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Judicial Control of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office

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Abstract

According to the recently adopted EU Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the new supranational body shall be subject to judicial control not only by Union courts, but first and foremost by national courts of the Member States. The particular role of national courts is rooted in the hybrid structure of proceedings that are initiated by the EPPO, but will result in a trial before a national criminal court. This paper, however, argues that judicial control of a Union institution should be exercised by a Union court and that the treaty system of judicial protection does not allow for a delegation of jurisdiction to national courts.

A German version of this article has been published in Böse M (2017) Die Europäische Staatsanwaltschaft ‘als’ nationale Strafverfolgungsbehörde – Kritik eines neuen Rechtsschutzmodells. JuristenZeitung 72(2):82–87.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Ligeti and Weyembergh (2015), p. 62; see also with regard to the general risks of a semi-decentralized model: Kaiafa-Gbandi (2015), pp. 236–237.

  2. 2.

    Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (O.J. L 283/1).

  3. 3.

    See with regard to these functions: Sauer (2008), p. 32 et seq.

  4. 4.

    Đurđević (2013), pp. 1003–1004; Wasmeier and Killmann (2015), Art. 86 AEUV para. 152; see also Art. 11 Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime (O.J. No. L 315/57): The right to a review of a decision not to prosecute, however, does not require review by a court.

  5. 5.

    Larsen (2013, unpublished), presentation at a conference on “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office – A constructive approach towards the legal framework”, Vilnius 16–17 September 2013, as summarized in Council-Document 13863/13, pp. 16, 19; for the contrary view see Erbežnik (2015), p. 216; see also Đurđević (2013), pp. 1002–1003.

  6. 6.

    Luchtman and Vervaele (2014), pp. 145–146.

  7. 7.

    Đurđević (2013), pp. 1001–1002; see with regard to an action for annulment Wasmeier and Killmann (2015), Art. 86 AEUV paras. 150–151.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. section 153a para. 1 German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung); see for the function of this requirement (judicial control of the prosecutor): Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), decision of 29 October 1992 – 4 StR 353/92, official court reports (BGHSt) vol 38, pp. 381, 382.

  9. 9.

    Luchtman and Vervaele (2014), p. 146; Böse (2012), p. 175.

  10. 10.

    COM (2013) 534 final of 17 July 2013.

  11. 11.

    COM (2013) 534 final of 17 July 2013, p. 7; see also recital (87) of the Regulation.

  12. 12.

    COM (2013) 534 final of 17 July 2013, p. 20.

  13. 13.

    Council Document 6490/14, p. 5.

  14. 14.

    Council Document 11045/15 - Annex, p. 27; see also Option 2 in Council Document 15862/1/14 REV 1 - Annex II, p. 48; see also the European Parliament’s resolution of 29 April 2015 - P8_TA(2015)0173, paras. 24–25.

  15. 15.

    Council Document 10266/16 - Annex, pp. 3–4.

  16. 16.

    See for an earlier version of Art. 36 resulting from the council negotiations: Council Document 12774/1/16 REV 1, p. 57; see also Council Document 11350/1/16 REV 1, p. 72.

  17. 17.

    Due to the preliminary ruling procedure, however, court proceedings will take a long time and, thereby, hamper an effective investigation, see Wasmeier and Killmann (2015), Art. 86 AEUV paras. 149.

  18. 18.

    See for criminal investigations in Germany: Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), decision of 29 November 2004 – 2 BvR 1034/02, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 58(23):1640, 1641; see also the compromise in Ligeti et al. (2012), Rule. 50 para. 5 of the “Model Rules for the Procedure of the EPPO”, available at http://www.eppo-project.eu/index.php/EU-model-rules (8 Nov 2017).

  19. 19.

    Inghelram (2015), pp. 128–129; Larsen (2013, unpublished) (note 5), p. 18.

  20. 20.

    CJEU, Judgment of 8 September 2015, Case C-105/14, Taricco and others, paras. 49 et seq.

  21. 21.

    See for proportionality checks under national law recital (88) of the Regulation.

  22. 22.

    See with regard to parallel problems in prior authorization procedures: Inghelram (2015), p. 132.

  23. 23.

    See the former version of Art. 36, Council Document 13227/15 - Annex, p. 15.

  24. 24.

    Inghelram (2011), pp. 227–228, 265; Meij (2015), p. 114.

  25. 25.

    CJEU, Case C-314/85, Foto-Frost, [1987] ECR 4199 paras. 15–17.

  26. 26.

    The decision of national court on the validity of an act adopted by a Union body will not have effect throughout the Union, see AG Mengozzi, opinion of 26 October 2006, C-354/04, Gestoras Pro Amnistia, [2007] ECR I-1583 paras. 120.

  27. 27.

    Since the Lisbon-Treaty has integrated the cooperation in criminal matters into the supranational structure of the Union, the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the legality and validity of acts adopted in this framework. See, by contrast, with regard to the pre-Lisbon era: AG Mengozzi (2006) (note 26), paras. 118 ff.

  28. 28.

    Larsen (2013, unpublished) (note 5), p. 21.

  29. 29.

    See with regard to the action for annulment: ECJ, Case C-50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, [2002] ECR I-6677 para. 43; see with regard to the preliminary ruling procedure: ECJ, Case C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, [2006] ECR I-289 para. 63, with further references.

  30. 30.

    AG Mengozzi, opinion of 27 January 2011, Case C-401/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki, [2011] ECR I-4911 paras. 68–70.

  31. 31.

    CJEU, Case 109/81, Porta, [1982] ECR I-2469 paras. 11 et seq.

  32. 32.

    CJEU, Case C-308/87, Grifoni, [1990] ECR I-1203 paras. 8–9.

  33. 33.

    AG Mengozzi (2011) (note 30), paras. 72–75.

  34. 34.

    Meij (2015), p. 114.

  35. 35.

    See the former German version of the corresponding provision in the European Constitutional Treaty (Art. III-170 para. 2 sent. 2), CONV 727/03 of 27 May 2003, p. 46 (“zuständig für die Erhebung der öffentlichenm Anklage”); for a detailed analysis see Böse (2012), pp. 190–191.

  36. 36.

    Wasmeier and Killmann (2015), Art. 86 AEUV paras. 145, 147.

  37. 37.

    See also Inghelram (2015), pp. 132–133.

  38. 38.

    Gärditz (2013), § 24 para. 52; German Bar Association (Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer) (2013), p. 9.

  39. 39.

    CJEU, Opinion No. 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para. 174; see also with regard to the Court’s monopoly on reviewing the legality of acts of the institutions the opinion of AG Kokott of 13 June 2014, ibid., para. 121.

  40. 40.

    CJEU, ibid., paras. 174, 197–198.

  41. 41.

    See Art. 1 of the Protocol No 8 to the TEU and to the TFEU.

  42. 42.

    Similarly Inghelram (2015), p. 266, 267; Meij (2015), p. 114.

  43. 43.

    Meij (2015), p. 112.

  44. 44.

    The argument that the Court of Justice lacks the capacity to exercise judicial control (Alexandrova [2015], p. 19) seems odd where decisions of the EPPO are taken by chambers of several prosecutors. If the Union can afford an institution for investigation and prosecution, there is a duty to provide judicial protection as well.

  45. 45.

    Delmas-Marty (2000), pp. 52–53; for a detailed analysis of the treaty framework see Böse (2012), p. 172 et seq.; Rheinbay (2014), p. 248 et seq.; for the contrary view see Inghelram (2011), pp. 264–265; see also Luchtman and Vervaele (2014), p. 146.

  46. 46.

    Zwiers (2011), p. 408. This approach has been taken in the “Model Rules for the Procedure of the EPPO” (note 18).

  47. 47.

    In German, the term “Hütchenspiel” (shell game, thimblerig) corresponds to the notion of the double hat model (“Doppelhut-Modell”).

  48. 48.

    See also Meij (2015), p. 104 (transparency of organization and procedure as a pre-condition for effective judicial review). Even where judicial review is assigned to national courts, it is far from clear which Member State will be competent. For instance, which Member State respectively court shall be competent to review the decision to reallocate a case to a European Delegated Prosecutor in another Member State (Art. 22 paras. 4 and 5): the Member State of the European Delegated Prosecutor who has taken over the case or that of the one who has conducted the investigation before?

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  1. Department of Law, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

    Martin Böse

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Böse, M. (2019). Judicial Control of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. In: Rafaraci, T., Belfiore, R. (eds) EU Criminal Justice. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97319-7_14

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