Voting on Harmonization

Abstract

In the previous sections, we have identified several potential market failures associated with network effects, and, moreover, we have asked whether and how “policy” or some “authorized body” should intervene. Considering the authorized body as an entity that strives to achieve some well-defined goal, we however ignored the decision process within such a body. For example, in section 4, we assumed that Europe’s official standardization bodies (ESBs) set standards in order to produce a shift from variety to harmonization. Although we argued that bureaucratic incentives common to the ESBs’ decision makers might bias that body’s objective function, we abstracted from possible conflicts among the decision makers within the ESBs. In fact, conflicts are likely to be present within such bodies. Recall that, e.g., CEN/CENELEC’s members are the “official” national standardization bodieslike CEN/CENLEC and ISO/IEC²⁰⁹, apply voting. However, is voting an appropriate mechanism for collective decision-making in such bodies?²¹⁰

“Given the fact that committees often decide on issues of standardization, even though a market based development might be preferable, the rules of decision making could have a much larger impact on welfare of society than acknowledged in the literature nowadays” (Goerke and Holler 1995, p. 349).