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The Intelligent Design of Religious Beliefs

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Advances in the Economics of Religion

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

While the economics of religion literature has considered many important aspects of religion (e.g., rituals, sacrifices), there has not been much theoretical research on religious beliefs in this discipline. This chapter aims to consider how religious beliefs are an integral part of religions and how they are connected to other aspects of religion, namely, religious rituals and the way religion affects individuals’ daily life. Moreover, this chapter claims that in many instances religious beliefs are intelligently designed to maximize the probability of survival of religious organizations in the face of events which may contradict some of the beliefs advocated by religions.

The research presented in this chapter is based mainly on Levy and Razin (2012, 2014a,b). This research was supported by the ESRC (grant number RES-000-22-1856) and the ERC (grant number 210385).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with hierarchical religions perform comparatively worse on a wide range of outcomes, which accords with Putnam (1993) who suggests that such religions deter formation of trust.

  2. 2.

    See the survey in Boyer (2001).

  3. 3.

    There are other ways to model religious beliefs. Benabou and Tirole (2006) assume that agents differ in their beliefs with respect to how much hard work is rewarded, in this or in the afterlife, and actively choose to maintain such beliefs. In Scheve and Stasavage (2006), on the other hand, religious beliefs allow for a psychic benefit in bad times, and hence such beliefs negatively correlate with preferences for social insurance.

  4. 4.

    See Anderson (1988).

  5. 5.

    See also Chwe (2003).

  6. 6.

    Such a system of beliefs can be interpreted both as the simple reward and punishments and as the “Protestant work ethic” belief, tying hard work for benefits in the afterlife.

  7. 7.

    According to statistics gathered by the National Abortion Federation (NAF), an organization of abortion providers since 1977 in the United States and Canada, there have been 17 attempted murders, 383 death threats, 153 incidents of assault or battery, 100 butyric acid stink bomb attacks, 373 physical invasions, 41 bombings, 655 anthrax threats, and 3 kidnappings committed against abortion providers.

  8. 8.

    Thomas Aquinas, summa theologica. p. 39.

  9. 9.

    The value of Îş is determined in equilibrium.

  10. 10.

    We assume in Levy and Razin (2012) that participation in rituals also instills beliefs. See the proof there.

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Correspondence to Gilat Levy .

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Levy, G. (2019). The Intelligent Design of Religious Beliefs. In: Carvalho, JP., Iyer, S., Rubin, J. (eds) Advances in the Economics of Religion. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98848-1_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98848-1_5

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