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The Role of Law and Trust in the Governance of Financial Institutions

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Relations of Complex Organizational Systems
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Abstract

It is becoming more widely recognised that relationships between firms may be usefully (sometimes only) viewed in non-market terms. Whereas it is more common to view relationships within a firm in terms of non-market relationships. This chapter focuses in particular on non-market forms of inter-firm relationships in the context of corporate governance.

The author would like to thank David Jacobson of Dublin City University and William Kingston of Trinity College Dublin for helpful comments and valuable discussion on earlier drafts of this chapter.

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© 1999 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Stewart, J. (1999). The Role of Law and Trust in the Governance of Financial Institutions. In: Urban, S. (eds) Relations of Complex Organizational Systems. Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-96437-3_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-96437-3_13

  • Publisher Name: Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-409-11487-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-96437-3

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