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Fairnessnormen und Anreize in Teams

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Organisatorische Veränderung und Corporate Governance

Part of the book series: Entscheidungs- und Organisationstheorie ((EOT))

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Zusammenfassung

Teams erfreuen sich in Unternehmungen wachsender Beliebtheit (vgl. z.B. DeMatteo et al. 1998, Dulebohn und Martocchio 1998, Lawler et al. 1995, Capelli und Rogovsky 1994). Die Gründe für diese Entwicklung sind vielfältig. Johnson fand in einer Befragung von 35 amerikanischen Unternehmungen heraus, dass als Hauptgründe für die Einführung von Arbeitsgruppen die Hoffnung auf erhöhte Produktqualität, Steigerung der Kundenzufriedenheit, höhere Produktivität und Zunahme des ‘team spirit’ in den Unternehmungen genannt werden (Johnson 1993). Gleichzeitig und als Folge davon nimmt der Einsatz auf Gruppenleistungen basierender Lohnsysteme auf Kosten individueller Leistungslöhne zu (vgl. Peck 1993). Dies kommt daher, dass die Bestimmung der individuellen Leistungsinputs mit steigender Interdependenz der Aufgaben zunehmend auf Schwierigkeiten stösst (vgl. z.B. Nickel und O’Neal 1990, Patten 1977). Gruppenentlohnung wird zudem die Eigenschaft zugeschrieben, Kooperation und die Entwicklung von ‘team spirit’ zu fördern (DeMatteo 1998).

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Authors
  1. Margit Osterloh
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  2. Sandra Rota
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Egbert Kahle

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© 2002 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden

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Osterloh, M., Rota, S. (2002). Fairnessnormen und Anreize in Teams. In: Kahle, E. (eds) Organisatorische Veränderung und Corporate Governance. Entscheidungs- und Organisationstheorie. Deutscher Universitätsverlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81058-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81058-8_4

  • Publisher Name: Deutscher Universitätsverlag

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-8244-0635-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-81058-8

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