Abstract
In this chapter I defend Explanationist Evidentialism, the theory developed and argued for in Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification, from the objections raised by Richard Fumerton, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Matthias Steup. Ultimately, I conclude that although each of these philosophers presents interesting challenges, none of the challenges succeed in undermining Explanationist Evidentialism. It remains a viable theory of epistemic justification:
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Those chapters, as well as this one, grew out of a 2016 Pacific APA symposium on Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Footnote 4 applies here as well.
- 6.
This is assuming an internalist view of epistemic justification, which both Fumerton and I are happy to do. Externalists may be able to avoid claiming that more is required. For example, a reliabilist can deny that one even needs to be directly aware of the pain experience. Instead, they can claim that as long as the pain belief is the result of a reliable belief forming process it is justified. Nevertheless, even a reliabilist will have to acknowledge that one needs to possess the concepts required for grasping the believed proposition in order to have a justified introspective belief.
- 7.
See Fumerton (2005, 125) where he argues in support of the importance of distinguishing these states when considering instances of justified introspective beliefs.
- 8.
I explore this promising combination in my (2018a).
- 9.
I have argued that epistemic conservatism is much more plausible than is often thought in my (2008) and (Forthcoming-a). I also argue that it is perfectly consistent with an evidentialist conception of epistemic justification in my (Forthcoming-b).
- 10.
See Poston (2014) for a coherentist view that is very similar to EE.
- 11.
- 12.
I discuss this in much more detail in my (2018a).
- 13.
- 14.
The example that follows is similar to one I describe elsewhere (2016, 195).
- 15.
In my previous work I referred to this view as “Psychologism”, but I will follow Kvanvig in calling it “Statism”.
- 16.
See Turri (2009) for discussion of this problem and others for Propositionalism.
- 17.
- 18.
I hesitate to agree with Steup about the plausibility of analyzing availability in terms of what S believes because it seems that restricting explanations that provide justification to the best sufficiently good available explanation may avoid the worries he raises. This sort of restriction is motivated by independent reasons (see my (2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018b)).
- 19.
Likewise, p’s being available as an explanatory consequence should be understood in terms of S’s being disposed to have a particular seeming on the basis of reflection alone.
- 20.
- 21.
Thanks to Kevin Lee, Scott Stapleford, and Siddharth Srikakolapu for helpful comments on earlier drafts. And, a very special thanks to Richard Fumerton, Jon Kvanvig, and Matthias Steup. I am honored that they took the time to read my book and write such thoughtful commentaries.
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McCain, K. (2018). Explanationist Evidentialism: A Defense. In: McCain, K. (eds) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Synthese Library, vol 398. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_22
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