Ontology Is Social. How Arendt Solves a Wittgensteinian Problem

  • Anna Magdalena SchauppEmail author
Part of the Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences book series (WHPS, volume 1)


Imagine that you and other scholars come together to hold a conference, to meet each other and to engage in intellectual exchange. You encounter colleagues. You might know some of them but not others. You are curious about the presentations and excited about who is speaking. Before coming to the venue, you cannot know with whom you will engage in conversations. You also do not know whether the assembled community of scholars will succeed in turning the conference venue into a space of academic discussion. Some speaker is already in the middle of her presentation.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Projekt UMR 2027, Philipps-Universität MarburgMarburgGermany

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