Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Introduction

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Europe's New Fiscal Union

Abstract

The euro crisis has dramatically impacted the institutional architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The crisis propelled Europe towards an unprecedented and distinctive fiscal centralization trajectory. A unique form of fiscal authority has been institutionalized in the shadow of euro crisis management. Newly-centralized powers were not captured by the European Commission. Instead, powers have been fragmented and spread across both existing and new executive EMU bodies. After documenting this phenomenon, the chapter presents the key actors which embody Europe’s fiscal authority – the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup and reviews the relevant available literature. The chapter then explains how the data has been collected, specifies the book’s expected contributions and provides the roadmap of this book.

If money rules the world, who rules money?

(Margrit Kennedy)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Bauer, M., & Becker, S. (2014). The Unexpected Winner of the Crisis: The European Commission’s Strengthened Role in Economic Governance. Journal of European Integration, 36(3), 213–229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beetsma, R., & Uhlig, H. (1999). An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Economic Journal, 109(458), 546–571.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2014). The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(4), 703–722.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The New Intergovernmentalism: States, Supranational Actors, and European Politics in the Post-Maastricht Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brunila, A., Buti, M., & Franco, D. (Eds.). (2001). The Stability and Growth Pact: The Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU. Basingstoke: Palgrave Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buti, M., & Franco, D. (2005). Fiscal policy in EMU: Theory, Evidence and Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caporaso, J., & Rhodes, M. (Eds.). (2016). Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, M. (2013). Fiscal Policy Coordination and the Future of the Community Method. Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 255–269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chiti, E., & Teixeira, P. (2013). The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses To The Financial And Public Debt Crisis. Common Market Law Review, 50(3), 683–708.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dehousse, R. (2016). Why has EU Macroeconomic Governance Become More Supranational? Journal of European Integration, 38(5), 617–631.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dyson, K. (2002). European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen, B. (1990, April). One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union. Economic Policy, 5(10), 117–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen, B., & Wyplosz, C. (1993). The Unstable EMS. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1993(1), 51–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Enderlein, E. et al. (2012). Completing the Euro: A Roadmap Towards Fiscal Union in Europe, Report of the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group. Notre Europe.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. (2012, November 30). Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, Commission Communication, COM(2012) 777 final/2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fabbrini, S. (2013). Intergovernmentalism and Its Limits: Assessing the European Union’s Answer to the Euro Crisis. Comparative Political Studies, 46(9), 5–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldstein, M. (1992, June 13). Europe’s Monetary Union: The Case Against EMU. The Economist.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankel, J. (1992). On the Dollar. In P. Newman, M. Milgate, & J. Eatwell (Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance. London: Macmillan Press Reference Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, M. (1997, August 28). The Euro: Monetary Unity to Political Disunity? Project Syndicate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, M. (2011). How the European Union Constrains the State. Multilevel Governance of Taxation. European Journal of Political Research, 50(3), 293–314.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, M. (2013). Conclusion: The European Integration of Core State Powers. Patterns and Causes. In P. Genschel & M. Jachtenfuchs (Eds.), Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, M. (2016). More Integration, Less Federation: The European Integration of Core State Powers. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(1), 42–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodhart, C. (1998). The Two Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency Areas. European Journal of Political Economy, 14(3), 407–432.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haas, E. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces (1950–1957). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heipertz, M., & Verdun, A. (2010). Ruling Europe: The Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Héritier, A. (2013). Covert integration of Core State Powers: Renegotiating Incomplete Contracts. In P. Genschel & M. Jachtenfuchs (Eds.), Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European integration of core state powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodson, D. (2011). Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hodson, D. (2013). The Little Engine that Wouldn’t: Supranational Entrepreneurship and the Barroso Commission. Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 301–314.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hodson, D., & Maher, I. (2001). The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4), 719–746.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3), 862–915.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2008). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jabko, N. (2013). The Divided Sovereignty of the Eurozone. In P. Genschel & M. Jachtenfuchs (Eds.), Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kasel, A. (2012). La présidence de l’Eurogroupe et la gouvernance économique de la zone euro’. In V. Charlety (Ed.), Le Système présidentiel de l’Union Européenne après Lisbonne. Paris: ENA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindberg, L. N. (1963). The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majone, G. (2005). Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mcnamara, K. R. (1999). The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in European Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1999, December 29). Europas Notenbank ist (Europe’s Central Bank Is Lonely), Interview with Die Zeit.

    Google Scholar 

  • Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2000). The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings and the Genies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Puetter, U. (2006). The Eurogroup: How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers shape European Economic Governance. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Puetter, U. (2012). Europe’s Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and European Council in EU Economic Governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(2), 161–178.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salines, M., Glöckler, G., & Truchlewski, Z. (2012). Existential Crisis, Incremental Response: The Eurozone’s Dual Institutional Evolution 2007–2011. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5), 665–681.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandholtz, W., & Stone-Sweet, A. (Eds.). (1998). European Integration and Supranational Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf, F. (1988). The Joint-Decision Trap. Lessons From German Federalism and European Integration. Public Administration, 66(2), 239–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schelkle, W. (2013). Fiscal Integration by Default. In P. Genschel & M. Jachtenfuchs (Eds.), Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verdun, A. (Ed.). (2002). The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winkler, A. (2016). The ECB as Lender of Last Resort: Banks vs. Governments. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 235(3), 329–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yiangou, J., O’Keeffe, M., & Glöckler, G. (2013). ‘Tough Love’: How the ECB’s Monetary Financing Prohibition Pushes Deeper Euro Area Integration. Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 223–237.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. European University Institute, Florence, Italy

    Pierre Schlosser

Authors
  1. Pierre Schlosser
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Schlosser, P. (2019). Introduction. In: Europe's New Fiscal Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98636-4_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation