Abstract
Secret handshake is a useful primitive that allows a group of authorized users to establish a shared secret key and authenticate each other anonymously. It naturally provides a certain degree of user privacy and deniability which are also desirable for some private conversations that require secure key establishment. The inherent user privacy enables a private conversation between authorized users without revealing their real identities. While deniability allows authorized users to later deny their participating in conversations. However, deniability of secret handshakes lacks a comprehensive treatment in the literature. In this paper, we investigate the deniability of existing secret handshakes. We propose the first generic framework that converts any secret handshake protocols into fully deniable ones. In particular, we define two formal security models, including session key security and deniability for our proposed framework.
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Notes
- 1.
pRO is introduced by Pass [18], and it is a weaker assumption compared to random oracle model.
- 2.
It analogous to Pass’s non-programmable random oracle methodology pRO, see detailed comparison in [25].
- 3.
Aux may consist of legal transcripts of protocol runs.
- 4.
\({\mathcal {A}}\) is not allowed to reveal honest user’s secret certificates \(\{ \mathsf{cert}_i^j \}\) and group secret keys \(\{ \mathtt{{msk}}_j \}\).
- 5.
The PKDF algorithm means that a key derivation function in the public-key setting.
- 6.
Refer to [13] for detailed Signer and User algorithm of BS scheme.
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Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the Singapore National Research Foundation under NCR Award Number NRF2014NCR-NCR001-012, the NSFC Research Fund for International Young Scientists (61750110528), National Cryptography Development Fund during the 13th Five-year Plan Period (MMJJ20170216), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (GK201702004).
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Tian, Y., Li, Y., Zhang, Y., Li, N., Yang, G., Yu, Y. (2018). DSH: Deniable Secret Handshake Framework. In: Su, C., Kikuchi, H. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11125. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99807-7_21
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