (sc. the Civill Soveraign) bee a Christian, he alloweth the beleefe of this Article, that Jesus is the Christ; … And because he is a Soveraign, he requireth Obedience to all his owne, that is, to all the Civill Laws; in which also are contained all the Laws of Nature, that is, all the Laws of God … l. c. (328).
And when the Civill Soveraign is an Infidel, every one of his own Subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the Laws of God … And for their Faith, it is internall, and invisible; They have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. L c. 43 (328). — But what (may some object) if a King, or a Senate, or other Soveraign Person forbid us to beleeve in Christ? To this, I answer, that such Forbidding is of no effect; because Beleef, and Unbeleef never follows mens Commands. Faith is a gift of God, which Man can neither give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be further asked, What if wee bee commanded by our lawfull Prince, to say with our tongue, wee beleeve not; must we obey such command? Profession with the tongue is but an externall thing, and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding firmely in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. … whatsoever a subject… is compelled to in obedience to his Soveraign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his Soveraigns … L c. 42 (270). — … he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article, but taketh it upon him of his private authority, though he be a Witnesse, and consequently a Martyr…, yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because being not called thereto, tis not required at his hands; nor ought hee to complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work. l. c. (271 f.).
s. o.S. 284 f. und 290 f.
… Daemons … are but Idols, or Phantasms of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy … L c. 44 (332).
L c. 44 (331).
… we may justly pronounce for the Authors of all this Spirituall Darknesse, the Pope, and Roman Clergy … L c. 47 (379). — The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in Religion, are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy. l. c. (377).
L c. 44 (332).
Er widmet ihm nur einen einzigen Absatz; vgl. L c. 46 (375).
Vgl. L c. 45 (350) und 12 (56 ff.).
L c. 44 (338).
L c. 44 (332).
L c. 44 (334).
L c. 44 (336).
Hobbes behandelt diese Phänomene daher insbesondere in seiner Erklärung der natürlichen Religion; s. L c. 12 (55 ff.).
Denn die Religion der Heiden war »a part of humane Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects.« L c. 12 (57). Vgl. auch E II, VI 2. Vgl. ferner folgenden Passus in L c. 46 (374): For a Private man, without the Authority of the Common-wealth … to Interpret the Law by his own Spirit, is another Error in the Politiques; but not drawn from Aristotle, nor from any other of the Heathen Philosophers. For none of them deny, but that in the Power of making Laws, is comprehended also the Power of Explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are Law, made Law by the Authority of the Common-wealth, and consequently, a part of the Civill Law? — Vgl. auch W IV 448, VI 183, 221 und 243 f. — In W VI 276 ff. spricht Hobbes allerdings vom Kampf zwischen Priester und Königen im heidnischen Altertum.
There is another Errour in their Civill Philosophy (which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the Heathen,) to extend the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, to the very Thoughts, and Consciences of men, by Examination, and Inquisition of what they Hold … L c. 46 (374).
… especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and extream torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an Article of the Christian Faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in an error, whom the naturall care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation? l. c. — Vgl. hierzu die Verwerfung der staatsfeindlichen Lehren, »That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions «, und »that whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne« in L c. 29 (172).
This nature of Sight having never been discovered … it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense, otherwise, than of things really without us: Which … (because they vanish away, they know not whither, nor how,) will have to be absolutely Incorporeall… As if the Dead of whom they Dreamed, were not Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven, or Hell, not Phantasmes, but Ghosts … L c. 45 (349). Vgl. auch L c. 34 (211), sowie c. 12 (55).
L c. 45 (353 und 361).
From these Metaphysiques (sc. of Aristotle), which are mingled with the Scripture to make Schoole Divinity, wee are told, there be in the world certain Essences separated from Bodies, which they call Abstract Essences, and Substantiall Formes … L c. 46 (367). — … it is upon this ground (sc. this doctrine of Separated Essences, built on the Vain Philosophy of Aristotle), that when a Man is dead and buried, they say his Soule (that is his Life) can walk separated from his Body, and is seen by night amongst the graves … the Errors, which are brought into the Church, from the Entities, and Essences of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false Philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corrob[or]ative of their Religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates. l. c. (369). — Ab hac doctrina de essentiis et formis substantialibus daemonologia Graecorum in ecclesia … relicta est… O III 499.
Aristotle, and other Heathen Philosophers define Good, and Evill, by the Appetite of men … But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure. And yet is this Doctrine still practised; and men judge the Goodnesse, or Wickednesse of their own, and of other mens actions, and of the actions of the Common-wealth it selfe, by their own Passions … L c. 46 (372). — Their Morall Philosophy is but a description of their own Passions. For the rule of Manners … is the Law…; that determineth … what is Good, and Evill: whereas they make the Rules of Good, and Bad, by their own Liking, and Disliking … l. c. (366). Vgl. ferner Ci III 31 und B 44.
s. S. 280 Anm. 28.
From Aristotles Civill Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of Common-wealths but the Popular, … Tyranny. All Kings they called Tyrants; … And that which offendeth the People, is no other thing, but that they are governed … by an Arbitrary government: for which they give evill names to their Superiors; never knowing (till perhaps a little after a Civill warre) that without such Arbitrary government, such Warre must be perpetuall; and that it is Men, and Arms, not Words, and Promises, that make the Force and Power of the Laws. And therefore this is another Errour of Aristotles Politiques, that in a wel ordered Common-wealth, not Men should govern, but the Laws. L c. 46 (373). — … it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie … And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the Practise of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular … L c. 21 (113). — (Tyrannicidium) olim ab omnibus sophistis Platone, Aristotele, Cicerone, Seneca, Plutarcho, caeterisque Graecae et Romanae anarchiae fautoribus, non modo licitum, sed etiam maxima laude dignum existimatum est. Ci XII 3. — Vgl. ferner Ci, p und XII 1 und 3, sowie L c. 29 (174) und O V 358 s.
Von dem der traditionellen Politik zugrundeliegenden Aristotelischen Satz, dass der Mensch ein ζῷον πολιτικόν ist, sagt Hobbes: Quod axioma, quamquam a plurimis receptum, falsum tarnen, errorque a nimis levi naturae humanae contemplatione profectus est. Causas enim, quibus homines congregantur et societate mutua gaudent, penitius inspectantibus facile constabit, non ideo id fieri, quod aliter fieri natura non possit, sed ex accidente. Ci I 2.
After the Athenians … had gotten the Dominions of the Sea … and were grown wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home, nor abroad, had little else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. Luke says, Acts 17.21) in telling and hearing news, or in discoursing of Philosophy publiquely to the youth of the City. … they spent the time of their Leasure, in teaching or in disputing of their Opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of the City together to hear them talk … From this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed, was called Schola, which in their Tongue signifieth Leasure; and their Disputations, Diatribae, that is to say, Passing of the time. Also the Philosophers themselves had the name of their Sects, some of them from these their Schools … as if we should denominate men from Morefields, from Pauls-Church, and from the Exchange, because they meet there often, to prate and loyter. L c. 46 (364f.).
But what has been the Utility of those Schools? what Science is there at this day acquired by their Readings and Disputings? That wee have of Geometry, which is the Mother of all Naturall Science, wee are not indebted for it to the Schools … The naturall Philosophy of those Schools, was rather a Dream than Science … L c. 46 (365f.).
And for Geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all (sc. in that which is now called an University); as being subservient to nothing but rigide Truth. L c. 46 (367).
Ci I 2; vgl. auch I 5. Vgl. auch den Pentameter: Professorum omnes (sc. cellae) ambitione tument. O I p. XCI.
… St. Paul… saith, That… the Day of Judgment… shall try every mans doctrine … And then they that have built false Consequences on the true Foundation, shall see their Doctrines condemned; neverthelesse they themselves shall be saved … and live eternally … L c. 43 (326).
And these are but a small part of the Incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing Philosophically, in stead of admiring, and adoring of the Divine and Incomprehensible Nature … L. c. 46 (370). — If such Metaphysiques, and Physiques as this, be not Vain Philosophy, there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it. l. c. (372). — Vgl. ferner L c. 32 (199), c. 40 (256) und c. 46 (366).
Vgl. Ci XII 1 und L c. 35 (219).
… the volumes of disputation about the nature of God … tend not to his Honour, but to the honour of our own wits, and learning … L c. 31 (195). — Ambo autem Adamus et Eva ambitione ducti, serpenti crediderunt, Deo non crediderunt, et de fructu vetito comederunt… O III 523. — Die ambitio ist also der Ursprung der Sünde; daher ist die ambitio die zu bekämpfende Leidenschaft; daher kann Hobbes von seinem Leviathan sagen, er sei: Justitiae mensura, atque ambitionis elenchus (O I p. XCIV). Dies bringt bereits der Titel des Leviathan zum Ausdruck; denn der Leviathan ist nach Hiob 41, 26: »King of all the children of pride.« cf. L c. 28 in fine. — betr. die ambitio vgl. Ci XII 9 —; an anderer Stelle (Ci I 2 n. 1 in fine) bezeichnet er als den Grund der Ungerechtigkeit die superbia, die aber gar nichts anderes als inanis gloria, bzw. als magnifice sentire de se ipso ist (s. Ci I 4 und 5).
Vgl. vor allem die Definition des »Reiches der Finsternis« (zitiert o. S. 302 f.). — Habsucht bzw. Ehrgeiz werden an folgenden Stellen als die Motive des Klerus angeführt: ambition or profit of the clergy — L c. 42 (271); vain — glory and ambition — L c. 42 (277); ambition — c. 44 (333); der Zehnte für den Klerus — l. c. (334); worldly ambition — c. 45 (361); worldly benefits — c. 47 (376); worldly Riches, Honour and Authority — c. 47 (379).
Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power… L c. 11 (50). — I put for a generali inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power … l. c. (49).
L c. 42 (312).
Vgl. auch die folgende Stelle: … Eodem quoque spectat canonizatio sanctorum, quam ethnici apotheosin appellarunt. Nam qui subditos alienos tanto praemio allicere potest, talis gloriae avidos ad quidlibet audendum et faciendum inducere potest. Quid enim nisi honorem apud posteros quaesiverunt Decii aliique Romani … Ci XVIII 14 — … oriuntur Ravilliaci et Clementes, qui cum reges suos occidendo ambitioni inservirent alienae, Deo se servire arbitrabantur. H XIII 7.
Vgl. Ci, d und XIII 14; L c. 21 (113) und c. 29 (174); WIV 288.
And if a man consider the originall of this great Ecclesiasticall Dominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy, is no other, than the Ghost of the deceased Romane Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof: For so did the Papacy start up on a Sudden out of the Ruines of that Heathen Power. L c. 47 (381).
s. o. S. 275 Anm. 12.
L c. 43 (329).
L c. 34 in princ.
L c. 38 in princ.
Hobbes rechtfertigt seine im Leviathan skizzierte Kritik des Dualismus der Substanzen mit folgenden Worten: But to what purpose (may some man say) is such subtilty in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and Obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this doctrine of Separated Essences, … would fright them from Obeying the Laws of their Countrey … L c. 46 (369).
L c. 42 (272, 290f. und 303) und 45 (353). vgl. auch S. 294 Anm. 77.
L c. 42 in princ.
L c. 42 (273–278).
Hobbes ausdrückliches Urteil über die Epikureische Philosophie (s. O III 540, W IV 387 und VI 98) lautet nicht anders als sein ausdrückliches, mehr oder weniger abfälliges Urteil über die gesamte antike Philosophie (vgl. auch die eingehende Kritik an Epikur-Lukrez in Co XXVI 3). Dass aber in Wahrheit eine enge Beziehung zwischen Hobbes und dem Epikureismus besteht, ist nie völlig verkannt worden. Es sei nur auf das Urteil von J. Fr. Buddeus verwiesen, der Hobbes als »Epicureae philosophiae consectator« bezeichnet (Isagoge historico-theologica ad theologiam universam, Lips. 1727, p. 280, sowie 1383; s. auch Buddeus, Institutiones theologicae dogmaticae, Lips. 1724, p. 455).
Vgl. hierzu und zum folgenden Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas, 4–19, 27ff., 68f., 84f., 199ff. und 215.
Vgl. L c. 11 (53) und 12 (55) mit Epikur, Sent. sel. 10–13, Lucr. 1140 ss. und V 1148–1198, Cic. Fin. I 13,43–14,46, sowie 19, 64. Die ebenfalls hierher gehörende Stelle Lucr. II 55–58 wird von Hobbes als Motto einer religionskritischen Untersuchung verwandt (W IV 385).
Vgl. vor allem Lucr. I 143 ss. Was den Gedanken der Bestimmtheit alles Geschehens angeht, so erfährt er durch Hobbes’ Determinismus eine noch weit über die Lehre Epikurs hinausgehende Zuspitzung.
Die Epikureische Götterlehre findet bei Hobbes begreiflicherweise keine unmittelbare Entsprechung; s. den folgenden Absatz im Text. Immerhin sei an die Verwandtschaft zwischen dem quasi corpus der Epikureischen Götter und den spirituellen Körpern der Engel und der Erwählten erinnert.
Auf die Abhängigkeit von Hobbes’ Kritik des Spiritualismus von der Lehre Epikurs verweist Buddeus l. c.
Hobbes sagt von einem seiner physikalischen Bücher: Ille docet motus animi et phantasmata sensus, Nec sanos patitur spectra timere viros. (O I, p. XCIV). Vgl. ferner L c. 12 (55) mit Lucr. I 96 ss. und V 1148 ss. Vgl. auch O I, p. XVIII.
Diogenes Laërtius X § 134.
Epicur, Sent. sel. 2. — Vgl. hierzu die Äusserung des Epikureers Gassendi: si res suavis est, mortem reputare ut malorum finem, longe suavius est, accessionem praeterea bonorum summorum sperare, pari ratione, qua athletam non tam delectat, quod a contentione lucraque cessaturus sit, quam quod praemium consequuturus. Syntagma philosophiae Epicuri, Hagae Comitis 1659, p. 31.
Si aliquem de Epicuri schola deum affectavit Christi nomine titulare, ut quod beatum et incorruptibile sit neque sibi neque alii molestias praestet (hanc enim sententiam ruminans Marcion removit ab illo severitates et iudiciarias vires), aut in totum immobilem et stupentem Deum concepisse debuerat (et quid illi cum Christo, molesto et Judaeis per doctrinam et sibi per sensum?), aut et de ceteris motibus eum agnovisse (et quid illi cum Epicuro, nec sibi nec Christianis necessario?) Adv. Marc. I 25. — Bezüglich des »Deus optimus« sagt Tertullian fernerhin: Sed puto jam et non optimus jam aliquid et cum Creatore moratus, nec in totum Epicuri deus. l. c. IV, 15. Cf. auch II 16.
»And perhaps if the death of a sinner were, as (Bishop Bramhall) thinks, an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; … accusing him … of little tenderness and love to mankind.« W V 103 s. — »But though God have power to afflict a man and not for sin without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as to afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torment? Is it not cruelty? No more than to do the same for sin, when he that so afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning.« l. c. 17. — »… a justitia Dei, qui cruciatus aeternos peccatoribus comminatus est, arguere aeternitatem ipsorum cruciatuum non potes. Etsi enim qui bona quae debentur non praestat, injustus sit, is tamen, qui mala vel damna debita non praestat, injustus non est, sed misericors. Quanto minus Deus, qui est infinite misericors, non poterit sine justitiae suae violatione mitigare tum diuturnitatem tum acerbitatem meritarum poenarum?« O III 522. — Vgl. ferner L c. 44 (342), H XIV 6 und W IV 354, sowie o. S. 290 ff.
»… (Hobbes) témoigne aussi qu’il lui semble que les peines des méchants doivent cesser par leur destruction; c’est à peu près le sentiment des sociniens, mais il semble que les siens vont bien plus loin.« Leibniz, Réflexions sur le livre de Hobbes …§ 2. — »(Sociniani) aeternitatem … poenarum infernalium cum iustitia et bonitate divina conciliari non posse existimantes, quidam illorum annihilationem potius damnatorum, quam aeternitatem poenarum admittere voluerunt.« J. Fr. Buddeus, Institutiones theologicae dogmaticae, Lips. 1724, p. 490. — »Poenas … aeternas (Sociniani) non positive, sed negative interpretantur, per annihilationem scilicet eorum, qui durissima illa merebantur.« Nicol. Arnold, Religio Sociniana … refutata, Francke 1654, p. 101. Arnold hebt ferner (p. 107) hervor, dass die Socinianer seines Wissens »noch nicht« gewagt hätten, ihre Meinung über das Schicksal der Verdammten offen zu äussern. Man vergleiche damit die (oben S. 291 erwähnte) Vorsicht des Hobbes in der Behandlung dieser Frage. — Vgl. auch O. Fock, Der Socinianismus, Kiel 1847, 718 ss.
v. Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, III2 681.
L c. 38 (247). — Vgl. auch die Bemerkung: »(Christ’s) eternall Kingdome, wherein shall be Protection, and Life everlasting.« L c. 42 (284).
F. Socinus, Praelectiones theologicae cap. 16. — Auf diesem Kapitel, sowie auf c. 15, 17, 22 und 23 beruhen die Darlegungen in H XIV6. — Vgl. ferner Arnold, l. c. 92–97.
In diesem Zusammenhang sei bemerkt, dass Hobbes’ Art of Sophistry (W VI 529–536) — wahrscheinlich um 1636 entstanden — eine Nachahmung von F. Socinus’ Elementi sophistici … explicati, et exemplis Theologicis illustrati (Racoviae 1625) ist.
Vgl. L c. 43 (321 s.) und 45 (358) mit Socinus, Opp. II 358 und Arnold l. c. 39 s.
Vgl. o. S. 280 mit Fock, l. c. 381.
Vgl. L c. 43 mit Socinus, Opp. I 278.
Vgl. Arnold, l. c. 80 ss. und 85 ss., sowie Fock l. c. 427 ss. Bei Hobbes vgl. die Erklärung der göttlichen Attribute als Attribute der Ehre, d. h. der Machtanerkennung in L c. 38; betr. die Ewigkeit Gottes vgl. u. a. L c. 46 (370).
Selbst Hobbes’ Behauptung, Christus sei in demselben Sinn »Person« Gottes wie Moses, ist durch die Socinianer vorbereitet; vgl. L c. 16 (85) mit Arnold l. c. 138 s. und 344.
Vgl. Fock l. c. 551 s. und L c. 41.
»Tantum id mihi videtur statui posse, post hanc vitam, animam, sive animum hominis non ita per se subsistere, ut praemia ulla poenasve sentiat, vel etiam ista sentiendi sit capax … statuo … animae nomine (sc. in S. Scriptura) vitam significari… Vivere … adhuc apud Deum is dici et potest, et debet, qui aliquando in vitam, eamque immortalem ab ipso Domino [omnino] revocabitur.« Socinus, Opp. I 454 b. Betr. Hobbes vgl. o. S. 286–290. Im einzelnen vgl. die Auslegung von Gen 2, 17 und Rom 5, 12 ss. bei Socinus I 537 und 541, sowie II 261 mit L c. 38 (241 s.); vgl. ferner die Auslegung der Erzählung vom Reichen und von Lazarus als blosser Parabel, sowie von Lukas 20, 36–38 bei Socinus, Opp. I 145 mit L c. 44 (342).
Vgl. L c. 38 in fine, 41 in princ. und 43 (327), sowie H XIV 6 mit Socinus, Praelectiones theologicae, c. 15–17.
s. o. S. 292 ff.
It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian Religion, From whence the Scriptures derive their Authority; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, How wee know them to be the Word of God, or, Why we beleeve them to be so: And the difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein the question it self is couched. For it is beleeved on all hands, that the first and originall Author of them is God; and consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our Knowledge of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our Beleefe; because some are moved to beleeve for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one generali answer for them all. The question truly stated is, By what Authority they are made Law. L c. 33 (208f.).
… the Scripture of the New Testament is there only Law, where the lawfull Civill Power hath made it so. L c. 42 (284). Dass dasselbe auch vom A. T. gilt, wird l. c. (280–283) gezeigt. Vgl. ferner L c. 33 (203 und 209).
So reduziert sich das Gebot, die Vernunft unter den Glauben gefangenzunehmen, auf das Gebot, so zu sprechen, »as (by lawfull Authority) we are commanded … though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the words spoken«. L c. 32 (200).
Man vergleiche zu der Stufenfolge knowledge — belief — law (s. S. 324 Anm. 168) die folgende Stelle: But whether men Know, or Beleeve, or Grant the Scriptures to be the Word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without obscurity, I shall shew what Articles of Faith are necessary, and onely necessary for Salvation, those men must needs Know, Beleeve, or Grant the same. L c. 43 (322). — Betr. den Sinn von »zugestehen« vgl. Ci XVIII 4.
… why wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs bee, that are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, Why we Beleeve it, but, How wee Know it; as if Beleeving and Knowing were all one. And thence while one side ground their Knowledge upon the Infallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the Testimony of the Private Spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall a man know the Infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the Infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own Private spirit to be other than a beleef, grounded upon the Authority, and Arguments of his Teachers; or upon a Presumption of his own Gifts? Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred the Infallibility of the Church; much lesse, of any particular Church; and least of all, the Infallibility of any particular man. L c. 43 (321). Vgl. auch W IV 339 f.
s. o. S. 319 Anm. 154.
L c. 33; vgl. auch L c. 42 (282f.) und Ci XVI 12.
L c. 33 (208).
… such texts (sc. of the New Testament), wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture … L c. 34 (217).
L c. 33 (207).
L c. 33 (207) und 42 (282).
Eine Andeutung in dieser Richtung ist die gelegentliche Bemerkung, dass dieselbe durch den Erfolg als berechtigt erwiesene Warnung laut dem Bericht der Chronik von dem Götzendiener Pharao Necho, hingegen laut dem 1. Buch Esra von Jeremia auf Grund göttlichen Ausspruchs gegeben worden ist; s. L c. 36 (227). * [Strauss notiert am Rand zu dieser Stelle, ohne daraus ausdrücklich eine Fußnote zu machen:] Und umgekehrt: unter Voraussetzung der Verbalinspiration kann man mit jeder kritischen Schwierigkeit fertig werden: ausgewähltes Volk Gottes, unergründliche Geheimnisse, die zur rechten Zeit, Stunde offenbart werden werden — Kritik kann nur Wahrscheinlichkeiten aufzeigen: Moses konnte doch mit Prophetie sein Grab kennen; cf. L 204 Abs. 1.
s. S. 324 Anm. 168 und S. 325 Anm. 172. Vgl. auch L c. 26 (152), 32 (200) und 33 (203).
Betr. diese Kriterien vgl. L c. 32 (200ff.), sowie die etwas abweichenden Angaben in c. 36 (234).
He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that they (sc. the Scriptures) are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not obliged to obey them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands have already the force of Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority, then that of the Common-wealth, residing in the Soveraign, who only has the Legislative Power. L c. 33 (209).
L c. 40 (254f.) und 42 (281). Vgl. o. S. 294f.
L c. 34 vers, fin., c. 43 (322) und 46 (369).
It is manifest therefore, that Christian men doe not know, but onely beleeve the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that the means of making them beleeve which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of Nature, that is to say, from their Teachers … For what other cause can there bee assigned, why in Christian Common-wealths all men either beleeve, or at least professe the Scripture to bee the Word of God, and in other Commonwealths scarce any; but that in Christian Common-wealths they are taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught otherwise? L c. 43 (321 f.). — By the Writings of the Fathers … we may find, that the Books wee now have of the New Testament, were held by the Christians of that time … for the dictates of the Holy Ghost… such was the reverence and opinion they had of their Teachers; as generally the reverence that the Disciples bear to their first Masters, in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not small. L c. 42 (283). — Vgl. auch. S. 324 Anm. 168 und S. 330 Anm. 191, sowie L c. 7 vers. fin.
Faith hath no relation to, nor dependence at all upon Compulsion, or Commandement; but onely upon certainty, or probability of Arguments drawn from Reason, or from something men beleeve already. L c. 42 (269). Cf. auch L c. 32 (199f.).
s. o. S. 300 f.
s. o. S. 290 ff.
… upon a Christian, that should become an Apostate, in a place where the Civill Power did persecute, or not assist the Church, the effect of Excommunication had nothing in it, neither of dammage in this world, nor of terrour: Not of terrour, because of their unbeleef; nor of dammage, because they returned thereby into the favour of the world; and in the world to come, were to be in no worse estate, then they which never had beleeved. L c. 42 (275). — … nor is there here (sc. in der Geschichte des Sündenfalls) any punishment but only a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original mortality, where death was no punishment but a gift of God. In which mortality he lived near a thousand years, and had a numerous issue, and lived without misery, and I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the immortality which then he lost. W V 102 f. — Vgl. auch die Bemerkung des Bischofs Bramhall: »It is to be presumed, that in those their second lives, knowing certainly from T. H. that there is no hope of redemption for them from corporal death upon their well-doing, nor fear of any torments after death for their ill-doing, they (sc. the reprobate) will pass their times here as pleasantly as they can. This is all the damnation which T. H. fancieth. W IV 359.
Vgl. u.a. die Leugnung der Möglichkeit einer visio beatifica in L c. 6 vers. fin. und W IV 347.
… there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; … but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; … L c. 15 (76).
Ci XVI 1. — Mit diesem Passus leitet Hobbes die Erörterung der offenbarten Religion ein.
S. 275 ff.
vgl. o. S. 300.
… God accepteth not the Will for the Deed, but onely in the Faithfull… L c. 43 (327).
… the Will, which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it selfe, as well in good, as in evill men. l. c. (327). — God … accepteth in all our actions the Will for the Deed … l. c. (320).
Vgl. z.B. L c. 15 (82): The Lawes (sc. of nature), because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.
s. o. S. 324 Anm. 171.
s. o. S. 284 Anm. 53.
… the Jews …, without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the sect of the Sadduces,) that those apparitions (sc. Angels and Daemons) … were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God … L c. 34 (215).
… the Sadduces … erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme) … L c. 8 (39).
And where St. Paul saies, We shall rise spirituall Bodies, he acknowledgeth the nature of Spirits, but that they are Bodily Spirits; which is not difficult to understand. For Air and many other things are Bodies, though not Flesh and Bone, or any other grosse body, to bee discerned by the eye. L c. 45 (350 f.) — … men, that are otherwise imployed, then to search into their causes (sc. of those Idols of the brain), know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, (the) some to call them Bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a power supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to call them Spirits, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the place where they appear, to resist their fingers … L c. 34 (211).
vgl. hierzu Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas, 126 f. und 194 ff.
s. S. 324 Anm. 171.
s. L c. 36.
L c. 36 (231).
… generally the Prophets extraordinary in the Old Testament took notice of the Word of God no otherwise, than from their Dreams, or Visions; that is to say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an Exstasie: which imaginations in every true Prophet were supernaturall; but in false Prophets were either naturall, or feigned. L c. 36 (230). — All which ways (sc. whereby God declared his Will in the Old Testament) he used also in the New Testament. l. c. (232).
Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream,… or some especiall gift of God, so rarely observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed; And seeing as well such gifts, as the most extraordinary Dreams, and Visions, may proceed from God, not onely by his supernaturall, and immediate, but also by his naturall operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of Reason and Judgment to discern between naturall, and supernaturall Gifts, and between naturall, and supernaturall Visions, or Dreams. And consequently men had need to be very circumspect, and wary, in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a Prophet, requires us to obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to be the way to happinesse. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and consequently, ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience; unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in the institution of a Common-wealth, as when the Prophet is the Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized. … seeing there is … so much Preaching in the New Testament against Prophets; and so much greater a number ordinarily of false Prophets, then of true; every one is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own perill…. Every man … is bound to make use of his Naturall Reason, to apply to all Prophecy those Rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from the false. … Every man therefore ought to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet; that is to say, who it is, that is Gods Vicegerent on Earth; and hath next under God, the Authority of Governing Christian men; and to observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which, in the name of God, hee hath, commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those Doctrines, which pretended Prophets with miracle, or without, shall at any time advance … L c. 36 (233 f.). — Vgl. hierzu auch Hobbes merkwürdige Verteidigung: I never said that princes can make doctrines or prophesies true or false; but I say every sovereign prince has a right to prohibit the public teaching of them, whether false or true. W IV 329.
Denn nur das Bekenntnis des Glaubens, nicht der Glaube selbst kann dem Urteil der Obrigkeit unterworfen werden; vgl. L c. 37 in fine.
… the dreams and prognostications of madmen (for such I take to be all those that foretell future contingencies) … ß 188. — … if men were at liberty, to take for Gods Commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods Commandement… L c. 26 (153). Vgl. ferner L c. 36 in fine, W IV 327f. und B 21 f. (the Pope did concerning the Scriptures the same that Moses did concerning Mount Sinai …).
… a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a Prophet. Can it (may some say) be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man?… Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God makes them understand his will… L c. 36 (228 [f.]). — To say God spake or appeared as he is in his own nature, is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility, Incomprehensibility. l. c. (231).
l. c. (231).
L c. 34 in fine.
… the voice of God in a Dream, or Vision supernaturall … is not Inspiration … L c. 34 (218).
When the nature of the thing is incomprehensible, I can aquiesce in the Scripture: but when the signification of words is incomprehensible, I cannot acquiesce in the authority of a Schoolman. W IV 314.
s. Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas, 204 ff.
s. S. 281 Anm. 37 und S. 348 Anm. 243.
For how admirable soever any work be, the Admiration consisteth not in that it could be done, because men naturally beleeve the Almighty can doe all things, but because he does it at the Prayer, or Word of a man. L c. 37 (236).
There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of working wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles, wrought by God himself,) to certain Arts of Magick, and Incantation…. Enchantment (is) not, as many think it, a working of strange effects by spells, and words; but Imposture, and delusion, wrought by ordinary means … For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the intentions, or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce, hope, fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. L c. 37 (238).
… the works of the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great miracles. L c. 32 (201). Vgl. auch L c. 37 (238).
… the thing they pretend to be a Miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not onely so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his naturall power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtful cases, wee have submitted our private judgments. L c. 37 (239). — A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free), to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles … But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique … l. c. (240).
… the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef, not universally in all men, elect, and reprobate; but in the elect only; … So also of our Saviour, it is written, (Mat. 13.58.) that he wrought not many Miracles in his own countrey, because of their unbeleef; and (in Marke 6.5.) in stead of, he wrought not many, it is, he could work none. L c. 37 (237).
To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand what works they are, which men wonder at, and call Admirable. And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been produced: The other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by naturall means, but onely by the immediate hands of God. But when wee see some possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle. Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it were a Miracle; because both the thing is strange, and the naturall cause difficult to imagin: So also were it, to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other Animal, engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the other, yet because ’tis usuall, it is no Miracle. In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a Miracle; because strange: but if a peece of wood be so changed; because we see it often, it is no Miracle: and yet we know no more, by what operation of God, the one is brought to passe, than the other. L c. 37 (235).
L c. 12 (55).
s. S. 337 Anm. 211.
… though prayer be none of the causes that move God’s will, his will being unchangeable, yet since we find in God’s word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask them, the motive to prayer is the same … the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. W V 200. — God is not moved by any thing that we do, but has always one and the same eternal purpose, to do the same things that from eternity he hath foreknown shall be done … no man nor creature living can work any effect upon God … W V 220f. — Vgl. hierzu S. 339 Anm. 218.
It is true, that God doth not all things that he can do if he will; but that he can will that which he hath not willed from all eternity, I deny; unless that he can not only will a change, but also change his will, which all divines say is immutable … W V 246. — Vgl. hierzu Thomas Aqu. S. th. I 16,7: … voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc considerandum est quod aliud est mutare voluntatem, et aliud est velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis eadem voluntate immobiliter permanente velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et postea fiat contrarium.
Impossible in themselves are contradictions only, as to be and not to be at the same time, which the divines say is not possible to God. All other things are possible at least in themselves. Raising from the dead, changing the course of nature, making of a new heaven, and a new earth, are things possible in themselves; for there is nothing in their nature able to resist the will of God. W V 176. — … there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall Apparitions … the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change … L c. 2(7f.).
s. S. 340 Anm. 223.
s. S. 339 Anm. 218 und S. 340 Anm. 223.
»The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because the first; and consequently strange … But at this day, because they are frequent, they are nor Miracles, neither to them that know their naturall causes, nor to them who know them not.« L c. 37 (236). — »Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another.« L c. 26 (152).
vgl. S. 338 Anm. 215.
s. z.B. S. 343 Anm. 231.
… For it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the Bread into Christs Body: For the Gentiles also held God to be Omnipotent; and might upon that ground no lesse excuse their Idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, a transubstantiation of their Wood, and Stone into God Almighty.« L c. 45 (358). — »Whatsoever (Aristotle) says is impossible in nature, they can prove well enough to be possible, from the Almighty power of God, who can make many bodies to be in one and the self-same place, and one body to be in many places at the same time, if the doctrine of transubstantiation require it, though Aristotle deny it.« (B 42 s.).
(Vgl. hierzu Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas 185 ff. Im Sinn des berechtigten Bedenkens, das G. Krüger in der Deutschen Literaturzeitung 1931, Sp. 2411 gegen die a.a.O. gegebene Darstellung erhoben hat, muss gesagt werden: die Aufhebung der Sonderstellung des Wunders, die Leugnung eines wesentlichen Unterschieds zwischen Wunder und Natur ist bei Calvin nur ein letztes, wenngleich notwendiges Ergebnis; nach Calvin ist die Idee der Natur als einer begreiflichen Ordnung, die Idee der Providentia universalis eine selbstverständliche, bereits durch die natürliche Vernunft verbürgte Voraussetzung für die dem Glauben eigentümliche Lehre von der Providentia specialis; aber indem Calvin jene Idee tatsächlich nur als selbstverständliche Voraussetzung behandelt, indem er, gegen die Scholastik polemisierend, — und zwar im Grunde weniger gegen den Inhalt der scholastischen Vorsehungslehre, als gegen die »fleischliche«, theoretische Gesinnung, die er in ihr zu erkennen glaubt — den Akzent eindeutig auf die Providentia specialis verschiebt, kommt er dazu, die (die Providentia specialis eindeutiger zeigende) inaequalis diversitas der natürlichen Vorgänge für wichtiger zu halten als den a Deo positus ordo und schliesslich von dem extremen Fall der Providentia specialis her, der das Wunder ist, auch das natürliche Geschehen zu verstehen und damit die Unterscheidbarkeit von Wunder und Natur zu leugnen. Nur und allerdings in diesem Resultat stimmt Hobbes mit Calvin überein.)
〈s. die vorige Anm.〉
Doctrinae naturalis exordium, optime … a privatione, id est, a ficta universi sublatione, capiemus. Supposita autem tali rerum annihilatione, quaeret fortasse aliquis, quid reliquum esset, de quo homo aliquis (quem ab hoc universo rerum interitu unicum excipimus) philosophari, vel omnino ratiocinari, vel cui rei nomen aliquod ratiocinandi causa imponere posset. Dico igitur, remansuras illi homini, mundi et corporum omnium, quae, ante sublationem eorum oculis aspexerat, vel aliis sensibus perceperat, ideas, … His itaque nomina imponeret, haec subtraheret et componeret. Co VII 1. — Vgl. auch S. 346 Anm. 238 und S. 360 Anm. 283.
… ob hanc rem, quod figuras nos ipsi creamus, contigit geometriam haberi et esse demonstrabilem. Contra, quia rerum naturalium causae in nostra potestate non sunt, sed in voluntate divina, et quia earum maxima pars, nempe aether, est invisibilis; proprietates earum a causis deducere, nos qui eas non videmus, non possumus. Veruntamen ab ipsis proprietatibus quas videmus, consequentias deducendo eo usque procedere concessum est, ut tales vel tales earum causas esse potuisse demonstrare possimus. H X 5. — … theoremata physicae, quia actiones naturales pleraeque sensum fugiunt … pauca possunt demonstrari. O IV 5.-Principia igitur, unde pendent quae sequuntur (sc. effectus naturae nobis per sensum cogniti), non facimus nos, nec pronunciamus universaliter, ut definitiones, sed a naturae conditore in ipsis rebus posita observamus … Neque necessitatem haec faciunt theorematis, sed tantum, non absque proprietatibus [propositionibus] universalibus supra demonstratis, generationis alicujus ostendunt possibilitatem. Co XXV 1. — Vgl. ferner E, p. 168, sowie W VII 183 f. — Eine Wissenschaft ist also nicht bloss dann demonstrativ, wenn die Ursachen, mit denen sie es zu tun hat, von uns geschaffen werden, sondern auch dann, wenn diese Ursachen uns präsent sind. Daher kann Hobbes gelegentlich der Analyse eines bestimmten natürlichen Phänomens sagen, seine causa sei »non modo possibilis, sed etiam certa et manifesta« (Co XXIX 2); man muss hier verstehen: certa, quia sensibus manifesta.
Hobbes’ ausdrückliche Begründung dieser These (s. o. S. 340 Anm. 222) lässt seine eigentliche Meinung nicht unmittelbar erkennen. Vgl. dazu den folgenden Absatz.
vgl. hierzu die klare Darlegung von F. Brandt, Thomas Hobbes’ mechanical conception of nature, Copenhagen/London 1928, bes. 342 und 370.
Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to the knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and not to another. And thence it is, that ignorant and superstitious men make great Wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from Nature (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God,) admire not at all … L c. 37 (236).
Physica … res novitia est… Co, d.
Paulatim eruditur vulgus, et verborum, quibus utitur, tandem aliquando vim intelligit … Cavendum ergo imprimis est doctoribus religionis ne regulis colendi Deum quicquam immisceant ex doctrina physicorum. Nam evitari vix potest, cum rerum naturalium nullam habeant scientiam, quin aliquando incidant in propositiones absurdas; quae postea, etiam ab indoctis detectae, faciant ut omnia quae docebunt contemnantur … H XIV 13. — … too rash beleef of reports; which the most sincere men, without great knowledge of naturall causes, (such as the Fathers were) are commonly the most subject to … L c. 46 (375). * [Ms.:] d) 〈Die Basis der Hobbes’schen Religionskritik.〉 (Hobbes und Descartes).
Kraus, J. R.
O V251.
Die Verwandtschaft der Hobbes’schen Grundlegung der Wissenschaft mit der Cartesischen ist vor allem von Tönnies klar erkannt worden (s. Hobbes3 XIV und 119). Wenn Tönnies aber sagt: »Hobbes geht, ebenso wie Descartes, von der Tatsache aus, dass für jeden Denkenden nur seine Empfindungen, d.h. nur subjektive oder psychologische Phänomene gegeben sind.« (l. c. 119), so verkennt er, dass jene »Tatsache« erst als Resultat des allgemeinen Zweifels die ihr eigentümliche Evidenz gewinnt: die Einsicht, von der Hobbes und Descartes ausgehen, ist nicht die Evidenz des Bewusstseins.
… si sensus nostros sine alia ratiocinatione sequamur, merito dubitamus an aliquid existat necne. (O V 251). Also: eine »alia ratiocinatio« sichert gegen die Konsequenzen aus der Trüglichkeit der Sinne usw. — Dass die Argumente für den allgemeinen Zweifel nicht »wahr«, sondern nur »wahrscheinlich« sind, hebt überdies Descartes selbst in seiner Responsio gegen Hobbes hervor. (l.c.).
Zum 1. Argument vgl. E I, II 10:… the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected. — Zum 2. Argument vgl. L c. 2 (6): … it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider…, I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.
Vgl. hierzu G. Krüger, Die Herkunft des philosophischen Selbstbewusstseins, Logos XXII, 243 ff.: »Das dritte Argument ist Descartes eigentümlich; es ist das entscheidende … Erst das dritte Argument genügt für den Zweck der Begründung eines wirklich universalen Zweifels …«
Die Differenz bezüglich des Wesens der Seele — Descartes’ Spiritualismus und Hobbes’ Materialismus — ist demgegenüber sekundär. Denn auch Descartes gibt zu, dass die Unkörperlichkeit des Bewusstseins als solches nicht die Möglichkeit ausschliesst, dass das Bewusstsein nur ein Akzidens des Körpers ist; die Unabhängigkeit der res cogitans von der res extensa folgt erst aus dem Prinzip, dass alles, was klar und deutlich als voneinander unabhängig vorgestellt wird, auch voneinander unabhängig ist; und dieses Prinzip fusst auf der Einsicht der rationalen Theologie, dass Gott absolut wahrhaftig ist. Auf Hobbes’ Einwand: »Potest … esse ut res cogitans sit subjectum mentis, rationis, vel intellectus, ideoque corporeum aliquid: cujus contrarium sumitur, non probatur.« (O V 253) erwidert Descartes in diesem Sinn: »Imo, contrarium non assumpsi…, sed plane indeterminatum reliqui usque ad sextam Meditationem, in qua probatur.« (l. c. 255).
… nullam Dei habemus imaginem sive ideam: ideoque prohibemur Deum sub imagine adorare, ne ilium, qui inconceptibilis est, videamur nobis concipere. O V 259f. — Quoniam ergo non est demonstratum nos ideam Dei habere, et Christiana religio nos obligat credere Deum esse incomprehensibilem [inconceptibilem], hoc est, ut opinor, cujus idea non habetur: sequitur existentiam Dei non esse demonstratam, multo minus creationem. l. c. 268.
S. die vorige Anm., sowie l. c. 259 f. und 266, vgl. Co XXVI 1 und H I 1.
Communis est opinio, non peccare medicos qui aegrotos decipiunt ipsorum salutis causa: neque patres qui filios suos fallunt boni ipsorum gratia: neque crimen deceptionis consistere in falsitate dictorum, sed in injuria decipientium. Viderit ergo D. C. an vera sit propositio universaliter sumpta, Deus nullo casu potest nos fallere; nam si non sit vera ita universaliter, non sequitur conclusio illa, ergo res corporeae existunt. O V 273.
vgl. E. Gilson, La liberté chez Descartes, Paris 1913, bes. 92 und 102 ff.
But what shall we answer to the words in Ecclesiasticus: ›Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; say not thou, he hath caused me to err.‹ If it had not been, ›say not thou‹, but ›think not thou‹, I should have answered that Ecclesiasticus is Apocrypha, and merely human authority. But it is very true that such words as these are not to be said … Yet true it is, that he did so make him. W V 14 f. Vgl. auch W V 6 f. die Berufung auf u. a. Hiob 12, 17.
vgl. z. B. L c. 34 (210) und O V 258.
Co VII 2–3.
Co VIII 1 und 4.
Co VIII 2 und 4.
Tönnies, Hobbes3 297.
Co VIII 24 und 23.
Co VII 1. Vgl. auch die Kenn[zeichnung] der empirischen Naturwissenschaft in Co XXIV in fine und XXV 1.
In unserem Zusammenhang kann dahingestellt bleiben, ob Hobbes’ Grundlegung der Naturwissenschaft von uns nicht wesentlich »phänomenalistischer« dargestellt worden ist als sie in Wirklichkeit ist. Denn dass Hobbes’ Philosophie im ganzen nicht phänomenalistisch ist, wird sich ohnedies aus dem Weiteren ergeben. Immerhin sei daran erinnert, dass die oben angedeutete Auslegung sowohl der Hobbes’schen Lehre vom Akzidens als auch seiner Bemerkung über die materia prima (dass sie ein merum nomen sei) keineswegs gesichert ist. Vgl. hierzu John Laird, Hobbes, London, 1934, bes. 94 ff.
Co XXIV in fine und XXV 1.
Dico igitur, remansuras illi homini, mundi et corporum omnium, quae, ante sublationem eorum, oculis aspexerat, vel aliis sensibus perceperat, ideas, id est memoriam imaginationemque magnitudinum motuum, sonorum, colorum etc. atque etiam eorum ordinis et partium; quae omnia etsi ideae tantum et phantasmata sint, ipsi imaginanti interne accidentia, nihilominus tanquam externa, et a virtute animi minime dependentia, apparitura esse. His itaque nomina imponeret, haec subtraheret et componeret. Cum enim caeteris rebus destructis manere tamen hominem illum, nimirum cogitare, imaginari, et meminisse supposuerimus, aliud quod cogitet praeterquam quae praeterita sunt, nihil est; … Co VII 1.
Co XXV 1.
s. S. 346 Anm. 238.
Hobbes’ Skepsis und Gewissheit zeigen sich beide gleichermassen deutlich in folgendem Dialog: »A. … certainly when the sun seems to my eye no bigger than a dish, there is behind it somewhere somewhat else, I suppose a real sun, which creates those fancies, by working, one way or other, upon my eyes, and other organs of my senses, to cause that diversity of fancy. — B. You say right; and that is it I mean by the word body, which briefly I define to be any thing that hath a being in itself, without the help of sense … Your desire, you say, is to know the causes of the effects or phenomena of nature; and you confess they are fancies, and, consequently, that they are in yourself; so that the causes you seek for only are without you, and now you would know how those external bodies work upon you to produce those phenomena.« W VII 80 ff. — Wie selbstverständlich die Existenz von »Dingen an sich« für Hobbes ist, zeigt auch und gerade sein Ansatz: er beginnt nicht mit dem Zweifel an der Existenz der Welt, sondern mit der Fiktion ihres Nichtseins.
vgl. S. 356 Anm. 268 und S. 353 Anm. 256. — Zu demselben Ergebnis kommt Brandt (l. c. 356ff.), der behauptet, dass der »Materialismus« des Hobbes nicht »methodisch«, sondern »metaphysisch« gemeint sei. Brandt unterschätzt allerdings erheblich die Gegeninstanzen gegen diese Behauptung, wenn er meint, die »phänomenalistische« Interpretation der Hobbes’schen Philosophie stütze sich ausschliesslich auf einen dunklen Satz in Co XXV 1: diese Interpretation stützt sich auf den ganzen 2. und 3. Teil von Co. Brandt verkennt, dass der »Materialismus« zwar nicht für Hobbes’ Bewusstsein, wohl aber von den Voraussetzungen von Co aus grundsätzlich problematisch ist oder jedenfalls wird. — Den Vorurteils-Charakter des H. schen Materialismus hat klar erkannt Basil Willey, The seventeenth century background, London 1934, n. 98 f.
But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is called Body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of Feeling, to resist their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to hinder them from a farther prospect. L c. 34 (211). — … though that name (sc. bodies) in common Speech be given to such Bodies only, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some degree of Opacity … L c. 46 (368). — Dass die vulgäre Auffassung die ursprünglichere ist, ergibt sich aus folgender Äusserung: Ego per corpus intelligo nunc id de quo vere dici potest, quod existit realiter in seipso, habetque etiam aliquam magnitudinem … Memini tamen quod corpus putarem aliquando id solum esse, quod tactui meo vel visui obstaret. O III 537.
For the Universe, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe. L c. 34 (210). Vgl. weiter die vorige Anm. und S. 333 Anm. 202.
By the name of spirit we understand a body natural, but of such subtilty that it worketh not on the senses. E I, XI 4.
S. S. 333 Anm. 202.
And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved actions. L c. 1 (3 f.). — And although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible …; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. L c. 6 (23).
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling … L c. 1 (3).
Dieses Vorurteil liegt auch der politischen Wissenschaft zugrunde. Denn diese Wissenschaft setzt voraus, dass nur die sinnlichen Güter wirkliche Güter sind: die »geistigen« Güter sind bloss für die Eitelkeit Güter (Ci I 2). Das ursprüngliche Gut, bzw. die Möglichkeitsbedingung aller sinnlichen Güter ist die Erhaltung unseres Körpers; das Recht auf die Erhaltung unseres Körpers ist der Ursprung aller Rechte und Pflichten. (Ci I 7).
Wenn Sein ursprünglich Widerständigkeit ist, so muss Sein radikal von dem ursprünglichsten Widerstand her verstanden werden. Der ursprünglichste Widerstand aber ist der mein Leben bedrohende Widerstand seitens der anderen Menschen. Daher ist die Furcht vor gewaltsamem Tod nicht allein das Prinzip von Recht und Staat, sondern zugleich das Prinzip alles vernünftigen Verhaltens, aller Aufklärung, alles Erwachens zum Verstehen von Seiendem. Denn die Erziehung des Menschen zum Bürger vollzieht sich durch »adversity or age« (s. Tönnies, Hobbes-Analekten I, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie XVII 294ff.), nocumentis vel praeceptis (Ci I 2), disciplina atque damnorum experientia (Ci, p.); und nicht nur die moralische Aufklärung vollzieht sich so, sondern alle Aufklärung: men have no other means to acknowledge their owne Darknesse, but onely by reasoning from the un-foreseen mischances, that befall them in their ways (L c. 44, 331). Das grösste nocumentum, damnum, infortunium aber, das es gibt, ist der gewaltsame Tod, bzw. die Gefahr des gewaltsamen Todes.
Daher braucht Hobbes keinen Beweis für die »Realität der Aussenwelt« zu führen. Das (bezeichnenderweise unbenutzt gebliebene) Material für einen solchen Beweis findet sich in Co XXV 1 in fine (die Veränderungen unserer Vorstellungen bezeugen die Existenz von äusseren Ursachen dieser Veränderungen).
… adeo ut si phaenomena principia sint cognoscendi caetera, sensionem cognoscendi ipsa principia principium esse, scientiamque omnem ab ea derivari dicendum est… Co XXV 1. — Vgl. auch O V 257f.
»Wenn nun diese (sc. die Mathematik) mit der Vernunft, die bloß empirische Grundsätze zuläßt, in Widerstreit gerät, … so ist die größte mögliche Evidenz der Demonstration mit den vorgeblichen Schlüssen aus Erfahrungsprinzipien in offenbarem Widerspruch, und nun muß man, wie der Blinde des Cheselden, fragen: was betrügt mich, das Gesicht oder Gefühl? (Denn der Empirismus gründet sich auf einer gefühlten, der Rationalismus aber auf einer eingesehenen Notwendigkeit.)« Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Vorrede (gegen Ende). — Vgl. hierzu und zu unseren Ausführungen im Text G. Krüger, Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Kritik, 1931, § 24 (»Die Seinsidee des englischen ›Empirismus› bei Kant«).
S. S. 353 f. und 357 Anm. 270.
Vgl. auch Laird, Hobbes, 132: »the experiment of feigning annihilation, when compared, say, with Descartes’ philosophical doubt, was curiously hesitating, since it presupposed that the memory of real bodies ›before their annihilation‹ was retained.«
For the understanding of what I mean by the power cognitive, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the image thereof … E I, I 8. — Vgl. ferner S. 346 Anm. 237 und 355/Anm. 265.
Vgl. o. S. 352 Anm. 250 und ausserdem folgende Äusserung Descartes’ in seiner Responsio auf Hobbes’ Objectiones: Fateor autem ultro me ad rem sive substantiam, quam volebam exuere omnibus iis quae ad ipsam non pertinent, significandam, usum fuisse verbis quam maxime potui abstractis: ut contra, hic philosophus utitur vocibus quam maxime concretis, nempe subjecti, materiae, et corporis, ad istam rem cogitantem significandam, ne patiatur ipsam a corpore divelli. O V 254.
E I, XI 2 und O V 260. L c. 11 (53). — Dass Hobbes bereits in der Zeit, aus der diese beiden Äusserungen stammen, die Körperlichkeit Gottes (wenn auch nicht öffentlich) gelehrt hat, geht aus Descartes’ Brief an Mersenne für Hobbes vom 21. Januar 1641 hervor: Omitto initium (sc. eines nunmehr verlorenen Hobbes’schen Briefes) de anima et Deo corporeis …
E I, XI 2; L c. 12 (55); H XII 5.
O V 260 — Dass der »Phänomenalismus« später auftritt als der »Materialismus«, hebt Tönnies in seinen Anmerkungen über die Philosophie des Hobbes (Vierteljahrsschr. für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, III, 72 f.) hervor. Betr. den (wahrscheinlichen) Einfluss Descartes’ auf die Entst[ehung] des Hobbes’schen »Phänomenalismus« vgl. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. II 372. * [Am Rand mit Bleistift als Einfügung notiert:] nicht (?)
vgl. hierzu Krüger, Die Herkunft des philosophischen Selbstbewusstseins, l. c. 246–250.
Meditationes, ed. pr. p. 15.
naturall causes and manners of men. Cf. L 371. Cf. Wegfallen der Biologic
Co
manners of men — ferner die Selbständigkeit der politischen Wissenschaft.
Kraus
Notizen
s. o. S. 318f.
L c. 31 (190f.)
Cur autem, si Deus in causa (sc. peccati) est, condemnamur nos? Responde mihi, qui sic rogas, cur Deus ab aeterno alios elegit, alios reprobavit, et quomodo ad poenas aeternas maximasque condemnavit eos, qui malum non-dum aut fecerant aut cogitaverant, nec nisi Deo volente et vim praebente, facere aut cogitare potuerunt? Responde etiam, an figulo de vase, quod finxit, non sit licitum statuere quicquid vult? Indica denique, ubi Scripturae aperte dicant, omnes illos, qui a regno Dei excludentur, victuros esse sine morte secunda cruciandos in aeternum. O III 501.
Vgl. das Urteil Leibnizens in seinen Réflexions sur le livre de Hobbes … § 8: »… il paraît en effet que suivant le sentiment de cet auteur, Dieu n’a point de bonté …« Vgl. auch § 12: »… cette opinion (sc. de Hobbes) qui dépouille Dieu de toute bonté et de toute justice véritable, qui le représente comme un tyran, usant d’un pouvoir absolu, indépendant de tout droit et de toute équité …«
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Strauss, L. (2001). Die Religionskritik des Hobbes Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der Aufklärung. In: Meier, H., Meier, W. (eds) Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft und zugehörige Schriften — Briefe. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-03542-4_6
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