A Truthful Mechanism for Interval Scheduling

  • Jugal Garg
  • Peter McGlaughlinEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11059)


Motivated by cloud computing, we study a market-based approach for job scheduling on multiple machines where users have hard deadlines and prefer earlier completion times. In our model, completing a job provides a benefit equal to its present value, i.e., the value discounted to the time when the job finishes. Users submit job requirements to the cloud provider who non-preemptively schedules jobs to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the sum of present values of completed jobs. Using a simple and fast greedy algorithm, we obtain a \(1+s/(s-1)\) approximation to the optimal schedule, where \(s > 1\) is the minimum ratio of a job’s deadline to processing time. Building on our approximation algorithm, we construct a pricing rule to incentivize users to truthfully report all job requirements.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Illinois at Urbana ChampaignUrbanaUSA

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