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Identification and Self-Knowledge

  • Luca MalatestiEmail author
  • Filip Čeč
Chapter
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 96)

Abstract

Recently, Matt King and Peter Carruthers have argued that the Real Self accounts of moral responsibility or autonomy are under pressure because they rely on a questionable conception of self-knowledge of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires. In fact, they defend, as a plausible assumption, the claim that transparent self-knowledge of propositional attitudes is incompatible with mounting evidence in the cognitive sciences. In this chapter, we respond to this line of argument. We describe the types of self-knowledge that might plausibly be involved, as psychological prerequisites, in the processes of identification and integration that lead to the constitution of the real self of an agent. We argue that these forms of self-knowledge do not require the type of transparent knowledge of propositional attitudes that, according to King and Carruthers, is incompatible with the results of contemporary cognitive science.

Keywords

King and Carruthers’s criticism to the “Real self” “Real self” accounts of responsibility Identification with our mental states Self-knowledge Conscious attitudes Self 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Marko Jurjako for reading and commenting on previous versions of this chapter. We presented and discussed some of the ideas in this chapter at the conference Contemporary Philosophical Issues: Society, Agency and Knowledge, Rijeka (Croatia), 24-25/05/2016, many thanks to the organizers and participants. The Croatian Science Foundation (HRZZ) funds our research that is a part of the project: Classification and explanations of antisocial personality disorder and moral and legal responsibility in the context of the Croatian mental health and care law (CEASCRO), grant n. 8071.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesUniversity of RijekaRijekaCroatia

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