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Interne Arbeitsmärkte und betriebliche Entgeltstrukturen — eine empirische Untersuchung

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Horst Albach

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Grund, C., Kräkel, M. (2001). Interne Arbeitsmärkte und betriebliche Entgeltstrukturen — eine empirische Untersuchung. In: Albach, H. (eds) Personalmanagement 2001. ZfB-Ergänzungshefte, vol 1. Gabler Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86553-3_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86553-3_1

  • Publisher Name: Gabler Verlag

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-409-11801-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-86553-3

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