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Postscript, 2018: Why Counterinsurgency Is Still Flawed

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Abstract

Both Iraq and Afghanistan continue to suffer from domestic struggles for power. The conflicts represent a mix of civil war, where contenders with some legitimacy vie for power, and insurgency, where one side is preponderant and the other uses guerrilla tactics. When appropriate, outside counterinsurgency must focus on building local government capacity, even at the cost of some inefficiency in delivering services. Current US counterinsurgency strategy theoretically stresses linking people to their government but practically often substitutes for government by directly providing services. Both counterinsurgency strategies and international development strategies need to refocus on local legitimacy and engage local governments, near the people, as their best opportunity.

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de Tray, D. (2019). Postscript, 2018: Why Counterinsurgency Is Still Flawed. In: Why Counterinsurgency Fails. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97993-9_5

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