Abstract
In this chapter we provide a philosophically rooted reflection on the concept of ‘autonomy’, focusing our discussion on an analysis of some of its core theoretical underpinnings as well as on its status as a lived capacity. This analysis draws on insights from the field of ‘personal autonomy’ and uses them as a reflective device in examining ‘national autonomy’. The ‘EU experience’, in particular in the aftermath of the European Banking and Debt Crisis, acts as the backdrop to our discussion. In adopting a ‘relational’ stance, we argue that although autonomy is an intrinsic capacity that is exercised by individual nations, relationships influence their capacity to recognise the existence of their autonomous capacities and exercise them. Indeed, strong and stable interactions (such as with other members of one’s community) are a crucial means through which autonomy is fostered. Autonomy helps to ensure EU member nations do not become subsumed under or subservient to more powerful orthodoxies. Troikanomics, however, has exemplified how the EU was colonised by an orthodoxy intent on subverting national autonomy and displacing countervailing sovereign status. In light of this, we ask whether it is still possible to speak meaningfully of the prospect of ‘autonomous’ member nations, and whether or not this is an aspiration that can survive within the EU’s current landscape. In this context, our analysis is not directly concerned with the autonomy of the EU itself as a distinct entity, but rather with the autonomy of the individual nations which comprise it.
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Notes
- 1.
This definition is derived from Christman’s (2015) introductory discussion on the constitutive components of personal autonomy—one in which he attempts to bring together, in an introductory fashion, general philosophical consensus on the concept. It is the inherent broadness of this definition (as distinct from the definition that he himself develops) that, for him, leaves it open to so much critical analysis and establishes it as such a fertile ground for philosophical debate.
- 2.
Our concept of ‘self-definition’ draws on Christman’s (2014) work on the concept of ‘self-narrative’ and seeks to depict the experience of a historically cohesive security in ‘who one is’.
- 3.
Here we make brief, provisional, reference to another concept of relevance for geopolitical communities, ‘sovereignty’. We argue that autonomy is a necessary condition for national sovereignty, that is, before a nation can be regarded as ascending to the rank of a transnationally recognised sovereign—one that is both legally and normatively authorised to exercise ownership over their decisions—they must first be capable of autonomous functioning. Consistent with the relational model of autonomy, we therefore argue that sovereignty is also relational, born from recognising a nation’s inherent autonomy. This perspective takes into consideration national interdependence—whereby sovereignty is drawn from both exercising autonomous capacities alongside its standing in relation to other sovereign nations. Sovereignty is therefore a product of the coexistence of, and engagement between, autonomous nations. For further insights, see de Benoist (1999) and Krasner (1999). Here also, Frigot and Bonadonna (2016) discuss the ‘postmodern’ view of sovereignty that highlights the cooperative nature to sovereignty within the community.
- 4.
This model draws on Kinsella (2015).
- 5.
Dworkin’s influential analysis (1988) plants the seeds concerning the extent to which we need to understand autonomy—and how it is fostered—as embedded in the interpersonal and temporally extended realities of social ontology.
- 6.
- 7.
The concept of ‘catalysed’ is used to distinguish the process through which autonomy is fostered from that by which it is ‘created’. In this way, autonomy is an inherent capacity to be exercised through the utilisation of prior capacities, rather than something that is bestowed by one’s external environment.
- 8.
For further insights, see Raspotnik et al. (2012).
- 9.
We discuss the concepts of solidarity and subsidiarity in greater detail in Chap. 8.
- 10.
The concept of ‘constitutional tolerance’ is discussed in greater detail by Lindseth (1999).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
Here, Meyers (1987) argues that the ‘all-or-nothing’ perspective on personal autonomy is misguided. She consequently differentiates between ‘local’ autonomy (as the capacity to decide in particular circumstances) and ‘programmatic’ autonomy (as the capacity to decide more major life choices).
- 14.
See MacKenzie (2014).
- 15.
Here, ‘diachronic’ perspectives on personal autonomy assert that we can only truly take ownership over the motivations and justifications underpinning our behaviours if they are subject to temporally extended critique. Christman’s ‘authenticity’ argument is important to note here. It asserts that an agent’s actions are only authentic if the agent does not feel a negative judgement or negative emotional reaction towards them, after having critically reflected on the historical processes leading to their desire (Christman 2009a). In a moment of weakness or vulnerability, a person may ‘identify’ with their action (see Frankfurt’s (1971) analysis), but it may nevertheless fail to be authentic because it is in conflict with their historical self-narrative. In succumbing to the dictates of the Troika, countries such as Ireland and Greece exhibited behaviours that they may have ‘identified’ with at that particular moment in time (perhaps due to a prevailing sense of desperation or defeat), but which they would find very difficult to stand by when placed against the backdrop of the longer historical narrative of their nation.
- 16.
This perspective is discussed in greater detail in Chap. 4.
- 17.
A broadly similar suggestion was floated, and again withdrawn, by former German Minister for Finance Wolfgang Schäuble.
- 18.
As discussed by Westlund (2015).
- 19.
While autonomy may require a critique of one’s environment, this need not necessitate standing in opposition to one’s environment.
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Kinsella, R., Kinsella, M. (2018). Autonomy Within the EU: A Relational Perspective. In: Troikanomics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97070-7_6
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