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The Communication Burden of Single Transferable Vote, in Practice

  • Manel AyadiEmail author
  • Nahla Ben AmorEmail author
  • Jérôme LangEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11059)

Abstract

We study single-winner STV from the point of view of communication. First, we assume that voters give, in a single shot, their top-k alternatives; we define a version of STV that works for such votes, and we evaluate empirically the extent to which it approximates the standard STV rule. Second, we evaluate empirically the communication cost of the protocol for STV defined by Conitzer and Sandholm (2005) and some of its improvements.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LARODEC, Institut Supérieur de GestionUniversité de TunisTunisTunisie
  2. 2.CNRS, LAMSADEUniversité Paris-DauphineParisFrance

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