Abstract
This chapter discusses the effects of democracy on corruption. Autocratic regimes are in general associated with a high prevalence of corruption while democratic regimes seem much less affected by corruption. The reason why democracies are less corrupt is that elections increase the probability of corrupt officials being kicked out. Moreover, effective checks and balances under democracy increase the probability of corrupt acts being disclosed. Finally, transparency erodes the rent associated with being close to power. Tests of these arguments have been conducted, but the results are mixed. While there is a consensus about the anti-corruption effects of democracy, the empirical evidence suggests that the magnitude of the effects depends on various factors, such as the age and the degree of maturity of democracy as well as electoral rules (majority or proportional systems, presidential, parliamentary or federal approaches).
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Sekkat, K. (2018). Democracy. In: Is Corruption Curable?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98518-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98518-3_5
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