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Governing Law Solutions to Ideal Laws

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Abstract

Chapter 2 investigates the potential for a theory of the metaphysics of ideal laws based around governing conceptions of lawhood. Three existing approaches are discussed: Armstrong’ theory of nomic necessitation, Cartwright’s capacity conception of laws, and Ellis’ theory of laws as essences of natural kinds. It is argued that none of these conceptions can provide a suitable explanation of the existence of ideal laws.

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Correspondence to Billy Wheeler .

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Wheeler, B. (2018). Governing Law Solutions to Ideal Laws. In: Idealization and the Laws of Nature. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99564-9_2

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