Skip to main content

De-Synchronisation Attack Modelling in Real-Time Protocols Using Queue Networks: Attacking the ISO/IEC 61850 Substation Automation Protocol

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10707))

  • 1151 Accesses

Abstract

Applications developed for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) protocols in several domains, particularly the energy sector, must satisfy hard real-time constraints to ensure the safety of the systems they are deployed on. These systems are highly sensitive to Quality of Service (QoS) violations, but it is not always clear whether a compliant implementation will satisfy the stated QoS of the standard. This paper proposes a framework for studying a protocol’s QoS properties based on a queuing network approach that offers a number of advantages over state machine or model-checking approaches.

The authors describe the framework as an instance of a network of M/M/1/K of queues with the block-after-service discipline, to allow for the analysis of probabilistic packet flows in valid protocol runs. This framework allows for the study of denial of service (DoS), performance degradation, and de-synchronisation attacks. The model is validated by a tool allowing automation of queue network analysis, and is used to demonstrate a possible breach of the QoS guarantees of the ISO/IEC 61850-7-2 substation automation standard with a de-synchronisation attack.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Ansilla, J.D., Vasudevan, N., JayachandraBensam, J., Anunciya, J.D.: Data security in smart grid with hardware implementation against DoS attacks. In: International Conference on Circuit Power and Computing Technologies, ICCPCT 2015, pp. 1–7 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Cherepanov, A.: WIN32/INDUSTROYER: A New Threat for Industrial Control Systems. Technical report, ESET, 12 June 2017

    Google Scholar 

  3. Dolev, D., Yao, A.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 29(2), 198–208 (1983)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Gaderer, G., Treytl, A., Sauter, T.: Security aspects for IEEE 1588 based clock synchronization protocols. In: IEEE International Workshop on Factory Communication Systems, WFCS 2006, Torino, Italy, pp. 247–250. Citeseer (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Gross, D., Shortle, J.F., Thompson, J.M., Harris, C.M.: Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th edn. Wiley-Interscience, New York (2008)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  6. Hurst, W., Shone, N., Monnet, Q.: Predicting the effects of DDoS attacks on a network of critical infrastructures. In: IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, 2015, pp. 1697–1702, October 2015

    Google Scholar 

  7. Itkin, E., Wool, A.: A security analysis and revised security extension for the precision time protocol. In: IEEE International Symphosium on Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement, Control, and Communication, ISPCS 2016, pp. 1–6 (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Kammas, P., Komninos, T., Stamatiou, Y.C.: A queuing theory based model for studying intrusion evolution and elimination in computer networks. In: The Fourth International Conference on Information Assurance and Security, pp. 167–171, September 2008

    Google Scholar 

  9. Li, Q., Ross, C., Yang, J., Di, J., Balda, J.C., Mantooth, H.A.: The effects of flooding attacks on time-critical communications in the smart grid. In: 2015 IEEE Power Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT), pp. 1–5, February 2015

    Google Scholar 

  10. Liu, S., Liu, X.P., Saddik, A.E.: Denial-of-Service (dos) attacks on load frequency control in smart grids. In: IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference ISGT 2013, pp. 1–6 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Malhotra, A., Goldberg, S.: Attacking NTP’s authenticated broadcast mode. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev. 46(2), 12–17 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. TC 57 Power Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange. Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility Automation - Part 7–2: Basic Information and Communication Structure - Abstract Communication Service Interface. IEC standard 61850-7-2. Technical report, International Electrotechnical Commission (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Mitchell, D.L., Durgin, N.A., Lincoln, P.D., Mitchell, J.C., Scedrov, A.: Undecidability of bounded security protocols. In: Workshop on Formal Methods and Security Protocols (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Mizrahi, T.: A game theoretic analysis of delay attacks against time synchronization protocols. In: 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement, Control and Communication, pp. 1–6, September 2012

    Google Scholar 

  15. Moussa, B., Debbabi, M., Assi, C.: A detection and mitigation model for PTP delay attack in a smart grid substation. In: IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015, pp. 497–502, November 2015

    Google Scholar 

  16. Osorio, C., Bierlaire, M.: An analytic finite capacity queueing network model capturing the propagation of congestion and blocking. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 196(3), 996–1007 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Patel, R., Borisaniya, B., Patel, A., Patel, D., Rajarajan, M., Zisman, A.: Comparative analysis of formal model checking tools for security protocol verification. In: Meghanathan, N., Boumerdassi, S., Chaki, N., Nagamalai, D. (eds.) CNSA 2010. CCIS, vol. 89, pp. 152–163. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14478-3_16

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Srikantha, P., Kundur, D.: Denial of service attacks and mitigation for stability in cyber-enabled power grid. In: 2015 IEEE Power Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT), pp. 1–5, February 2015

    Google Scholar 

  19. TC 57 Power systems management and associated information exchange. Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - Part 5: Communication requirements for functions and device models. IEC standard 61850–5. Technical report, International Electrotechnical Commission (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Tsang, J., Beznosov, K.: A security analysis of the precise time protocol (short paper). In: Ning, P., Qing, S., Li, N. (eds.) ICICS 2006. LNCS, vol. 4307, pp. 50–59. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11935308_4

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Ullmann, M., Vgeler, M.: Delay attacks - implication on NTP and PTP time synchronization. In: 2009 International Symposium on Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement, Control and Communication, pp. 1–6, October 2009

    Google Scholar 

  22. Wan, X.Y., Li, Z., Fan, Z.F.: A SIP DoS flooding attack defense mechanism based on priority class queue. In: 2010 IEEE International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Information Security, pp. 428–431, June 2010

    Google Scholar 

  23. Wang, Y., Lin, C., Li, Q., Fang, Y.: A queueing analysis for the denial of service (DoS) attacks in computer networks. Comput. Netw. 51(12), 3564–3573 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Wei, J., Kundur, D.: A flocking-based model for DoS-resilient communication routing in smart grid. IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2012, pp. 3519–3524, December 2012

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by an EPSRC Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security Research PhD grant. The authors would like to thank Joshua Robinson and Ela Kasprsky for their help in understanding some of the mathematical concepts used in this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to James G. Wright .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Wright, J.G., Wolthusen, S.D. (2018). De-Synchronisation Attack Modelling in Real-Time Protocols Using Queue Networks: Attacking the ISO/IEC 61850 Substation Automation Protocol. In: D'Agostino, G., Scala, A. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10707. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99843-5_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99843-5_12

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-99842-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-99843-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics