Abstract
In recent decades Hegel has been the subject of a revival of interest by a number of scholars in the Anglophone philosophical world who claim that he can provide us with conceptual resources for answering particular problems concerning the philosophy of mind, the nature of our conceptual activity, and the character of knowledge. One of these problems concerns the nature of perceptual experience, and it is the core of a controversy called “the debate over non-conceptual content”.
In my paper I will focus on Hegel’s later picture of perceptual experience, by taking into account his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Most scholars who have addressed it in the last decades seem to agree precisely on a reading of Hegel as sharing many important views with the non-conceptualists. Such readings seem to challenge the standard McDowellian picture of Hegel.
I will look at what has come to be seen as the basic non-conceptual component in Hegel’s theory of mental activity, namely sensation (Empfindung). Contrary to some contemporary interpretation, from my point of view Hegel’s texts on Empfindung must not be taken primarily as theorizing a non-conceptual component that has to be “processed” by some further activities in order to acquire intentional and conceptual content. By showing the difficulties inherent to this way of reading Hegel’s Anthropology, I will make room a different approach to Hegel’s text. This will result in a different picture of Hegel’s theory of perceptual experience, which will be closer to McDowell’s than what has been considered until now.
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Notes
- 1.
They involve general topics such as the anatomy of animal experience, the fine grained nature of human experience, the nature of perceptual illusion, the construal of intentionality, etc. For an overview, see Crane (1992), Gendler–Hawthorne (2006) , Bermúdez–Cahen (2012) , York (2003), Brewer (2005), Byrne (2005), Peacocke (2001), Duhau (2014), Heck (2000), Laurier (2004).
- 2.
Hanna (2013, 2).
- 3.
- 4.
RRBS, 269.
- 5.
Despite the brief statement in the Preface to Mind and World claiming that the book can be conceived as “a prolegomenon to a reading of the Phenomenology,” Hegel’s role in McDowell’s work is not quite that of protagonist. McDowell himself has claimed that “Hegel figures in my book only as an inspiring figure, largely off-stage” (C, 342). McDowell has since taken into account other important texts from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit at stake in the debate on the origins and nature of norms, see HWV.
- 6.
Among the few articles that refer to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit to highlight the difference between Hegel and McDowell is Houlgate (2006, 2016). Publications that interrogate Hegel’s mature texts in light of concerns related to perception and cognition include DeVries (1988, 2013), Forman (2010), Ikäheimo (2017).
- 7.
See HIRK, 84.
- 8.
See HIRK, 83.
- 9.
HMG, 88.
- 10.
IR, 63.
- 11.
For a discussion of McDowell’s Kant see Bird (1996), Sedgwick (1997), Allison (1997), Friedman (2002), and McDowell’s exchange with Robert Pippin : Pippin (2005, 2007), McDowell RPS, HWV. For an overview of these controversies, as well as of the development of McDowell’s interpretation of Kant, see Corti (2014, 95–99, 184–187).
- 12.
HIRK, 71, and HMG, 82.
- 13.
HIRK, 71, my emphasis.
- 14.
See HIRK, 73–74. See also, along the same lines, Sellars (1992, 4).
- 15.
RFS, 273.
- 16.
- 17.
LPS, 62; VPG, 99. See also other famous passages, such as the one contained in the Preface to the second edition of the Encyclopaedia: “It is only an ill-minded prejudice to assume that philosophy stands antithetically opposed to any sensible appreciation of experience” (EL, 5). And: “In Empiricism there lies this great principle, that what is true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception” (EL, § 38R).
- 18.
Notable among contemporary Hegelian philosophers who reject the notion of experience is Robert Brandom , who claims that “experience is not one of my words,” Brandom (2002, 205 fn. 7). In the current debate, the notion of experience is a central divide between Brandom and McDowell, who are often both considered “Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians” (Rorty, 1998) . McDowell, however, rejects being enrolled in this philosophical camp (“I am resisting being cast as the hind legs of a pantomime horse called “Pittsburg neo-Hegelianism”—EI, 279).
- 19.
LPS, 62; VPG, 99.
- 20.
In surveying the basic features of the “descriptive” and the “reconstructive” approach, one must keep in mind that both approaches occur in varying degrees. Moreover, many readings that circulate today combine elements from both the models (how that can be consistently done will not be questioned here). The terms “description” and “reconstruction” are not strictu sensu technical Hegelian terms and do not correspond to Hegel’s use of “Beschreibung” and “Rekonstruktion.” My expressions instead point to two coherent ways of making sense of Hegel’s idea of a philosophical Darstellung of experience. For a detailed discussion, see Corti (2016a, 51–64).
- 21.
This is the first way Hegel defined the subject matter of the “Anthropology” section of his system (in some notes he took in 1811). For the historical context in which his “Anthropology” arose, see Rameil (1988, 42) but also Wolff (1991, 32), Tuschling (1994), Bauer (2016), Jaeschke (2010), Sandkaulen (2011), Chiereghin (1991), Fetscher (1970), Hespe-Tuschling (1991).
- 22.
ES, § 406R.
- 23.
There has been a widespread tendency to read Hegel’s notion of soul as a more or less refined theory of the unconscious: see Mills (1996, 2000, 2002), Berthold-Bond (1992, 1995), Severino (1983), Christensen (1968a, b). For an account coming from a less-pronounced psychoanalytical background, see Brinkmann (1998, 9), according to whom: “The soul, according to Hegel, represents the pre-conscious or, in any case, the pre-tematic life.”
- 24.
VSG II, 709.
- 25.
VPG, 89; see also EL, § 408.
- 26.
VSG I, 67ff.
- 27.
Mills (2000, 322).
- 28.
“A sphere that contains them [activities] underneath consciousness,” Severino (1983, 72).
- 29.
PSS, 125, my emphasis.
- 30.
ES, § 402.
- 31.
See VSG II, 655ff. and ES § 401A, 171.
- 32.
See VSG II, 655ff., VSG I, 58ff., 673ff., and ES, § 401.
- 33.
VSG I, 58. On the contrary, “the content of internal sensation come from spirit: right, religion, love are within the spirit” (VSG II, 666). With “internal sensation,” Hegel seems to address episodes that we would call “psycho-somatic.” Today they would be studied by theory of emotions or moral psychology. In the newly published Lectures, Hegel gives as example “blushing from shame” and “turning pale out of fear” (VSG II, 669).
- 34.
VSG II, 648, 655; see also LPS, 111, VPG, 69, and ES, §§ 399, 402. On this aspect, see for instance, Gabriel (2011, 50, 52).
- 35.
ES, § 401R. See for instance the formulation “Sensation in general is the healthy participation of the individual mind in its bodiliness” (ES, § 401R). Brinkmann (1998, 11), recalls Husserl’s notion of Leib in order to understand this formulation. See also Severino (1983, 28). As for the mind-body relation in Hegel, see Wolff (1991), Winfield (2011), Nuzzo (2013), Van der Meulen (1963).
- 36.
ES, § 402 e § 402A; see also FSJ, 31.
- 37.
VSG II, 10. This is a feature Hegel had attributed to sensation since his Jena period, see FSJ, 31.
- 38.
ES, § 400, transl. mod.
- 39.
VSG II, 653.
- 40.
ES, § 402A. Michael Wolff describes “what Hegel has here in view” as a “content that is neither propositional content (sensing that…) nor an intentional attitude (sensing something, for instance something warm or rigid)” Wolff (1991, 48). See also Wolff (1991, 36). Sensation, Hegel claims, lacks any capacity to represent objects or proto-objects at all (ES, § 400A; VSG I, 52). In some places, Hegel seems to move in the opposite direction—see VSG II, 74.
- 41.
“Die Subjektivität der empfindenden Seele ist eine so unmittelbare, so unentwickelte, eine so wenig selbst bestimmende und unterscheidende, dass die Seele, insofern sie nur empfindet, sich noch nicht als ein einem Objektiven gegenüberstehendes Subjektives erfaßt” (VSG II, 991; ES, § 400A).
- 42.
EL, § 20.
- 43.
“If I say that I feel something hard or warm, or see something red … this distinction pertains to my consciousness or reflection, which distinguishes between subjective sensation and its general object,—a distinction which is as yet absent in sensation as such. Insofar as joy, pain, rage, etc. are themselves sensations, it is pleonastic to speak of one’s sensations of joy, pain, rage, etc.” (PSS, p. 108). „Pleonasm“ here does not only refer to the innocuous addition of an element already expressed in the initial formulation. Hegel sometimes uses the term to index a misleading way of presenting things, when the structure of an activity is distorted through language (cf. EL, 23R).
- 44.
EN § 351A, §§ 357–358.
- 45.
- 46.
ES, § 400. See also VSG II, 804.
- 47.
See for instance the following passage: “First we speak of intuition (Anschauung), then of representation (Vorstellung), insofar as it is directed to intuition; then we speak of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) as it is directed to the representing activity… Next we speak of memory (Gedächtnis), where this is directed to representation of images. What is present in representation is transformed by memory…” (LPS, 202–203; VPG, 182–183).
- 48.
Houlgate (2006, 246).
- 49.
- 50.
Houlgate (2006, 251).
- 51.
Also see, for instance, Winfield (2007), whose treatment of psyche as preceding intelligence seems to foster the idea of a separable layer. He describes the mind’s activity as “starting from sensation of its immediate givenness, distinguishing this from mind’s own intuiting by paying attention and apprehending the intuited object as something in space and time” (Winfield 2007, 61–62). See also his idea that “Intuitions become representations when the mind recollects them”; then the image (Bild) is “the form intuition takes upon becoming produced and reproduced by mind” (Winfield 2010, 20). The same, applied to psychology, can be found in Surber (2013).
- 52.
GW, 24,1, 158. See also VSG I, 187, 191.
- 53.
VSG I, 51.
- 54.
- 55.
Houlgate (2006, 243).
- 56.
“By the ‘hard line’ on animal perception, I mean the thesis that none of the conscious perceptual states with representational content enjoyed by mature humans can be enjoyed by nonlinguistic animals without concepts, or with only minimal conceptual capacities. By the ‘soft line,’ I mean simply the denial of the hard line. So the soft line says that some of the conscious perceptual states with representational content enjoyed by mature humans can be enjoyed by non-linguistic animals without concepts, or with only minimal conceptual capacities.” Peacocke (2001, 260).
- 57.
The tension between contentfulness of sensations and their non-cognitive role is highlighted by DeVries (1988, 70).
- 58.
DeVries (1988, 68 fn. 15), my emphasis.
- 59.
FSJ, 29.
- 60.
RFS, 273.
- 61.
This is the strategy pursued by Houlgate (2016) in his answer to McDowell.
- 62.
Hegel seems to point to the thesis of the “unifying perceptual instant,” in which all operations happen at the same time, in ES, 410A. He does so by exploiting the notion of habit, writing that “seeing is the concrete habit, which immediately unifies the diverse determinations of sensation, consciousness, intuition, understanding etc. into a single simple act.” If one takes this as Hegel’s position, one needs to work carefully to avoid attributing Hegel an empiricist position (with Humean flavor) that makes “habit” responsible for unifying impressions. It is possible, however, to read the section on habits as a section in which Hegel is being “critical.”
- 63.
- 64.
Ikäheimo (2000, 31).
- 65.
LPS, 112; VPG, 20.
- 66.
This is the title of an insightful and understudied essay by Bernard Bourgeois—Bourgeois (1994).
- 67.
ES, § 379.
- 68.
ES, § 445R.
- 69.
This approach to spirit’s activities, Hegel says, “makes the mind just an aggregative entity and regards their relationship as an external, contingent relation” (ES, § 445R; the same point is made at LPS, 203; VPG, 9, 183). The target of Hegel’s attacks is mainly “empirical psychology,” but some basic assumptions concerning separability are also shared by the “descriptivist” interpreter.
- 70.
LPS, 240, tranls. mod.; VPG, 228.
- 71.
LPS, 113; VPG, 72.
- 72.
“When I speak of something objective or about general principles, then that is something universal that is there for everyone. Reasons, principles are also held in common, but this is not a dimension of sensation; rather, the latter means that I am there according to my immediate singularity” (LPS, 155; VPG, 70). Hegel therefore writes, “It is thus quite inadmissible to appeal to one’s mere sensation. Whoever does this withdraws from the realm, common to all, of reasons, of thinking, and of objectivity, into his individual subjectivity.” (ES, § 400A).
- 73.
These considerations move more in the direction of what Robert Pippin claims when he writes: “In his “Anthropology” (the first part of his “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit”), he [Hegel] is concerned to preserve and understand properly (in their relation to other sorts of accounts) certain kinds of explanation that must partially appeal to the natural conditionedness of human life. We know, for example, that a person’s outlook, the way she thinks about everything, is some sort of a function of her natural age; we know that diet and climate are not irrelevant to cultural practices; we know that the body, especially the face, can carry and convey a meaning like no linguistic event […] The plot for his narrative concerns attempts by human spirit to free itself from a self-understanding tied to nature, and these anthropological elements are understood as initial, very limited successes.” Pippin (2002, 68–69). Pippin , however, seems far too dismissive of the first steps in this path, and does not appear to allow for the possibility of rethinking sensations in light of considerations Hegel raises later.
- 74.
ES, § 380.
- 75.
The technical term is not directly related to the Kantian meaning of “Antizipation.”
- 76.
PSS, 121.
- 77.
ES, § 380, my emphasis.
- 78.
- 79.
See Halbig (2002, 93–94).
- 80.
As mentioned above, when Hegel considers some activities of the soul, like sensation, “per se,” he calls them “contradictions.” A case for this is made in Bourgeois (1994).
- 81.
VPG, 35.
- 82.
PSS, 109.
- 83.
See VSG II, 651: “The animal follows its sensations (Empfindungen), its instinct. His life contains the measure of what is good and bad for him.” This, Hegel states, does not apply to humans, who do not have an “automatic” relation to their environment that is driven by instinct, like animals, but rather a reflective one. For an interpretation of the animal’s way of cognizing as presented in the above quote, see Robert Brandom’s notion of a “Reliable Differential Responsive Disposition,” Brandom (2002, 2009).
- 84.
LPS, 63.
- 85.
Houlgate (2006, 252).
- 86.
I take the term “additive” from Boyle (2016).
- 87.
ES, § 445.
- 88.
SL DG, 12.
- 89.
A reconstructive approach offered as an alternative to a “descriptive” one should also encompass other sections of Hegel’s text (the section on “habits,” for instance) that have been commonly taken to suggest that Hegel offers a positive account, while they can be seen as a critical exposition. I’ve tried to do this in Corti (2016a).
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Corti, L. (2018). Senses and Sensations: On Hegel’s Later Account of Perceptual Experience. In: Sanguinetti, F., Abath, A. (eds) McDowell and Hegel. Studies in German Idealism, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98896-2_6
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