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Some Further Themes on the Outlook of the Capitalist World

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Book cover The Unfree Market and the Law

Part of the book series: Economic and Financial Law & Policy – Shifting Insights & Values ((EFLP,volume 2))

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Abstract

It is obvious that, during the past centuries, capitalism has contributed to economic growth, be it that, in our times, the questions arise (1) at what price, (2) whether or not economic growth is really that important as the adherents of economic neo-liberalism want us to believe, and (3) whether this growth has not reached its limits.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Compare Harari (2014), pp. 372–373.

  2. 2.

    Harari expresses this as follows (Harari 2014, p. 372):

    The economic pie of 2014 is far larger than the pie of 1500, but it is distributed so unevenly that many African peasants and Indonesian labourers return home after a hard day’s work with less food than did their ancestors 500 ago. Much like the Agricultural Revolution, so too the growth of the modern economy might turn out to be a colossal fraude. The human species and the global economy may well keep growing, but many more individuals may live in hunger and want.

  3. 3.

    Piketty (2014). See even Bush (2010), p. 471.

  4. 4.

    See especially the observations of Thomas Piketty in this regard (see Piketty (2014)).

  5. 5.

    See https://www.nationaldebtclocks.org/.

  6. 6.

    The reason for this is that, under the logic of capitalism, the poorer a potential credit taker is, the higher the risk for the credit giver, so the higher the price (= the interest) that will be charged for the credit will be. As a result, the poorest economic agents (going from individuals to states) will bear the highest interest burden, which in its own turn makes the richest institutions on earth (and their shareholders), mainly private banks and similar financial institutions, ever more rich.

    As a result, the logic of the capitalist financial system literally implies that the rich get ever more rich to the detriment of the poor.

    One may observe this logic thus the more striking as regards so-called “shark loans”. (On the economic rationality behind loan sharks, see Ferguson (2009), p. 41.) Under the dictates of (unbridled) capitalism, it appears that poor people who don’t have access to regular bank credits, but who are nevertheless in need of credit, are inclined to take up credit from more wealthy members of society (among which certain types of specialized financial institutions) against extreme contractual conditions. Examples are being given of loan sharks charging 100% interest over a loan period of 30 days (see https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loansharking.asp; last consulted on June 16, 2018).

    Even the so-called micro-credits that were developed to help poor people in developing countries (by giving them access to cheap credit) have gotten contaminated by the capitalist ideas, where it has been mentioned in recent press that the interest charged for such micro-credit can also take extremely high proportions. (See for instance Máxima-bank vraagt ‘woekerrentes’ voor micro-kredieten. At: http://www.quotenet.nl/Nieuws/Maxima-bank-vraagt-woekerrentes-voor-micro-kredieten-145079 (last consulted on June 16, 2018).)

    All this illustrates how far away the capitalist credit practices are from the Christian ideals that those who have too much should be willing to share their excess wealth with those who are in need (Luke, 3:11) and that the one giving a loan should do this without the intention of ever getting paid back (Luke, 6:35), let alone of charging a high interest. (See also Byttebier (2017), p. 94 a.f.)

    Luke, 6:34–35 indeed reads as follows:

    And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? For sinners also lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil. (King James Version; http://biblehub.com/kjv/luke/6-34.htm; last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  7. 7.

    Compare Stiglitz (2002), p. 23.

  8. 8.

    This is yet another illustration of the turnaround of values caused by the capitalist ideologies.

  9. 9.

    Compare Stiglitz (2002), pp. 10–11.

  10. 10.

    In this context, Galbraith has pointed out that especially when a state (or another government) establishes a commission to study a problem, the laissez faire, laissez passer-principle in general is in place, as such commissions mostly work for such a long time that, whenever they present the outcome of their findings, the problems they researched have either lost public interest or, since then, more pressing problems have arisen which need a similar postponement approach. (See Galbraith (1992), p. 20.)

  11. 11.

    It has, for instance, been reported in November 2017 that the Belgian outstanding debt (= the public debt and the debt of private citizens combined) then amounted to 296% of the Belgian Gross Domestic Product. It was hereby, furthermore, mentioned that the combined private debt amounted to 190% of the GDP and the public debt to more than 100% of the GDP (See Belgische schuldenberg groter dan ooit. At: https://www.demorgen.be/economie/belgische-schuldenberg-groter-dan-ooit-bf4e2127/ (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  12. 12.

    See again also Stiglitz (2002), p. 10 a.f.

  13. 13.

    See for instance Sachs (2011).

  14. 14.

    See, for instance, the observations of the French Philosopher Michel Foucault, as referred to in Byttebier (2017), p. 326. See also Chomsky and Polychroniou (2017), p. 154.

  15. 15.

    Stiglitz (2010), p. 195.

  16. 16.

    Compare Chomsky (2017), p. 65 a.f.

  17. 17.

    See Clune (2013).

  18. 18.

    In a disguised form, this is what the “trickle-down-economy” is all about.

  19. 19.

    We have left open the question whether Smith himself sympathised with this vision to such an extent that he would deemed it a valid excuse for the many detrimental characteristics of modern-day capitalism.

  20. 20.

    See the further references in Byttebier (2017), p. 114 a.f. Also Byttebier (2015), pp. 145–147.

  21. 21.

    Stiglitz (2002), pp. 10–11.

  22. 22.

    Where labour is still even provided by underaged children who barely get compensated.

  23. 23.

    Galbraith (1987), p. 84. See also the findings of Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse.

  24. 24.

    Bruckner (2002), p. 26; see also Fromm (1979), p. 90 a.f.

  25. 25.

    Smith (1979), p. 47; Berend (2006), p. 14; Bruckner (2002), p. 26.

  26. 26.

    Loizou (2012), p. 32.

  27. 27.

    See especially Vinton (2017).

  28. 28.

    See for instance Webster (2017). See already before Daisy (2015).

  29. 29.

    See especially Sachs (2011). See already before Galbraith and Salinger (1978), p. 162.

  30. 30.

    Oxfam (2014).

  31. 31.

    Bruckner (2002), 25 a.f.

  32. 32.

    Ongenae (2014), p. 44.

  33. 33.

    Bruckner (2002), p. 20. See also Fromm (1979), p. 85 a.f.

  34. 34.

    Kruithof (1985), pp. 56–56.

    See also Ripple (2017):

    We are jeopardizing our future by not reining in our intense but geographically and demographically uneven material consumption and by not perceiving continued rapid population growth as a primary driver behind many ecological and even societal threats. By failing to adequately limit population growth, reassess the role of an economy rooted in growth, reduce greenhouse gases, incentivize renewable energy, protect habitat, restore ecosystems, curb pollution, halt defaunation, and constrain invasive alien species, humanity is not taking the urgent steps needed to safeguard our imperilled biosphere.

  35. 35.

    This is the so-called “market leadership” myth. (See also Simon (2009), p. 54.)

  36. 36.

    Kruithof (2000), p. 15.

  37. 37.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 17; Kruithof (1985), p. 57.

    Especially in the debate of global warming, the negationism of mainly socio-economic “right” oriented thinkers takes worrying proportions.

    Achenbach has in this regard pointed out that in 2015 almost half of the Americans did not believe that the use of fossil fuels contributes to global warming (see Achenbach (2015), p. 134):

    People emphasising the sense of community, are inclined to distrust large capitals and advocate strong government regulations; they usually deny the risks of climate change. People who are more hierarchical and individualistic, have respect for successful business men and do not like government involvement, they are inclined to deny warnings on climate change, recognising that accepting it, will lead to taxes or regulations to reduce greenhouse emissions. In the US the debate has become an acid test, where someone joins one group or another. When we argue about climate (…), we actually argue about who we are and to which club we belong.

    See furthermore Ripple (2017):

    The earth is finite. Its ability to absorb wastes and destructive effluent is finite. Its ability to provide food and energy is finite. Its ability to provide for growing numbers of people is finite. And we are fast approaching many of the earth’s limits. Current economic practices which damage the environment, in both developed and underdeveloped nations, cannot be continued without the risk that vital global systems will be damaged beyond repair.

  38. 38.

    See Wolffers (2011), p. 92, on the immense power of the food industry.

    See also Gore (2013b), p. 283.

  39. 39.

    Wolffers (2011), p. 240 a.f.

    In Western countries alone, the pharmaceutical industry is estimated to have made 10% of the population addicted to antidepressants and other “legitimate” narcotics. For instance, according to recent research by the “Christian mutuality” (a public health insurer), in Flanders alone, one out of 6 people takes sedatives on a very regular basis, which, given the very addictive characteristics of these drugs, is a very worrying high figure.

    See furthermore Harari (2014), p. 368.

  40. 40.

    Hartwell (2014).

  41. 41.

    See also Oxfam (2017), p. 6, referring to this problem as to one of the “false assumptions” on which the capitalistic economic system is based:

    False assumption #6: Our planet’s resources are limitless. This is not only a false assumption, but one which could lead to catastrophic consequences for our planet. Our economic model is based on exploiting our environment and ignoring the limits of what our planet can bear. It is an economic system that is a major driver of runaway climate change.

  42. 42.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 19.

  43. 43.

    Marcuse (1968), p. 102.

  44. 44.

    Steger (2013), p. 41.

  45. 45.

    Rand (2008), p. 26.

  46. 46.

    Pauli (2014), p. 33.

  47. 47.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 4.

  48. 48.

    Krugman (1998), p. 80 a f.

  49. 49.

    See Steger (2013), p. 41; Lloyd (2012), p. 370 a.f.; Berend (2006), p. 263 a.f.

  50. 50.

    Berend (2006), p. 269.

  51. 51.

    Turner (1973).

  52. 52.

    On this subject, see also Stiglitz (2002), p. 23.

  53. 53.

    Steger (2013), p. 31.

  54. 54.

    As phrased by Ripple (2017):

    But, even at this moment, one person in five lives in absolute poverty without enough to eat, and one in ten suffers serious malnutrition.

  55. 55.

    Stiglitz and Chariton (2005); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2014); Lloyd (2012), p. 374.

  56. 56.

    As said earlier, Harari (2014), p. 372, has phrased this strikingly as follows:

    The economic pie of 2014 is far larger than the pie of 1500, but it is distributed so unevenly that many African peasants and Indonesian labourers return home after a hard day’s work with less food than did their ancestors 500 ago. Much like the Agricultural Revolution, so too the growth of the modern economy might turn out to be a colossal fraude. The human species and the global economy may well keep growing, but many more individuals may live in hunger and want.

  57. 57.

    See also Stiglitz (2002), p. 10, explaining why referring to labour as a (mere) production factor is inappropriate.

  58. 58.

    See the OECD-Country note referring to Belgium, at: http://www.oecd.org/edu/Belgium-EAG2014-Country-Note.pdf (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

    See furthermore Anonymous (2013), Paelinck (2014) and Temmerman (2014).

  59. 59.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 67.

  60. 60.

    See Michielsen (2014), pp. 13–14.

  61. 61.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 67.

  62. 62.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 68.

  63. 63.

    For an inside story on these, see Walker and Hartley (2012).

  64. 64.

    See furthermore Stiglitz (2002), p. 23.

  65. 65.

    For instance in Belgium, there are next to the actual taxes, several so-called “social security contributions” in play which, from an economic point of view, have the same effect as actual taxes themselves.

    See in this regard furthermore Stiglitz (2010), p. 197; see also Kruithof (2012), p. 76.

  66. 66.

    Baeck (1972), p. 82.

  67. 67.

    Hallerberg and Bridwell (2008), p. 74.

  68. 68.

    Meanwhile, this is a problem which has repeatedly compromised the attempts of subsequent Belgian federal governments to balance government financing (see for instance Moerman (2014), p. 18).

  69. 69.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 16 a.f.

  70. 70.

    With, for instance, the exception of countries which have called upon special financing resources provided by the IMF and which are as a result subjected to a stricter monitoring by the same IMF (see Fritz-Krockow and Ramlogan (2007), p. 38 a.f.).

  71. 71.

    Stiglitz (2012), p. 210.

  72. 72.

    Krugman (1994), p. 156 a.f.; Streeck (2013), p. 70 a.f.; Bonner and Wiggin (2006), p. 226 a.f.

  73. 73.

    Obviously, also before in history countries became endebted to the bank sector. (See Graeber (2012).)

  74. 74.

    Brook and Watkins (2012), p. 33.

    See also Keen (2017), pointing out that (and in what way) Germany is one of the main exceptions in this regard:

    Germany is virtually the only country in the world with falling levels of both public and private debt. But this is only possible because of its huge trade surplus. Trade deficits must be financed by borrowing. Germany’s trading partners are getting deeper into debt in order to buy German goods. In essence, Germany is offshoring the creation of its money supply. That can’t go on forever, because it eventually results in overindebtedness in trade deficit countries.

  75. 75.

    Ingham (1984), p. 48.

  76. 76.

    See Streeck (2013), p. 73:

    The development of the debt state may be understood both as a retarding factor in the crisis of the tax state and as the rise of a new political formation with its own laws.

  77. 77.

    See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last consulted on June 16, 2018); Cohen (2008), p. 167; Van Meerhaeghe (1985), p. 97.

  78. 78.

    Stiglitz (2012), p. 208.

  79. 79.

    See especially Piketty (2014). See even Bush (2010), p. 471.

    In an interview with the Duch newspaper “De Volskrant”, former ECB-president Jean-Claude Trichet expressed his concerns for the huge amounts of outstanding public debt, especially of the Members of the European Union (see De Waard (2018)):

    Trichet’s main concern is that the global debt burden – both public and private debt – is at present higher than before the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. “This indicates how fragile the system still is. The IMF has pointed this out this very weak. And, to my opinion, the international community is not sufficiently aware of this fact.” (Own, free translation.)

  80. 80.

    See on this for instance Friedman (1993).

  81. 81.

    See the similar concern recently expressed by former ECB-president J.-C. Trichet (see De Waard (2018)).

  82. 82.

    See in general Harari (2014), p. 352.

    See also Coffey (2012):

    That means the real power to control the world lies with four companies: McGraw-Hill, which owns Standard & Poor’s, Northwestern Mutual, which owns Russell Investments, the index arm of which runs the benchmark Russell 1,000 and Russell 3,000, CME Group which owns 90% of Dow Jones Indexes, and Barclay’s, which took over Lehman Brothers and its Lehman Aggregate Bond Index, the dominant world bond fund index. Together, these four firms dominate the world of indexing. And in turn, that means they hold real sway over the world’s money.

  83. 83.

    This worry is moreover not new, as ancient philosophers such as Plato, already expressed it. (See Plato (1987), p. 296 a.f., dealing with so-called “imperfect societies”.)

  84. 84.

    Sachs (2011), p. 116 a.f.; Kruithof (2000), p. 14; Krugman (2004), p. 221.

  85. 85.

    See for instance Diks (2013).

    According to this author, the wealth of the Rotschild family can be estimated at 490,000,000,000,000,000 USD, or 490,000 trillion USD. The author of this article explicitly refers to the power to (privately) create money out of nothing and the fact that, because of this power, entire nations have entirely become in the grip of the private banking sector, as one of the main causes for this extreme wealth accumulation. The author, furthermore, points out that if the Rothschild family would be willing to share its extreme wealth, every human being would obtain 70 million USD.

    Other sources mention a far more moderate wealth of the Rotschild family, estimated at a “mere” USD 350 billion in assets throughout the world, however at the same time indicating that much of the family’s wealth is held privately, making it is very difficult to ascertain their true net worth, and that, moreover, a lot of the family’s wealth is distributed among different family members across different countries and different businesses (see https://www.quora.com/Why-does-500-trillion-rich-Rothschilds-are-not-on-Forbes-richest-people-list; last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  86. 86.

    This, additionally, creates an important intergenerational shift, as the next generations will have to carry the financial burden created by the opulence and waste of the former generations.

  87. 87.

    Galbraith (1992), p. 20.

  88. 88.

    See for further comments on the so-called “too big to fail”-paradigm, Chomsky (2017), p. 83 (speaking of the “too big to jail”-paradigm).

    With regards to Belgium, the bail-out efforts done in 2008–2009 in order to support banks in need, are reported to have been responsible for 15% of the then total government debt, a fact that for Rik van Cauwelaert represents a sufficient motive for the introduction of a special bank tax (ensuring that banks take their responsibility in supporting the re-payment of this debt, moreover because Belgian banks, in history, have always made a lot of profit on financing the Belgian government debt …). (See Van Cauwelaert (2014).)

  89. 89.

    Engelen (2011), p. 27. See also Chomsky and Polychroniou (2017), p. 153 a.f.

  90. 90.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 217.

  91. 91.

    Kruithof (1985), p. 57.

  92. 92.

    See also De Waard (2018), containing an interview with former ECB-president J.-C. Trichet.

  93. 93.

    The same applies to the climate change problem, one of the most important other problems of our times which the doctrines of economic neo-liberalism prefer to simply ignore.

  94. 94.

    See also Piketty (2014), p. 540, who, for that reason, prefers taxation as a technique of government financing above debt financing.

  95. 95.

    The “reduction” of debts through new credits (so-called credit financing), obviously does not bring a solution, as it only leads to a (from an intergenerational perspective very unjust) shift of the problem.

  96. 96.

    Which will take place in case of economic growth, including especially export of own products and services.

  97. 97.

    This will happen in case of a stagnating or negative economic growth (which in general leads to a higher dependence on import).

  98. 98.

    See also Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018), n° 32:

    The offshore system has also ended up aggravating the public debt of the countries whose economies are less developed. It was in fact observed how the accumulated private wealth of some elites in the fiscal havens is almost equal to the public debt of the respective countries. This highlights how, in fact, at the origin of that debt there are often economic losses created by private persons and unloaded on the shoulders of the public system. Moreover, it is noted that important economic players tend to follow, often with the collusion of the politicians, a practice of division of the losses.

  99. 99.

    Piketty describes this as follows (Piketty (2014), p. 540):

    The rich world is rich, but the governments of the rich world are poor.

  100. 100.

    Think tanks, such as the aforementioned “Club of Rome” have already for decades been warning about this.

  101. 101.

    Compare Ronse (1992), p. 79.

    The Catholic church has even put it more bluntly:

    it is good to point out how often the public debt is also created by an incautious, if not fraudulent, management of the public administrative system. These debts, those financial losses that burden the various nations, pose today one of the major obstacles to good functioning and growth of the various national economies. Numerous national economies are in fact burdened by having to cope with the payment of interest, which derives from that debt, and must therefore dutifully undertake structural adjustments to suit this need. (See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018), n° 32.)

  102. 102.

    As regards especially Europe, see Krugman (2012), p. 177 a.f.; Stiglitz (2012), p. 254. See also Dévoluy et al. (2011), p. 52.

  103. 103.

    See De Boeck (2014), p. 12; Van Haver and Blomme (2014), p. 6; Haeck (2014).

  104. 104.

    Piketty (2014), p. 540.

  105. 105.

    Stiglitz (2002), p. 11.

    See also Oxfam (2017), p. 20, catching this problem in the phrase “tax is for everyone else”:

    One of the main ways that the super-rich contribute to broader society is through taxes incurred on their income, wealth and capital gains, which can pay for essential public services and redistributes wealth from the richest to the most vulnerable people. However, the IMF has found that tax systems around the world have become steadily less progressive since the early 1980s, via the lowering of the top rate of income tax, cuts to taxes on capital gains and reductions in inheritance and wealth taxes.

  106. 106.

    See Stiglitz (2002), p. 10, rightly criticizing the use of this term.

  107. 107.

    See Stiglitz (2002), p. 11.

  108. 108.

    It needs to be emphasized that, when mentioning “income from labour”, this not only refers to labour performed as an employee, but for instance also to labour performed as an independent worker in his own (or in a small business). Indeed, in addition to working classes in a strict sense of the word, also small independent business owners, as well as small and medium enterprises, are clearly interesting sources of income through taxation for many (Western and Western inspired) governments.

  109. 109.

    See Stiglitz (2002), p. 13, furthermore pointing out that this is even more the case due to (neo-)liberalization measures:

    Capital market liberalization enhances the bargaining power of capital: effectively, it gives “capital” the right to announce that if it is taxed unduly, or if other measures that it dislikes are adopted, i will leave the country.

  110. 110.

    Stiglitz (2012), p. 73:

    The rich and superrich often use corporations to protect themselves and shelter their income, and they have worked hard to ensure that the corporate income tax rate is low and the tax code is riddled with loopholes. Some corporations make such extensive use of these provisions that they don’t pay any taxes.

  111. 111.

    Stiglitz (2012), pp. 73 a.f.; Stiglitz (2002), pp. 13–14; see also Oxfam (2014), 16.

    For some striking examples, see Oxfam (2016), pp. 27 a.f., for instance mentioning some of the practices of Belgian beer producer “AB InBev”:

    The Belgium-based Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev) is the world’s largest brewing company, and sells over 200 different brands of beer across Europe, Asia and America. Not only does the company dominate the market—it has a powerful political voice too. It spent $3.7m lobbying the US government in 2014, and 56 of the 141 lobbying reports it filed were on issues relating to taxation. AB InBev has used its influence to deliberately target legislation designed in the public interest, for example establishing voluntary advertising standards to avoid limitations on advertising to young people. In Brazil before the 2014 World Cup, the company was involved with FIFA in pressuring the government to change a law banning the consumption of alcohol at football matches, so that its products could be sold. Small retailers also pay a price for corporate dominance. In the US, the Justice Department is currently probing allegations that AB InBev is curbing competition by buying up distributors, making it harder for micro-breweries to get their products onto store shelves. (See Oxfam (2016), p. 28.)

  112. 112.

    See also Brockmans (2014), p. 26; Bernstein (2004), p. 30.

    In its study “Even it up”, Oxfam for instance mentions the case of Nicaragua, where, in 2014 the poorest 20% of the population is forced to spend 31% of their income on income taxes, while the richest 20% only have to spend 13% of their income on taxes (see Oxfam (2014), p. 83).

    Oxfam has in this regard even argued that, at the beginning of 2016, the global system of tax avoidance to the benefit of the rich and the powerful is sucking the life out of welfare states in the rich world, for instance denying poor countries the resources they need to tackle poverty, put children in school and prevent their citizens dying from easily curable diseases.

    See also Oxfam (2017), p. 4 a.f.:

    Paying as little tax as possible is a key strategy for many of the super-rich. To do this they make active use of the secretive global network of tax havens, as revealed by the Panama Papers and other exposés. Countries compete to attract the super-rich, selling their sovereignty.

  113. 113.

    Stiglitz (2006), pp. 269 a.f.; and Stiglitz (2002), p. 25.

    While we all speak passionately about the importance of democratic principles, we also recognize that our democracies are imperfect and that some groups’ voices are heard more loudly than others. In the arena of international economic policy, the voices of commercial and financial interests are heard more loudly than those of labour and consumer interests. As just noted, they have tried to convince others, with remarkable success, that there is no conflict of interests – which means that there are no trade-offs. The consequences speak for themselves: the growing dissatisfaction with reform policies is partly a consequence of the fact that so many have actually been made worse off. (Stiglitz (2002), p. 25.)

    Compare Soros (1999), pp. 121–123; Hazenberg (2013), p. 136. See also Kruithof (2000), pp. 145 a.f.; Bijlo (2014), p. 63.

    Michel Foucault has in this regard held that in particular the objective of big enterprises to seize political power is characteristic for the particularity of economic neo-liberalism. Where classic “economic liberalism” had been about a given economy determining a space in which the free market can grow unhindered, neo-liberalism is exactly about how the political exercise of power can be modeled to the needs of such free market economy (or, put otherwise, the selfish needs of the rich and powerful). According to Foucault, this is precisely the reason why economic neo-liberalism is much more directing than classic economic liberalism as regards market mechanisms (= neo-liberalism as so-called “intervening liberalism”), which as a result explains in more depth the tendency of economic neo-liberalism to influence politics (inter alia, in the field of fiscal decision making, but for example also in the field of monetary policy). (See Foucault (2008), pp. 247 a.f. and 270 a.f.; also Foucault (2013), p. 181. See furthermore Oxfam (2017), p. 4, confirming all of this.)

  114. 114.

    Oxfam (2015), p. 5.

    For instance, the large and successful enterprises operating in the financial and insurance sector each year make gigantic profits come from different activities, among which large-scale lending to states (and other public entities). These profits are mainly used for financing dividend payments to shareholders which explains the enormous wealth of the very rich. However, substantial amounts of these profits are also used for financing all types of mechanisms influencing governments (so-called “corporatocracy”). (See Oxfam (2015), p. 7.)

    In 2013, the financial sector for instance spent only in the USA 400 million USD on lobbying activities and next to that 517 million USD on campaign financing, which makes it the second largest lobbyist with a share of 12% of global spending on lobbying in the USA. In the European Union, the expenditure for lobbying by the financial sector was “limited” to 150 million USD. Meanwhile, the global community of the Western economies remains burdened with the large financing cost of the bailouts of 2008–2009, which are estimated to have amounted to 21 billion USD in the USA alone. It is furthermore striking that, while the financial sector has been able to rise up again from the ashes created by the financial crisis which it had, to a large extent, caused itself and once again makes extremely high profits again, which, under the form of dividend payments, flow back to the very rich, the income of the average American had in 2015 still not been restored to the level it had before the financial crisis. (See Oxfam (2015), p. 7.)

    Also in 2013, the pharmaceutical sector and the health sector spent as much as 487 million USD on lobbying expenses, which made this sector the largest lobbyist (with a share of 15% of total lobbying expenditure). During that period, the sector spent moreover 260 million USD on campaign financing. The expenditure of the pharmaceutical sector and the health sector in Europe in the same year was estimated at ±50 million USD. (See Oxfam (2015), p. 7.)

  115. 115.

    Oxfam (2015), p. 9.

  116. 116.

    More specifically the idea that the rich (entrepreneurs) are the driving force within society and should, therefore, be burdened by taxation as little as possible, so that they may continue their “noble pursuit” of striving for unbridled wealth, given the beneficial effects this has for the rest of society. In this, thinking of economic neo-liberalism clearly goes back to the ideas of Adam Smith, who also expressed his contempt for taxing the rich entrepreneurs as they should remain unhindered in their noble plight of bringing more prosperity to the world.

  117. 117.

    Steger (2013), p. 42; Lipton (2014); see also Oxfam (2014), p. 16 a.f.

  118. 118.

    Sachs (2011), p. 118.

  119. 119.

    Bijlo (2014), p. 63.

    As explained in Oxfam’s study “Even it up” (see Oxfam (2014), p. 16):

    The race to the bottom on corporate tax collection is a large part of the problem. Multilateral agencies and finance institutions have encouraged developing countries to offer taks incentives – tax holidays, tax exemptions and free trade zones – to attract foreign direct investment. Such incentives have soared, undermining the tax base in some of the poorest countries. In 2008/09, for instance, the Rwandan government authorized tax exemptions that, if collected, could have doubled health and education spending.

  120. 120.

    See already Galbraith (1974), pp. 91 a.f.

    See also Bijlo (2014), p. 63. Furthermore Légé (2011), pp. 89–108; Oxfam (2016), p. 5.

  121. 121.

    Bernstein (2004), p. 30, also explicitly pointing out that in the post-modern (neo-liberalized) world, the weakest and poorest are the ones who are most heavily taxed.

    See also in the report “Even it up” of Oxfam:

    For instance, today’s lopsided tax policies, lax regulatory regimes and unrepresentative institutions in countries around the world are a result of this elite capture of politics. Elites in rich and poor countries alike use their heightened political influence to benefit from government decisions, including tax exemptions, sweetheart contracts, land concessions and subsidies, while pressuring administrations to block policies that may strengthen the hand of workers or smallholder food producers, or that increase taxation to make it more progressive. In many countries, access to justice is often for sale, legally or illegally, with access to the best lawyers or the ability to cover court costs only available to a privileged few. (See Oxfam (2014), p. 59.)

  122. 122.

    Oxfam (2014), pp. 16 a.f. See also Streeck (2017).

  123. 123.

    On this policy goal, see Stiglitz (2002), p. 27.

  124. 124.

    For further details, see Anonymous (2014).

  125. 125.

    For further proposals in this regard, see Byttebier (2017), Chapters 4 and 5.

  126. 126.

    Such as: J. K. Gailbraith (see especially Galbraith (1974), pp. 95–96), in addition to his numerous other publications; Amartya Sen (see especially Sen (1977, 2009)); Paul Krugman (see e.g. Krugman (2009, 2012)); Joseph E. Stiglitz (see e.g. Stiglitz (2002, 2006, 2012)); Thomas Piketty (see e.g. Piketty (2014)); Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina (see Roser and Ortiz-Ospina (2017)).

  127. 127.

    See also Stiglitz (2002), his whole contribution dealing with this topic.

  128. 128.

    Galbraith (1992), pp. 90–91.

  129. 129.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 8.

  130. 130.

    Stiglitz (2002), p. 25.

  131. 131.

    Steger (2013), p. 42.

    See also Turner (2016), p. 119, having pointed out:

    Inequality has grown dramatically in advanced economies over the past 30 years. Since 1980 the bottom quintile of U.S. earners has received no increase in real wages; the income of the top 1% have tripled (…). The root causes are widely debated. Globalization of product and financial markets has certainly played a significant role; the impact of new technology may even be more profound. And the growth of finance has itself produced rapidly increasing earnings at the top of distribution.

    Even the Catholic church has in the recent past reached this insight:

    Although global economic well-being appears to have increased in the second half of the twentieth century with an unprecedented magnitude and speed, at the same time inequalities proliferate between various countries and within them. Moreover, the number of people who live in conditions of extreme poverty continues to be enormous. (See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018), n° 5.)

  132. 132.

    Bruckner (2002), p. 21:

    On connaît les chiffres dans leur redoutable monotonie (même si certains peuvent les contester).

  133. 133.

    Pizzigati (2012), p. 319.

  134. 134.

    Galbraith (1974), pp. 95–96:

    In 1965 the one-tenth of families and unattached individuals with the lowest incomes received before taxes about 1 per cent of the total money income of the country; the tenth with the highest incomes received 28 per cent of the total, which is to say their incomes averaged 28 times as much as the lowest tenth. The half of the households with the lowest incomes received, before taxes, only 23 per cent of all money income. The half with the highest income received 77 per cent. In 1965 only about 6 per cent of all family units had incomes before taxes of more than $15,000. They received, none the less, 27 per cent of total income. At the other extreme, 25 per cent had before tax incomes of less than three thousand and received only 4 per cent of the income.

  135. 135.

    Steger (2013), pp. 113–115.

  136. 136.

    Lloyd (2012), p. 374.

  137. 137.

    Oxfam (2014), pp. 9–11 and pp. 35 a.f.; Oxfam (2016), pp. 4 a.f.

  138. 138.

    See e.g. Haeck (2014), p. 6.

  139. 139.

    See also Bahree (2016):

    There is also (...) a strong correlation between extreme inequality and low social mobility.

    If you are born poor in a highly unequal country you will most probably die poor, and your children and grandchildren will be poor too. In Pakistan, for instance, a boy born in a rural area to a father from the poorest 20% of the population has only a 1.9% chance of ever moving to the richest 20%. In the U.S., nearly half of all children born to low-income parents will become low-income adults.

  140. 140.

    This even has raised the question to what extent former outbursts of violence in American schools (see for instance the Columbine- and comparable drama’s; on this: Cullen (2009), p. 417; see also van Oudheusden (2012), p. 164) have been an expression of this downward spiral in the field of public education financing and investments in social care systems. (See furthermore Galbraith (1992), p. 122.) In more recent times, a similar question arises as regards the wave of terrorist attacks that have occurred in several European cities.

  141. 141.

    Piketty (2014).

  142. 142.

    See also Pauli (2014), pp. 32–35.

  143. 143.

    Oxfam (2014).

  144. 144.

    Oxfam (2014), pp. 8 and 32.

  145. 145.

    Oxfam (2014), pp. 8 and 32.

  146. 146.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 32.

  147. 147.

    McCarthy (2014).

  148. 148.

    McCarthy (2014).

  149. 149.

    Oxfam (2015).

  150. 150.

    Oxfam (2015), p. 2.

  151. 151.

    Oxfam (2015), p. 3.

  152. 152.

    Crédit Suisse Research Institute (2015).

  153. 153.

    Treanor (2015).

  154. 154.

    Treanor (2015).

  155. 155.

    The report hereby defines “wealth” as the value of assets including property and stock market investments, but excluding debt (see Treanor 2015).

  156. 156.

    Treanor (2015).

  157. 157.

    Treanor (2015).

  158. 158.

    Anderson (2015a, b).

  159. 159.

    Oxfam (2016).

  160. 160.

    Bahree (2016).

  161. 161.

    OECD (2013). See also https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/trends-in-income-inequality-and-its-impact-on-economic-growth_5jxrjncwxv6j-en (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  162. 162.

    https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/research/research-institute/global-wealth-report.html (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

    Global wealth grew at a faster pace to USD 280 trillion, the highest since the bank began tracking it in 2000. The US accounted for more than half the increase. The growth was fuelled not only by widespread gains in equity markets but also substantial increases in non-financial assets, the report said. Average global wealth grew 4.9% to a record $56,540 per adult, with the richest 1% owning about half of all household wealth (see Anonymous (2018a)).

  163. 163.

    Anonymous (2018a).

  164. 164.

    Crédit Suisse Research Institute (2017), p. 4.

  165. 165.

    Anonymous (2018a).

  166. 166.

    Crédit Suisse Research Institute (2017), p. 27 a.f. See also Anonymous (2018a).

  167. 167.

    Crédit Suisse Research Institute (2017), p. 39.

  168. 168.

    Crédit Suisse Research Institute (2017), p. 16.

  169. 169.

    Oxfam (2017).

  170. 170.

    In the previously quoted Oxfam report of 2016, this number was 62.

  171. 171.

    https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  172. 172.

    Oxfam (2017), p. 2.

  173. 173.

    https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  174. 174.

    See however the earlier quoted extreme wealth of the Rotschild family, referred to earlier in footnote 85.

  175. 175.

    https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  176. 176.

    Oxfam (2017), p. 3.

  177. 177.

    Oxfam (2017), p. 3 a.f.; https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

    Oxfam for instance interviewed women working in a garment factory in Vietnam who work 12 hours a day, 6 days a week and still struggle to get by on the USD 1 an hour they earn producing clothes for some of the world’s biggest fashion brands. The CEOs of these companies are some of the highest paid people in the world.

  178. 178.

    https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  179. 179.

    https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  180. 180.

    https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  181. 181.

    Gilmore (2018). See also Knight Frank Research (2018).

  182. 182.

    On the crisis of the British welfare state in general, see Taylor-Gooby (2013).

  183. 183.

    Taylor-Gooby (2013), p. 2.

  184. 184.

    Taylor-Gooby (2013), p. 2.

  185. 185.

    Whitham (2016).

  186. 186.

    https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues-we-work-on/poverty-in-the-uk/challenging-extreme-economic-inequality (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  187. 187.

    https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues-we-work-on/poverty-in-the-uk/challenging-extreme-economic-inequality (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  188. 188.

    Whitham (2016).

  189. 189.

    Whitham (2016).

  190. 190.

    Whitham (2016).

  191. 191.

    Even in the Aristotelian sense of the word.

  192. 192.

    Compare Chomsky (2017), p. 65 a.f.

  193. 193.

    See for instance Friedman (1993). See also the works of Ayn Rand referred to under “References”, next to numerous other neo-liberal authors.

  194. 194.

    For some recent data in this regard, see Oxfam (2017), p. 17:

    In publicly listed companies, this drive for ever-greater profit has delivered rich rewards for shareholders. For corporations in the UK, the proportion of profits going to shareholders as dividend payments rather than being reinvested in the business, has risen from 10% of profits in the 1970s to 70% today. In 2015, the proportion was 86% and 84% for Australia and New Zealand respectively, thanks in part to a tax credit that investors receive on their dividend payouts. In India, as profits have been rising for the 100 largest listed corporations, the share of net profits going to dividends has also increased steadily over the last decade, reaching 34% in 2014/15, with around 12 private corporations paying more than 50% of their profits as dividends (…). Corporations have also been hoarding cash: according to rating agency Moody’s, US (non-financial) corporations held a total of $1.7 trillion on their balance sheets at the end of 2015135 and have been buying back their own shares to further increase the value for shareholders. In the US, the 500 largest listed corporations spent on average 64% of their profit on buying back shares between September 2014 and September 2016.

  195. 195.

    Reference being made to the well-known “laissez faire, laissez passer”-principle.

  196. 196.

    See also Stiglitz (2002), p. 16.

  197. 197.

    Iceland being a noteable exception. (See, for instance Syrmopoulos (2015); https://www.mintpressnews.com/iceland-has-sent-26-bankers-to-prison-while-us-white-collar-prosecutions-hit-record-low/210595/; last consulted on June 16, 2018.)

    As pointed out by Syrmopoulos (2015):

    Massive debts were incurred in the name of the Icelandic public, to allow the country to continue to function, which are still being repaid to the IMF and other nations eight years later by the citizens of Iceland. In contrast to the U.S., Iceland has chosen to hold the criminals that manipulated their financial system accountable under the law.

    See also Chomsky (2017), p. 83 a.f.

  198. 198.

    Even the Catholic church has reached a similar conclusion:

    The recent financial crisis might have provided the occasion to develop a new economy, more attentive to ethical principles, and a new regulation of financial activities that would neutralise predatory and speculative tendencies and acknowledge the value of the actual economy. Although there have been many positive efforts at various levels which should be recognized and appreciated, there does not seem to be any inclination to rethink the obsolete criteria that continue to govern the world. On the contrary, the response seems at times like a return to the heights of myopic egoism, limited by an inadequate framework that, excluding the common good, also excludes from its horizons the concern to create and spread wealth, and to eliminate the inequality so pronounced today. (See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018), n° 5.)

  199. 199.

    Meredith (2014), pp. 100–103.

  200. 200.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 10.

    Stiglitz’ comment in question does not essentially differ from the insights of Thomas Malthus.

  201. 201.

    Meredith (2014), pp. 100–103, esp. p. 103.

  202. 202.

    Galbraith (1992), p. 129.

  203. 203.

    United Nations Development Programme (2014), p. 3.

  204. 204.

    Galbraith (1974).

  205. 205.

    See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/food-banks-archbishop-of-canterbury-urges-politicians-to-face-up-to-britains-hunger-9909324.html (last consulted on June 16, 2018); See also http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/hunger-has-not-vanished-from-our-affluent-even-overweight-society%2D%2Das-archbishop-welby-has-pointed-out-9909189.html (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  206. 206.

    Moore (2018) and Bulman (2018).

  207. 207.

    Moore (2018). See also Bulman (2018); https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues-we-work-on/poverty-in-the-uk (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  208. 208.

    Roser and Ortiz-Ospina (2017).

  209. 209.

    http://www.feedingamerica.org/ (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  210. 210.

    This was moreover reported to be the highest number in over 50 years. (See Feeding America (2014), p. 3.)

  211. 211.

    http://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-in-america/impact-of-hunger/hunger-and-poverty/ (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  212. 212.

    See http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/14poverty.cfm (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  213. 213.

    See Feeding America (2014).

    See also http://help.feedingamerica.org/site/PageServer/?pagename=HIA_hunger_in_america&s_src=W14CDIRCT&s_subsrc=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.feedingamerica.org%2F&_ga=1.31822968.715348318.1418886761 (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  214. 214.

    See Feeding America (2014), p. 1:

    Unemployment and poverty rates have remained high since the Great Recession of 2008, and the number of households receiving nutrition assistance from the federal government’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program has increased by approximately 50 percent between 2009 and 2013. Demand for charitable food assistance has also expanded. HIA 2014 finds an increased number of individuals relying on charitable assistance to access nutritious foods for themselves and their families.

    See also Feeding America (2014), p. 3:

    The economy has experienced an unusually slow recovery since the deep recession in 2008 and 2009. The nation’s poverty rate reached 15.1 percent in 2010, the highest rate since 1993. The poverty rate remained at 15 percent in 2012 with 46.5 million people living in poverty. This is the largest number living in poverty since statistics were first published more than 50 years ago.

  215. 215.

    Coleman-Jensen et al. (2017).

  216. 216.

    Coleman-Jensen et al. (2017).

  217. 217.

    See http://www.feedingamerica.org/. See also Feeding America (2017).

  218. 218.

    Geysels (2014), pp. 11–59, esp. pp. 24–27. See also Raspoet (2014), pp. 51–55.

  219. 219.

    http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/957/Binnenland/article/detail/2262911/2015/03/24/15-procent-van-de-Belgen-leeft-onder-armoedegrens.dhtml (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  220. 220.

    See Lahaye et al. (2017). See also Anonymous (2018b).

  221. 221.

    See Anonymous (2018b).

  222. 222.

    Rand (2008), p. 23.

  223. 223.

    Gailbraith has observed that under these doctrines, the only role reserved for the government lies in spending for military reasons, for subsidies to large corporations and agriculture and for financing “bailouts” of financial institutions in need. (See Galbraith (1992), p. 122.)

  224. 224.

    Friedman (1993), p. 11.

  225. 225.

    See for instance some of the reactions of Bill Gates to Piketty findings (made public in Piketty (2014)), making it clear that, as a rich man, he is obviously not in favor of taxing (income from) capital more, rather of taxing consumption more:

    Piketty’s favorite solution is a progressive annual tax on capital, rather than income. He argues that this kind of tax “will make it possible to avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral while preserving competition and incentives for new instances of primitive accumulation”.

    I agree that taxation should shift away from taxing labor. It doesn’t make any sense that labor in the United States is taxed so heavily relative to capital. It will make even less sense in the coming years, as robots and other forms of automation come to perform more and more of the skills that human laborers do today.

    But rather than move to a progressive tax on capital, as Piketty would like, I think we’d be best off with a progressive tax on consumption. (…)

    Like Piketty, I’m also a big believer in the estate tax. Letting inheritors consume or allocate capital disproportionately simply based on the lottery of birth is not a smart or fair way to allocate resources. (See Gates (2014).)

  226. 226.

    Oxfam (2015), p. 7.

  227. 227.

    See, for instance, an interview with the former ECB-president Jean-Claude Trichet that was published in “De Volkskrant” on April 23th 2018. (See De Waard (2018).)

  228. 228.

    See also the opinion expressed by Professor N. Ferguson as quoted in Knight Frank Research (2018), p. 10:

    This is an extraordinarily difficult question in political economy, because it’s about generational imbalances. Right now, the dice are loaded in favour of the baby-boomers, people like me who were born in the two decades after the end of World War Two, and they’re loaded against newborns, children and the unborn. This is a really striking pathology of modern times, this breach of contract between the generations. It’s very hard to fix because the unborn and children don’t get to vote, whereas the elderly now tend to stick around long after retirement age, and they vote in rather large numbers.

  229. 229.

    See The Bologna Declaration (1999).

  230. 230.

    Regarding the situation in the USA, it has, for instance, been pointed out in an article that appeared in The Economist of 28 March 2015 that:

    tuition fees have nearly doubled, in real terms, in 20 years. (See Anonymous (2015a), pp. 11–12.)

    Furthermore, it has been argued that:

    In America, retrenchment in state budgets has pushed up tuition fees. In California, for instance, they have tripled over 15 years, and a further 28% rise is proposed. Outside America, the first big shift towards private funding happened in Australia, where tuition fees were jacked up in the late 1980s. A host of other countries followed including New Zealand, Chile, South Africa, some of the former Soviet republics, Britain and Thailand. China used to impose no fees at all, now it charges 6,000–10,000 yuan ($800–1,600) a year, not much for an urban family but a lot for a rural one. (See Anonymous (2015b), pp. 12–14.)

  231. 231.

    See, for a more recent example in the geographical context of the Netherlands: Minten (2015), p. 18.

  232. 232.

    See already above, the earlier referred to findings by Crédit Suisse (see Sects. 4.2 and 4.7).

  233. 233.

    See recently Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018).

  234. 234.

    Compare Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018), n° 21, referring to:

    the fact that among the major reasons for the most recent economic crisis was the immoral behavior of agents in the financial world, where the supranational dimension of the economic system makes it easy to bypass the regulations established by individual countries [and to the fact that] the extreme volatility and mobility of capital investments in the financial world permit those who control them to operate smoothly beyond every norm that does not aim at an immediate profit, often blackmailing by a position of strength even legitimate political authority.

  235. 235.

    The fact that states are willing to bail out banks is for Chomsky an argument to hold that there is, in fact, not a free market system in place:

    Every time there is a crisis, the taxpayer is called on to bail out the banks and the major financial institutions. If you had a real capitalist economy in place, that would not be happening. Capitalists who make risky investments and failed would be wiped out. But the rich and powerful do not want a capitalist system. They want to be able to run the nanny state so when they are in trouble the taxpayer will bail them out. The convention phrase is “too big to fail.” (See Chomsky and Polychroniou (2017), p. 153.)

  236. 236.

    Chomsky and Polychroniou (2017), p. 153, speaking of “socialism for the rich” and “capitalism for the poor”.

  237. 237.

    De Waard (2018).

  238. 238.

    Compare this to the recent events in Italy.

  239. 239.

    Kuntz et al. (2015), pp. 9–13, esp. p. 11. See also Nicolson (2015), pp. 68–101.

  240. 240.

    See Byttebier (2017), p. 313, n° 282.

  241. 241.

    Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018), n° 14.

  242. 242.

    This subject matter obviously is close to the heart of the author of this book, as he is both active in the academic sector himself and in this capacity has been a first hand witness of the destructive impact the implementation of the neo-liberal idea good, in the course of his academic career, has had on the academic sector.

  243. 243.

    In this context, see the vision of Margaret Thatcher herself (see Thatcher (1993), pp. 597–598) which, due to many neo-liberal interventions, has since then been realised in most European countries.

    See also Anonymous (2015c), pp. 6–11, esp. 6:

    Governments want top-class universities because the modern economy is driven by human capital. The goal is to nurture people who will create intellectual property and clusters of high-tech companies similar to those around Stanford and Cambridge.

  244. 244.

    Anonymous (2015c), pp. 11–12; Anonymous (2015b), p. 12.

  245. 245.

    In the so-called “Prague communication” of 19 May 2001 it is, for instance bluntly mentioned that one of the main goals of university education is to offer a framework for a lifetime of learning “in order to strengthen the economic competitiveness” (see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/lifelong_learning/c11088_nl.htm (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

    Even so, in the communication of Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve of 28 and 29 April 2009, the employability of fresh university students on the (capitalist) labour markets has been mentioned as the central topic, where it was announced that:

    the interested parties need to collaborate in order to increase the initial qualifications, to renew the schooled professional population and to improve the provisioning, accessibility and quality of career and work guidance. Furthermore traineeships in the context of learning programs and on-the-job-trainings are more encouraged. (See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/lifelong_learning/c11088_nl.htm. last consulted on June 16, 2018).

    See especially under point 2 of the latter communication:

    student-centred learning and mobility will help students develop the competences they need in a changing labour market and will empower them to become active and responsible citizens.

    Furthermore, the 13th point of this communication emphasizes the immediate employability of graduating university students:

    With labour markets increasingly relying on higher skill levels and transversal competences, higher education should equip students with the advanced knowledge, skills and competences they need throughout their professional lives. Employability empowers the individual to fully seize the opportunities in changing labour markets. We aim at raising initial qualifications as well as maintaining and renewing a skilled workforce through close cooperation between governments, higher education institutions, social partners and students. This will allow institutions to be more responsive to employers needs and employers to better understand the educational perspective. Higher education institutions, together with governments, government agencies and employers, shall improve the provision, accessibility and quality of their careers and employment related guidance services to students and alumni. We encourage work placements embedded in study programmes as well as on-the-job learning.

  246. 246.

    Verhaeghe (2011), pp. 22–23.

    Verhaeghe hereby convincingly argues that this evolution has especially been caused by the introduction of several neo-liberal inspired quantitative evaluation systems (as these prevail since and under the rule of the abovementioned Bologna Declaration).

  247. 247.

    http://www.ehea.info/Uploads/%281%29/EI%20report%20Bologna%20ministerial%202012.pdf (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  248. 248.

    As regards Belgium, see http://www.oecd.org/edu/Belgium-EAG2014-Country-Note.pdf (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  249. 249.

    Micklethwait and Woolridge (2014), p. 121.

  250. 250.

    See also Chomsky (2017), p. 67.

  251. 251.

    See Verhaeghe (2011).

    One can but express the hope that, at the very least, the following vision that in 2018 has been expressed by the (Catholic) “Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith” will ever get through to the European universities in order to finally start some elementary public debate about the foregoing:

    In this regard, it is particularly desirable that institutions such as universities and business schools both foresee and provide, as a fundamental and not merely supplementary element of their curricula of studies, a formational dimension that educates the students to understand economics and finance in the light of a vision of the totality of the human person and avoids a reductionism that sees only some dimensions of the person. An ethics is needed to design such formation. The social doctrine of the Church would be a considerable help in this connection. (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2018, n° 10).

  252. 252.

    Amesz (2012), p. 159.

  253. 253.

    See “UNFCCC”—“United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” of May 9th 1992.

  254. 254.

    See Galbraith (1992), p. 20, already quoted in footnote 15 of Chap. 2.

  255. 255.

    In this context, John Dejaeger bluntly held that:

    vier vijfde van de wereldbevolking geen boodschap heeft aan betekenisloze klimaatovereenkomsten en gewoon doorgaat met het verbranden van steenkool en olie.

    (freely translated: “four fifths of the world population is not involved with the meaningless climate agreements and just continues with the burning of coal and fossil oil”.) (See Dejaeger (2014), p. 89.)

  256. 256.

    Galbraith (1992), p. 23.

    Phrased in a more blunt manner: Rand (1992), p. 37. See also Bell (1996), p. 187.

  257. 257.

    Gore (2013a), p. 496.

  258. 258.

    Stiglitz (2006), p. 166. See also Hazenberg (2013), p. 137.

  259. 259.

    Amesz (2012), p. 61.

  260. 260.

    See for instance https://www.climateprediction.net/ (last consulted on June 16, 2018).

  261. 261.

    Compare this to how Stiglitz has defined the overall purpose of the economy:

    The purpose of economic activity is to increase the well-being of individuals, and economic structures that are able to do so are more desirable than those that do not. (See Stiglitz (2002), p. 9.)

    See, similarly Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2018), n° 6.

  262. 262.

    These theories culminated, for instance, in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1244).

  263. 263.

    It is remarkable that in the writings of the twentieth century mystic Maria Valtorta (1897–1961), Jesus Christ has been quoted on declaring that rationalism has been one of the main causes for the decline of Christian faith in the Western world:

    See, My soul: There are few things that I condemn as severely as this rationalism which rapes and desecrates and kills Faith -- I say Faith with a capital, in order to say true Faith, absolute, regal Faith. I condemn it as My assassin. It is this very rationalism which kills Me in hearts and which prepares and has prepared very sad times for the Church and the world.

    I have cursed other things. But none will I curse as this. It has been the seed from which have come other poisonous doctrines, and others, and still others. It has been the treachery which opens the door to the enemy. It has in fact opened the doors to Satan who has never reigned as much as now, since rationalism reigns.

    But it is said: ‘When the Son of man will come, He will not find faith in hearts’. Therefore rationalism does its work. I will do Mine. (See http://www.bardstown.com/~brchrys/Ratunlsm.html; last consulted on June 16, 2018.)

  264. 264.

    See especially the already before in this book quoted insights of Erich Fromm.

  265. 265.

    See for instance Harari (2014), p. 348 a.f.

  266. 266.

    Marcuse (1991).

  267. 267.

    Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2013), p. 66.

  268. 268.

    Chomsky and Polychroniou (2017), p. 154.

  269. 269.

    Ongenae (2014), pp. 44–45, esp. p. 44.

  270. 270.

    See, for instance, Luyendijk (2015), p. 89, as regards the vision on ethical values of bank sector employees.

  271. 271.

    See Galbraith (2004), p. 21:

    It remained for the often perversely articulate John Maynard Keyes to doubt on the pleasure of toil. He quotes the words of an aged charwoman that were preserved on her tombstone. She had just been released from a lifetime of work:

    Don’t mourn for me, friends,

    Don’t weep for me, never,

    For I’m going to do nothing,

    For ever and ever.

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    Koen Byttebier

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Byttebier, K. (2018). Some Further Themes on the Outlook of the Capitalist World. In: The Unfree Market and the Law. Economic and Financial Law & Policy – Shifting Insights & Values, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97382-1_4

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