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The Relationships of a Design and Build Contractor with other Participants

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Part of the book series: Baubetriebswirtschaftslehre und Infrastrukturmanagement ((BAUBWL))

Abstract

The overriding purpose for a client to undertake a construction project or a number of projects is to improve the effectiveness of his operations and hence service and profits, as was explained previously in section 2.1.5. The objective of both contractor and client can be expressed in terms concerned with the efficiency of the firm such as increasing profitability, improving service, maintaining existing clients and attracting new business. While professional practice/consultants may claim that they are less entrepreneurial than contracting organisations, conflicts, nevertheless, between the needs of individual firms and the needs of the project will arise398.

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© 2003 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

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Winter, C. (2003). The Relationships of a Design and Build Contractor with other Participants. In: Contractor-Led Procurement. Baubetriebswirtschaftslehre und Infrastrukturmanagement. Deutscher Universitätsverlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81614-6_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81614-6_5

  • Publisher Name: Deutscher Universitätsverlag

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-8244-7947-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-81614-6

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