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Emotions, Volitions and Motivational Dynamics

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Surprise: An Emotion?

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 97))

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Abstract

Emotions are usually supposed to be passive states and volitions active ones. But if one takes into account their dynamical aspect, they can also be considered as two kinds that belong to a more inclusive category, namely the category of motivational dynamics. Volition implies a conative and dynamical aspect and its dynamics is sustained and oriented by one’s motivation. Emotions also are motivated dynamical processes. In what follows I will examine in more details and compare the processes of emotions and the processes of volitions as two kinds of motivational dynamics. Both emotions and volitions can be active either at the explicit level of consciousness or in an implicit way. I will examine how implicit or explicit volitions can trigger implicit or explicit emotions, how occurrent emotions -implicit and explicit ones- can trigger volitions, and how the different interactions between emotions and volitions involve different kinds of surprise.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This differential between our current expectations and some aspect of the situation is a common property of the burst of surprise and the burst of different kinds of occurrent emotions, even if emotions other than surprise do not imply an emotion of surprise as a component - this would lead to an infinite regression.

References

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Correspondence to Pierre Livet .

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Livet, P. (2018). Emotions, Volitions and Motivational Dynamics. In: Depraz, N., Steinbock, A. (eds) Surprise: An Emotion?. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 97. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98657-9_7

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