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Hermeneutics and Its Problems pp 77–97Cite as

[Hermeneutics After Schleiermacher]

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Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 98))

Abstract

The distinctions Schleiermacher drew fundamentally determined the subsequent path of hermeneutics, but the absence of a basis for his ideas did not allow for their further deepening or development. In this chapter, Shpet surveys the views of, among others, Boeckh, who identified philology with history. Blass subsequently attempted to expand Boeckh’s definition, outlining the tasks of philology in a way that could be transferred to history. Shpet also deals in this chapter with Birt and Usener.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Boeckh 1877. Concerning the special tasks of a theological hermeneutics, as distinct from those of philology, Boeckh writes: “The distinction between them … becomes understandable.” Boeckh 1877: 80.

  2. 2.

    Quite indicative of the sense of this self-limitation is Birt’s hermeneutics in the new (3rd) edition of Iwan Müller’s handbook. See Birt 1913.

  3. 3.

    Boeckh 1877: 75.

  4. 4.

    Boeckh 1877: 270. Cf. Boeckh 1877: 18, 57. Cf. Schleiermacher 1998: 8 – “The science of history, though, is ethics. Since language also has a natural aspect, the differences of the human spirit are also determined by the nature of the human being and by that of the planet. Therefore, hermeneutics is rooted not only in ethics, but also in physics. Ethics and physics lead, however, back again to the dialectic, as the science of the unity of knowledge.” See also Schleiermacher 1839: 8, 370ff, 480ff, 568ff. Cf. Weissenborn 1847: 9ff.

  5. 5.

    [The German editors note that the typed manuscript they used reads here “philological knowledge, but with philology itself on the whole” whereas the hand-written copy has the text reading as above. See Špet 1993: 173f. The 2005 Russian edition serving as the fundamental text in this translation follows the decision of the German editors to read “philosophical … philosophy itself on the whole.”]

  6. 6.

    Boeckh 1877: 10.

  7. 7.

    [The editors of the German-language translation understandably take this to be a reference to Chapter 1. See Špet 1993: 174.]

  8. 8.

    Boeckh 1877: 52. Cf. Boeckh 1877: 15, 75.

  9. 9.

    [Boeckh 1877: 53.]

  10. 10.

    Boeckh 1877: 10.

  11. 11.

    Boeckh 1877: 11.

  12. 12.

    Boeckh 1877: 18.

  13. 13.

    Boeckh 1877: 17. Cf. Boeckh 1877: 11 – “History, therefore, differs from philology only in terms of appearance, namely, with respect to its scope, since it usually is limited chiefly to the political sphere and examines the rest of cultural life only in connection with the life of the state.”

  14. 14.

    Blass 1892: 165. Cf. in this volume the comments of Ludwig von Urlichs: “It (philology) is therefore essentially a recognition and assimilation.” Philology, in his opinion, adjoins closely to history and is distinguished from it by the fact that it has to do not with changes (Veränderungen), but with states (die Zuständlichkeit), not with the political characters (!) of politicians, but with culture in general. Urlichs 1892: 5. Cf. moreover the opinion of Steinthal, who noting his agreement with Boeckh, thinks that philology in its broadest sense must be understood as the history of the human spirit. Steinthal 1878a: 27. Even clearer is Steinthal’s statement: “… in short, philology is history. With any other presupposition, philology is either understood one-sidedly, or it entirely loses the status of a science and becomes only an auxiliary discipline.” Steinthal 1864: 28–29.

  15. 15.

    Boeckh 1877: 11.

  16. 16.

    Birt 1913: 4.

  17. 17.

    Birt 1913: 4.

  18. 18.

    Birt 1913: 3.

  19. 19.

    Usener 1882: 19 – “So it is: philology is not a historical science.”

  20. 20.

    Usener 1882: 29.

  21. 21.

    Usener 1882: 30.

  22. 22.

    Usener 1882: 35.

  23. 23.

    Usener 1882: 34.

  24. 24.

    Usener 1882: 39.

  25. 25.

    [The German editors note that the typed copy of Shpet’s work – clearly in error – reads here “philology” instead of “philosophy.”]

  26. 26.

    Boeckh 1877: 4; cf. Boeckh 1877: 45, 52ff, 75ff. Cf. Conrad Hermann contrasts “wie” [the “how”] and “was” [the “what”]. Hermann 1875: 237. On the contrary, Urlichs distributes “wie” and “was” between hermeneutics and critique. Urlichs 1892: 9.

  27. 27.

    Boeckh 1877: 52.

  28. 28.

    See the Introduction.

  29. 29.

    Boeckh 1877: 33. “Philology attains its third auxiliary goal thanks to its methodology, which is the theory of knowing the act of knowing, i.e., of understanding in general.”

  30. 30.

    Thus, for example, Boeckh refers grammar to the formal part of philology only insofar as it is a matter of grammatical understanding. Conversely, as the object of language, grammar, in its history, is a part of the content of philology. Cf. Boeckh 1877: 53–54.

  31. 31.

    Boeckh 1877: 76.

  32. 32.

    Boeckh 1877: 11.

  33. 33.

    [Shpet adds here that the emphasis is his addition.]

  34. 34.

    [Boeckh apparently understands Vorstellung and Idee as virtually, if not in fact, synonomous: “es ist in allem eine Vorstellung oder Idee ausgeprägt.” Boeckh 1877: 56.]

  35. 35.

    [Boeckh 1877: 11.]

  36. 36.

    [Boeckh 1877: 11.]

  37. 37.

    Boeckh 1877: 11–12. It seems to me that this final conclusion is unexpected. In my view, just the reverse follows from what was just said. Precisely because φιλολογείν is the beginning of civilization, it is also the beginning of φιλοσοψείν.

  38. 38.

    Boeckh 1877: 77–78.

  39. 39.

    Boeckh’s opposition loses its fundamental significance if we understand it not in the sense of a generic opposition, but only in the sense of a difference between species or, even worse, in the sense of a relation between genus (“sign”) and species (“image”). Apparently, Blass imagines the case to be this way when he defines the object of hermeneutics not only as the written or spoken word, but also as other signs “or any product in general of the human spirit.” Blass 1892: 167.

  40. 40.

    Boeckh 1877: 80.

  41. 41.

    [hermeneutics pertaining to the Scriptures and secular hermeneutics.]

  42. 42.

    Boeckh 1877: 92.

  43. 43.

    [Shpet mentions here “difficulties from two sides” but then presents three. This anomaly is not mentioned in the Russian text (Shpet 2005: 348), but the German translation remarks that the third difficulty that follows was inserted only in a typed version of the original Russian work and is not found in the handwritten copy. See Špet 1993: 189f. Presumably, then, Shpet overlooked correcting the text when he inserted the third difficulty.]

  44. 44.

    See Boeckh 1877: 103.

  45. 45.

    Boeckh 1877: 81.

  46. 46.

    [Boeckh 1877: 81–82.]

  47. 47.

    If this statement is understood and thought through in all of its details, it will be clear that it resolves in advance a series of issues that sometimes evoke futile disputes. One thing, in particular, is important: Psychological interpretation cannot rise to objective conditions (such an interpretation is only a reflex), and, conversely, historical interpretation cannot rise to psychological conditions. Concerning all this, see below. This is not the place.

  48. 48.

    Boeckh 1877: 83.

  49. 49.

    From the viewpoint of the interests of the objective content of what is communicated, I consider this correct, but in a general analysis of the types of interpretation we cannot ignore one of its independent types, even if it is not the direct object of the given special study.

  50. 50.

    Blass 1892: 175.

  51. 51.

    Boeckh 1877: 82, 93–111.

  52. 52.

    Boeckh 1877: 82, 111–112.

  53. 53.

    Boeckh 1877: 82; cf. Boeckh 1877: 111ff.

  54. 54.

    Boeckh 1877: 83.

  55. 55.

    Boeckh 1877: 82, 124–140.

  56. 56.

    [Reading with Špet 1993: 196 “genericheskuju” instead of “geneticheskuju” as in Shpet 2005: 354.]

  57. 57.

    Boeckh 1877: 82f, 140–156.

  58. 58.

    Boeckh 1877: 127.

  59. 59.

    [Reading with Boeckh 1877: 16 and Špet 1993: 198 “genericheskaja” for “geneticheskaja” as in Shpet 2005: 355.]

  60. 60.

    Boeckh 1877: 156.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Manchester, NJ, USA

    Thomas Nemeth

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  1. Gustav Shpet
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    Thomas Nemeth

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Shpet, G., Nemeth, T. (2019). [Hermeneutics After Schleiermacher]. In: Nemeth, T. (eds) Hermeneutics and Its Problems. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 98. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98941-9_6

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