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Kooperation: Erklärungsperspektive der Industrieökonomik

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Kooperationen, Allianzen und Netzwerke

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Zusammenfassung

Die Industrieökonomik, im englischen Sprachraum als „Industrial Organization“ (IO) bezeichnet, ist ein zentrales Forschungsgebiet der modernen Volkswirtschaftslehre. Sie ist eine Teildisziplin der Mikroökonomik und befasst sich mit den Entscheidungen und Verhaltensweisen von Unternehmen, der Organisation und Struktur von Industrien sowie der Funktionsweise von spezifischen Märkten. Im Zentrum des Interesses stehen speziell Verhaltensweisen und Märkte, die mit dem Modell der vollkommenen Konkurrenz nur unzureichend beschrieben werden können. Solche Märkte sind insbesondere gekennzeichnet durch eine geringe Anzahl von Anbietern, heterogene Produkte mit differenzierten Preisen, komplizierte vertikale Strukturen auf der Angebotsseite (mehrstufige Produktion und Distribution) sowie hohe Aufwendungen fir Werbung und Forschung und Entwicklung (F and E). Um die Funktionsweise solcher Märkte zu verstehen, analysiert die theoretische Industrieökonomik das strategische Verhalten von Unternehmen mit Hilfe von verschiedenen Modellen der oligopolistischen Konkurrenz Das dominierende Analyseinstrument ist dabei die Spieltheorie, zu deren Entwicklung die Industrieökonomik im Gegenzug wichtige Beiträge geleistet hat.

Die Autoren danken Roman Bär und Dennis Gärtner für wertvolle Hinweise und Anregungen.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sozialökonomischen Institut, Universität Zürich, Schweiz

    Dr. Stefan Bühler (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am FEW-HSG und Oberassistent)

  2. Universität St. Gallen, Schweiz

    Univ.-Professor Dr. Franz Jaeger (Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftspolitik und Direktor des Forschungsinstituts für Empirische Ökonomie und Wirtschaftspolitik (FEW-HSG)

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  1. Dr. Stefan Bühler
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken, Deutschland

    Joachim Zentes (Direktor des Instituts für Handel und Internationales Marketing) & Dirk Morschett (Wissenschaftlicher Assistent und Habilitand am Institut für Handel und Internationales Marketing) (Direktor des Instituts für Handel und Internationales Marketing) &  (Wissenschaftlicher Assistent und Habilitand am Institut für Handel und Internationales Marketing)

  2. Universität Trier, Trier, Deutschland

    Bernhard Swoboda (Inhaber der Professur für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Marketing und Handel) (Inhaber der Professur für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Marketing und Handel)

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Bühler, S., Jaeger, F. (2003). Kooperation: Erklärungsperspektive der Industrieökonomik. In: Zentes, J., Swoboda, B., Morschett, D. (eds) Kooperationen, Allianzen und Netzwerke. Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-99865-1_4

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