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Practical Reason and Enantiosemy of Human Dignity: The Reality of the Principle in Italy

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The Reality of Human Dignity in Law and Bioethics

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 71))

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Abstract

In examining the reality of the principle of dignity, and in order to fully understand it, the Italian experience reveals that it is better not to refer to it explicitly given its “enantiosemic” character. Indeed, the Italian Constitution whilst both recognizing and affirming human dignity as a key concept does not expressly identify it. In practice, this shows that it is often better for it to be used implicitly.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Enantiosemy: “Semantic condition of a word which, as it has evolved over time, has taken on an opposite meaning to its etymological meaning”, in Lessico Universale Italiano, 1971, Rome, vol. VII. De Mauro, T. 1999. The Grande dizionario italiano dell’uso, vol. II. Turin: UTET, gives a broader synchronic definition of enantiosemy: “The fact of a word meaning one thing as well as its opposite, with this ambiguity causing opposing interpretations”. The French Wiktionnaire entry and the English Wikipedia entries are along the same lines.

  2. 2.

    Azzoni, G. (2012). Dignità umana e diritto private. Ragion Pratica, 38:76 (also published on line).

  3. 3.

    Italian law is a system of written (or statutory) law, of Romano-Germanic tradition, with a hierarchy of sources that places a rigid Constitution at its highest level.

  4. 4.

    The legal standards stipulated in a law are subject to a posteriori constitutionality review by a Constitutional Court comprised of jurists. It is important to note that, particularly after the reform of Title 5 of the Constitution in 2001, the “constitutional block” of principles developed in the direction of the opening up and permeabilization to international principles. In fact, with the new article 117, para. 1 of the Constitution (which states: “Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from European Union law and international obligations”), the capacity of the constitutional judge and the judicial authorities in general to directly refer to and apply in their decisions the principles contained in international instruments has been extended. In particular, the principles and rules relating to human dignity are contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 and in the Oviedo Convention of 1997 (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and of the Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine).

  5. 5.

    Among the examples of the abuse of the concept of human dignity to justify the widest variety of decisions, particular attention should be paid to the reference to human dignity in the programmatic speech by Jorge Rafael Videla after the coup d’État of March 24, 1976 in Argentina: “In our opinion, respect for human rights does not only stem from legal instruments or international declarations, but is based on our deep Christian belief that human dignity represents a fundamental value. We take on absolute powers to protect the natural human rights, not to suppress freedom but to exalt it, not to bend justice but to impose it”, quoted in Italian by Colombo, G. 2008. Sulle regole. Milan: Feltrinelli, Serie Bianca, 72.

  6. 6.

    Article 36 of the Constitution.

  7. 7.

    On the relationship between these three focal points, see the best pages of Rodotà, S. (2013). La rivoluzione della dignità. Naples: La Scuola di Pitagora, 12 and s., which emphasises that dignity is the concept that has made it possible to move from the concept of a subject of law to the concept of the person as a target of equality and freedom. It is not a matter, in this discussion about the reality of the principle, of referring to the literature devoted to the analysis of dignity as a concept; however, in this literature, we would like to highlight at least one article we particularly appreciated: Resta, G. (2010). La dignità. In Trattato di Biodiritto. Ambito e fonti del biodiritto, ed. S. Rodotà, M. Tallacchini, 259. Milan: Giuffrè. See also, on the triptych of freedom, equality, dignity, Vincenti, U. (2009). Diritti e dignità umana. Rome-Bari: Laterza, 126 and s.

  8. 8.

    See the reconstruction provided by the journal of Bellocci, M. and Passaglia, P. (ed.). (2007). La dignità dell’uomo quale principio costituzionale, Quaderno predisposto in occasione dell’incontro trilaterale delle Corte costituzionali italiana, spagnola e portoghese. Rome: Palazzo della Consulta, 30/09-01/10/2007 (September 2007) published on the website of the Italian Constitutional Court: www.cortecostituzionale.it.

  9. 9.

    This “reasonable” character used by the Constitutional Court plays the role exercised by the principle of proportionality for the German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.

  10. 10.

    See Scaccia, G. (2012). Dignità umana e giudice amministrativo. In Studi in onore di Aldo Loiodice, 1089 and s. Bari: Cacucci editore.

  11. 11.

    Article 13.

  12. 12.

    Article 27.

  13. 13.

    Article 21.

  14. 14.

    The records of the debate can be consulted on line at the website: www.nascitacostituzione.it; for the debate on article 32, see: http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/02p1/02t2/032/index.htm. The best books for information about the debates are: Fagiolo, G. (1992). La costituzione della Repubblica italiana. L’iter parlamentare articolo per articolo. Rome: Edilogos, on article 32, vol. I, 324 and s. and Falzone, V., Palermo, F. and Cosentino, F. (1979). La Costituzione della Repubblica italiana. Illustrata con i lavori preparatori e corredata da note e riferimenti. Rome: Mondadori, 3rd edition, 114 and s. on article 32.

  15. 15.

    The idea that the closing wording of Article 32 concerns the human person to establish a true habeas corpus is put forward by Rodotà, S. La rivoluzione della dignità, op. cit., 30.

  16. 16.

    The Italian deputy G. Martino, a doctor, developed this point forcefully, see: http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/02p1/02t2/032/index.htm.

  17. 17.

    The debate is available for consultation at page: http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/01principi/002/index.htm and the series of meetings is reconstructed by Fagiolo, G. La Costituzione della Repubblica Italian, op. cit., 102 and s. In general terms on this debate and on the decision not to refer expressly to human dignity, see Rossi, E. (2006). Art. 2. In Commentario alla Costituzione, ed. R. Bifulco, A. Celotto, M. Olivetti, vol. I, 39 and s. Turin: UTET Giuridica.

  18. 18.

    The first version stated: “This Constitution, in order to ensure the autonomy, freedom and dignity of the human person and to promote the necessary social, economic and spiritual solidarity, recognises and guarantees the inalienable and sacred rights of man. for the individual and for social groups in which he is integrated and organically and progressively develops”; the second provisional version also made an express reference to human dignity: “To protect the inviolable and sacred principles of autonomy and dignity of the person, of humanity and of justice between men, the Italian Republic guarantees the essential rights of the individual and for social groups where personality is expressed, and demands the fulfilment of the fundamental duties of political, economic, and social solidarity”. The version quoted in the text was finally adopted.

  19. 19.

    See Scaccia, G. Dignità umana e giudice amministrativo, op. cit.

  20. 20.

    Judgement no. 293/2000.

  21. 21.

    Judgement no. 414/1991.

  22. 22.

    Council of State, opinion of November 09, 2005 no. 3389; Court of Cassation, judgements of March 11, 2004 no. 5044 and May 29, 2008 no. 14199 quoted in Scaccia, G. Dignità umana e giudice amministrativo, op. cit., 1092 and s.

  23. 23.

    There is a wealth of legal doctrine, but two articles are particularly interesting: Pirozzoli, A. (2007). Il valore costituzionale della dignità. Un’introduzione. Rome: Aracne, with regard to constitutional case law, and Scaccia, G. Dignità umana e giudice amministrativo, op. cit., 1089 and s. regarding administrative law. Other interesting research on the applications of case law are those of Piciocchi, C. (2013). La dignità come rappresentazione giuridica della condizione umana. Padoue: Cedam, which observes the applications of the concept in relation to freedom of the press, violation of graves and social rights; Bellocci, M. and Passaglia, P. (ed.). La dignità dell’uomo quale principio costituzionale, op. cit., regarding non-discrimination. In immigration law, in particular for an analysis of the relation (and opposition) between the concepts person and subject of law, referring (or not) to human dignity, see the different contributions (in particular those of M. Pellissero and M. Pifferi) in Meccarelli, M., Palchetti, P. and Sotis, C. (ed.). (2012). Ius peregrinandi, Il fenomeno migratorio tra diritti fondamentali, esercizi della sovranità e dinamiche di esclusione. Macerata: edizioni università di Macerata.

  24. 24.

    In criminal law, the concept is used in several fields, very different from each other (e.g. as a criterion for strengthening the protection of honour and morality, as a limitation on freedom of expression, as a protected interest related to prostitution, Holocaust denial, punishment of hate speech and criminal protection of the memory). See Brignone, C. (2009). Aspetti della dignità umana nell’orizzonte del diritto penale. Università degli studi di Trento, XXII ciclo, A.A: 2009/10, published on line on Diritto penale contemporaneo and the position paper of Tesauro, A. (2013). Riflessioni in tema di dignità umana, bilanciamento e propaganda razzista. Turin: Giappichelli. On the interesting and harmful application of the concept, see Risicato, L. (2008). Dal “diritto di vivere” al “diritto di morire”. Riflessioni sul ruolo della laicità nell’esperienza penalistica. Turin: Giappichelli, 40 et seq.; the author shows the transfigurations of the concept of dignity in relation to sexual violence in the case of an affirmation that the protected interest is human dignity, we come back to the old idea that sexual offences protect family morality and not sexual freedom. For a collection of judgements relating to human dignity with regard to penalty law (e.g. on the issues of life imprisonment, restrictions on searches and the imprisonment of the terminally ill), see Limoccia, L. (2012). Diritto penitenziario e dignità umana. Rome: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

  25. 25.

    For example, the Constitutional Court (judgement no. 103/1989), on the basis of the reference to human dignity in Article 41 of the Constitution affirmed the existence of a general principle of equal treatment of workers within the same company. On the other hand, the Court of Cassation has not referred to such a principle (see for example Cass. civ. sez lav. [sect. Labour] August 14, 2004, no. 15878 and prior to the decision of the Constitutional Court, Cass., s.u., May 17, 1996, no. 4570 and May 29, 1993, no. 60309).

  26. 26.

    See Pirozzoli, A. Il valore costituzionale della dignità, op. cit., 127: the author counted the number of Constitutional Court judgements expressly referring to human dignity: 55 between 1987 and 1996, 20 between 1997 and 2001 and 12 between 2001 and 2006. It appears that over the last ten year, this figure has continued to fall.

  27. 27.

    Law no. 104 of February 05, 1992.

  28. 28.

    There is a wealth of literature on this case. However, there is a comprehensive account of the case on http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eluana_Englaro and some information also at https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eluana_Englaro.

  29. 29.

    See Scaccia, G. Dignità umana e giudice amministrativo, op. cit., 1101; for a summary of both points of view, the “hetero-directed” version of human dignity as a limit to the possibilities of self-determination and the “self-directed” version of human dignity as the identity and respect of the whole person, see Vallini, A. (2012). Illecito concepimento e valore del concepito. Statuto punitivo della procreazione, principi, prassi. Turin: Giappichelli, 23 et seq.

  30. 30.

    Corte d’Appello di Milano, order of 16 December 2006, available on a number of websites.

  31. 31.

    Court of Cassation, 1st civil chamber, judgement no. 21748 of 16 October 2007, known as the Englaro judgement, also available on several websites. Much has been written and spoken about this case. At a criminal level, see Viganò, F. (2008). Riflessioni sul caso di Eluana Englaro. Diritto penale e processo, 8:1039 and on the institutional aspects see Sorrenti, G. La decisione e la regola. Prime note su alcune tendenze in atto nel sisetma politico (a margine del caso Englaro): www.forumcostituzionale.it.

  32. 32.

    The case refers to the Roe vs Wade ruling of the US Supreme Court, given in 1973 concerning abortion, in which the Court based its decision on the affirmation of the predominance of certain interests (the self-determination of the mother) over others (the expectation of life of the foetus). The result is that, for more than thirty years, there has been in the USA a division between the “pro-Roes” and the “pro-Wades”. In short, if the judge decides on the basis of a zero-sum logic on ethically contentious topics, the outcome is to arrive at an exclusive and non-inclusive decision; on this aspect, see Sotis, C. (2012). Le regole dell’incoerenza. Pluralismo normativo e crisi postmoderna del diritto penale. Rome: Aracne, 29 and s.

  33. 33.

    CEDH, 16 December 2008, Ada Rossi and others vs Italy.

  34. 34.

    Corte Costituzionale, order no. 334/08.

  35. 35.

    Corte d’Appello di Milano, order of 9 July 2008, published on line at page: http://it.wikisource.org/wiki/Decreto_Corte_d%27Appello_di_Milano_9_luglio_2008.

  36. 36.

    Respectively decision of the director general of the Direzione generale sanità della Giunta regionale Lombardia of September 03, 2008 and Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) per la Lombardia, 3e chamber, January 26, 2009, no. 214, quoted by Scaccia, G. Dignità umana e giudice amministrativo, op. cit., 1102 in the notes 62 and 63.

  37. 37.

    On this decision, see Pioggia, A. (2010). Il diritto alla salute e la “direttiva Sacconi” sull’obbligatorietà di nutrizione e idratazione artificiali. Giornale di diritto amministrativo, and on line at: http://www.astrid-online.it/rassegna/rassegna-i/12-04-2010/Pioggia_Nota-decreto-Sacconi--marzo-2010-.pdf.

  38. 38.

    On the basis of the offence of “violenza private” set out in article 610 of the Crominal Code. The associations that filed a complaint with the Rome prosecutor were “Radicali italiani”, “Nessuno tocchi Caino” et “Associazione Luca Coscioni”, for information, see the aforementioned Wikipedia page.

  39. 39.

    Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) per il Lazio, 3e chambre, 12 September 2009, no. 8650/2009, judgement published at: http://www.amblav.it/download/sentenza_n_8650_2009.pdf.

  40. 40.

    For what we consider to be a very balanced report of the facts, the problems involved and the constitutional balances relating to this issue, see Spadaro, A.. (2009). Può il Presidente della Repubblica rifiutarsi di emanare un decreto-legge? Le “ragioni” di Napolitano, published on line at: http://www.forumcostituzionale.it on 10 February 2009.

  41. 41.

    Law no. 40 of February 19, 2004 “Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita”.

  42. 42.

    Judgement no. 151/2009. The judgements of the Constitutional Court are published on line at the Court’s website: www.cortecostituzionale.it.

  43. 43.

    Judgement no. 162/2014. Human dignity is cited just once in this judgement (in para. 5 of “Considerato in diritto”) to affirm that, while in principle it is incumbent on the legislature to find the point of balance between the different requirements at issue in the ethically contentious questions, it must do so with respect for human dignity.

  44. 44.

    We refer to the decision of the ECHR (Grand Chamber) of November 03, 2011, S.H. and others vs Austria, in which the Court returned to its previous decision in the same case (ECHR, April 01, 2010, part one, S.H. and others vs Austria).

  45. 45.

    See in particular para. 113 of the aforementioned decision of November 03, 2011 (Grand Chamber), S.H. and others vs Austria: “It is true that some of the arguments raised by the Government in defence of the prohibition of gamete donation for in vitro fertilisation can refer only to the prohibition of ovum donation, such as preventing the exploitation of women in vulnerable situations or limiting potential health risks for ovum donors and preventing the creation of atypical family relations because of split motherhood. However, there remain the basic concerns relied on by the Government, namely, that the prohibition of the donation of gametes involving the intervention of third persons in a highly technical medical process was a controversial issue in Austrian society, raising complex questions of a social and ethical nature on which there was not yet a consensus in society and which had to take into account human dignity, the well-being of children thus conceived and the prevention of negative repercussions or potential misuse. The Court has found above that the prohibition of ovum donation for in vitro fertilisation, which relied on these grounds, is compatible with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. It considers that these considerations are also pertinent for the prohibition of sperm donations for the purpose of in vitro fertilization, having regard to the need to take account of the general framework in which it was decreed”.

  46. 46.

    Concerning this dichotomy as an essential characteristic of the tensions on the fundamental rights, see Delmas Marty, M. (2004). Le relatif et l’universel. Paris: Seuil, coll. “La couleur des idées”.

  47. 47.

    This case found against certain Internet Service Providers for data processing as the procedure used for data management, which was much more economical and simple, was not deemed necessary in view of the criterion of need against human dignity. See Prescrizioni sulla conservazione dei dati di traffico (Telecom Italia) of 10 January 2008, published on the official website: www.garanteprivacy.it.

  48. 48.

    See numerous opinions published on the official website of the Commissione nazionale di Bioetica: http://www.governo.it/bioetica/pareri.html.

  49. 49.

    Case examined by the Comitato Etico locale AOU Meyer of Florence, 2014. We have been authorised to read the files and quote them.

  50. 50.

    That is what the doctor stated in his letter to the Comitato Etico locale.

  51. 51.

    The effects of this drug are reversible from a hormonal point of view, but not from a psychological point of view. For this reason, its use for children is prohibited in Italy.

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Sotis, C. (2018). Practical Reason and Enantiosemy of Human Dignity: The Reality of the Principle in Italy. In: Feuillet-Liger, B., Orfali, K. (eds) The Reality of Human Dignity in Law and Bioethics. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 71. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99112-2_6

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