Skip to main content
Book cover

International Conference on Complex Systems

ICCS 2018: Unifying Themes in Complex Systems IX pp 129–137Cite as

Election Methods and Collective Decisions

  • 2284 Accesses

Part of the Springer Proceedings in Complexity book series (SPCOM)

Abstract

This paper presents some simulation results on various collective decision methods in the context of Downsian proximity electorates. I show why these results are less than ideal, and contrast these different voting systems with a new system called Serial Approval Vote Elections (SAVE), which produces better outcomes that approach the ideal represented by the median voter theorem. I show how SAVE works in both normal and unusual electorates, how SAVE can be easily integrated into committee procedures, and how SAVE can be used in larger elections.

Keywords

  • Collective decisions
  • Voting methods
  • Median voter theorem
  • Arrow’s impossibility theorem
  • Serial approval vote elections

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-96661-8_13
  • Chapter length: 9 pages
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
eBook
USD   169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • ISBN: 978-3-319-96661-8
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
Softcover Book
USD   219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
Hardcover Book
USD   249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
Learn about institutional subscriptions
Fig. 1.

References

  1. Arrow, K.J.: Social Choice and Individual Values, Cowles Foundation Monograph, 3rd edn., vol. 12. Yale University Press (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Black, D.: On the rationale of group decision-making. J. Polit. Econ. 56(1), 23–34 (1948). http://www.jstor.org/stable/1825026

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  3. Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C.: Approval voting. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 72(3), 831–847 (1978). https://doi.org/10.2307/1955105. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955105

    CrossRef  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Brennan, G., Hamlin, A.: Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 95(1–2), 149–175 (1998). http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1004936203144

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  5. Cary, D.: Estimating the margin of victory for instant-runoff voting. In: Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, San Francisco, CA, (2011). https://www.usenix.org/events/evtwote11/tech/final_files/Cary8-2-11.pdf

  6. Cavin, T.E., Pavlov, O.V.: Social Decisions in a Democracy and the Introduction of Serial Approval Vote Elections. Social Choice and Welfare (2018, submitted)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Dodgson, C.L.: A Method For Taking Votes on More than Two Issues. Clarendon, Oxford (1876). Reprint in Black, D.: The Theory of Committees and Elections, pp. 224–234. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1958) and McLean, I., Urken, A.: Classics of Social Choice. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Downs, A.: An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper, New York (1957)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Feddersen, T.J.: Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting. J. Econo. Perspect. 18(1), 99–112 (2004). http://www.jstor.org/stable/3216877

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  10. Grofman, B., Feld, S.L.: If you like the alternative vote (aka the instant runoff), then you ought to know about the Coombs rule. Elect. Stud. 23(4), 641–659 (2004). http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137940300060X

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  11. Gurwitz, C.: Weighted median algorithms for L\(_{\rm 1}\) approximation. BIT 30(2), 301–310 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02017350. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02017350

    Google Scholar 

  12. Humphreys, M., Laver, M.: Spatial models, cognitive metrics, and majority rule equilibria. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 40(01), 11–30 (2010). http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123409990263

  13. Nijenhuis, A., Wilf, H.S.: Combinatorial algorithms (1975). http://cds.cern.ch/record/104492

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Social Science and Policy Studies, Salisbury Laboratories, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 100 Institute Road, Worcester, MA, 01609-2280, USA

    Thomas Edward Cavin

Authors
  1. Thomas Edward Cavin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas Edward Cavin .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. New England Complex Systems Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Prof. Alfredo J. Morales

  2. Instituto de Investigaciones en Matemáticas Aplicadas y en Sistemas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico, Distrito Federal, Mexico

    Dr. Carlos Gershenson

  3. New England Complex Systems Institute and University of Massachusetts, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Dan Braha

  4. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA

    Ali A. Minai

  5. New England Complex Systems Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Yaneer Bar-Yam

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Cavin, T.E. (2018). Election Methods and Collective Decisions. In: Morales, A., Gershenson, C., Braha, D., Minai, A., Bar-Yam, Y. (eds) Unifying Themes in Complex Systems IX. ICCS 2018. Springer Proceedings in Complexity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96661-8_13

Download citation