Abstract
Maintaining reasonableness in argumentative discourse means first of all avoiding the use and acceptance of the wrong argumentative moves that are traditionally known as fallacies. Therefore the way in which the fallacies are treated is the litmus test of the problem-validity of the code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse that is derived from the pragma-dialectical procedure for conducting a critical discussion. After the rules of the code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse have been established it is made clear that the fallacies that have been recognized in the literature are all violations of these rules. To conclude it is explained what the special characteristics are of the pragma-dialectical treatment of the fallacies that differentiate this approach from other approaches.
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Notes
- 1.
For the potential conventional validity of the rules for critical discussion, see Sect. 5.4.
- 2.
As long as the general principle of reasonableness has not been abandoned altogether, there is no a priori reason to assume that the occurrence of a fallacy necessarily means that the wrongness cannot be remedied, so that the critical discussion gets “re-railed” (van Eemeren 2015: 631–641).
- 3.
A full explanation of the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion can be found in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 123–157).
- 4.
If a proposition is part of the point of departure, it is during the discussion to be treated as an accepted starting point. This neither means that it is indisputable nor that it cannot be called into question in another discussion.
- 5.
Just like the list of accepted propositions is to be checked for its consistency, the methods chosen for determining the accuracy of information need to be scrutinized for their adequacy.
- 6.
For the procedure for identifying unexpressed premises, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 60–68).
- 7.
As will be discussed in Chap. 8, there may be specific institutional conditions preventing or constraining the use of certain argument schemes.
- 8.
A conclusive defence of a sub-standpoint does not automatically imply that the standpoint at issue is conclusively defended, because the justificatory force of the main argumentation also needs to be defended successfully. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the defence of sub-standpoints with the help of sub-sub-standpoints, and so on.
- 9.
The code of conduct presented in this section is based on van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 190–196).
- 10.
Discussants can only be expected to observe these commandments if the “higher order conditions” for conducting a critical discussion have been fulfilled. See Chap. 1, note 5.
- 11.
Advancing argumentation, i.e. the use of logos , may be combined with the use of ethos or pathos , but should not be replaced by it.
- 12.
When fallacies are not univocally defined in the same way, we try to capture their most conspicuous disruptive characteristic.
- 13.
For examples of the fallacies mentioned in this section see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 107–207).
- 14.
For the relationship between relative and structure-dependent properties and the fallacies of composition and division, see van Eemeren and Garssen (2009).
- 15.
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van Eemeren, F.H. (2018). Critical Discussion and the Identification of Fallacies. In: Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Argumentation Library, vol 33. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95381-6_4
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