Abstract
In the closing days of the Second World War, the world’s political leaders made a commitment to global security and development. Their legacy materialized substantially in a set of international institutions of economic cooperation and conflict resolution, indirectly leading to the formalisation of the concept of official development assistance (ODA). Although such assistance seems only occasionally to have reached its promised objectives of poverty elimination and development enhancement, its designers, crafters and multiple contributors deserve much respect, recognition and admiration. Despite geopolitical considerations, a large part of their action can only be motivated by their high believe in human common destiny and solidarity. Development is a difficult process, always subject to multiple impediments. Some of these impediments may appear obvious, while many others are unsuspected, and unless all human efforts are joined for the same objective, the fight against global poverty risks fought in vain. The main instrument for this purpose is, by far, the official development assistance, which is significantly delivered through the BWFIs, which despite their efforts could not escape much criticism, to which they responded through timid governance reforms.
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Notes
- 1.
PPP is calculated with the following formula: [$ = P1/P2]. Where: $ is exchange rate of currency 1 to currency 2; P1 the cost of good g in currency 1; and P2 represents the cost of good g in currency 2.
- 2.
The largest member of the IMF is the United States, with a current quota (as of March 2017) of SDR82.99 billion (about US$113 billion), and the smallest member is Tuvalu, with a quota of SDR2.5 million (about US$3.4 million).
- 3.
Up to 25% must be paid in SDRs or widely accepted currencies (such as the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, or the British pound sterling), while the rest is paid in the member’s own currency.
- 4.
The Stand-By and Extended Arrangements (SBA) are designed to help countries address short-term balance of payments problems. The length of an SBA is typically 12–24 months, and repayment is due within 3¼–5 years of disbursement.
- 5.
Under the amended Article XII, Section 5(a).
- 6.
As of January 2018, SDR1 = US$1,428120.
- 7.
Currently, the United States’ power in the IMF and the WBG is vastly greater than the charter-determined right to veto decisions that require an 85% majority.
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Naciri, A. (2018). Concluding Remarks: A Lightened Cooperation and Assistance!. In: The Governance Structures of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions. SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97906-9_11
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