Zusammenfassung
Führte die Französin Edith Cresson, Mitglied der Kommission der Europäischen Union (EU), französische Einstellungspraktiken in die EU ein, als sie einen alten Freund als ihren Berater fir ein Projekt der Kommission einstellte, oder benahm sie sich lediglich so, wie sich jeder Verwaltungsbeamte bei der gegebenen Struktur der EU verhalten hätte? Hat der stellvertretende griechische Finanzminister Nikos Athanassopoulos nur die korrupten Praktiken aus seinem Land in die internationale Organisation eingebracht, als er an dem illegalen Verkauf von jugoslawischem Getreide als griechisches Getreide (Sherlock und Harding 1991: 21) beteiligt war (und fir schuldig erklärt wurde), oder reagierte er kreativ auf neue Möglichkeiten? Dieser Aufsatz untersucht, ob Bürger und Regierungen die seit langem bestehenden nationalen Muster der Korruption weiterhin verwenden, wenn sie an einer supranationalen Regierungsform wie der Europäischen Union beteiligt werden oder ob der Ursprung der Korruption in der EU in der Natur einer internationalen Organisation selbst begründet ist. Ist Korruption eine negative äußere Erscheinungsform, die jeder Organisation innewohnt, oder das Ergebnis des Eindringens nationaler Muster in die internationale Arena?
Aus dem Amerikanischen von Antje Schultheis und Annika Ufer. Die Autorin möchte dem Programm für Deutschland und Europa-Studien des Zentrums für Europäische Studien der Universität Harvard (Program for the Study of Germany and Europe at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University) Mr die Ausstattung mit den nötigen finanziellen Mitteln für eine Forschungsreise nach Brüssel und den Mitgliedern des UCLAF (Unité coordinatif de la lutte anti-fraud) sowohl für die Zeit, die sie sich genommen haben, als auch für ihre Kommentare danken. Dank auch für die Bemerkungen von Jens Borchert, Timothy Frey und Manfred Wenner zu früheren Versionen dieses Manuskripts.
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Warner, C.M. (2000). Institutionen der Korruption oder Korruption der Institutionen? Betrug in der Europäischen Union. In: Borchert, J., Leitner, S., Stolz, K. (eds) Politische Korruption. Jahrbuch für Europa- und Nordamerika-Studien, vol 3. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-99573-5_10
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