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Personalmanagement 2001 pp 27–50Cite as

Beförderungs- und Austrittsregeln in Partnerschaften: Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Betriebswirtschaftlichen Abteilung II (Personal- und Organisationsökonomie), Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Deutschland

    Dr. Gunter Steiner (ehemaliger Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter)

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  1. Dr. Gunter Steiner
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Horst Albach

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Steiner, G. (2001). Beförderungs- und Austrittsregeln in Partnerschaften: Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde. In: Albach, H. (eds) Personalmanagement 2001. ZfB-Ergänzungshefte, vol 1. Gabler Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86553-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86553-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Gabler Verlag

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-409-11801-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-86553-3

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