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The Politics of TDI and the Different Views in EU Member States: Necessary Safety-Valve or Luxurious Rent-Seeking Device?

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The Future of Trade Defence Instruments

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

Abstract

The article discusses the tightening of the European Union’s Anti-Dumping Regulation as a consequence of the debate on the “Market Economy Status” for China. It gives some facts and figures on the European Union’s current anti-dumping activities, in particular those against China. Given China’s treatment as a Non-Market Economy, the anti-dumping duties imposed are considerably higher than those imposed against “injurious dumping” from Market Economy countries. The article gives some insights into the chemical industry’s thinking on anti-dumping. The industry’s export dependency and its quest for further trade liberalisation provides for an interesting case study on how an industrial sector views the politics of anti-dumping. The main part of the article is an analysis of the political discussions and legislative initiatives in the context of China’s MES. The European Commission’s proposals are discussed as well as the reactions of the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and those of business stakeholders. With respect to the position of stakeholders, the article elaborates on the difficulties within German industry to come to an acceptable position on China’s MES. The article concludes that the political climate in Europe calls for a tightened and stricter anti-dumping practice. As long as European politicians defend the positions of economic operators who feel threatened by Chinese exports, any discussions on introducing less stringent and more liberal anti-dumping rules will remain an illusion. On the contrary, strict anti-dumping rules are here to stay.

The opinions contained in this article are those of the authors.

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Notes

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Petter, B., Quick, R. (2018). The Politics of TDI and the Different Views in EU Member States: Necessary Safety-Valve or Luxurious Rent-Seeking Device?. In: Bungenberg, M., Hahn, M., Herrmann, C., Müller-Ibold, T. (eds) The Future of Trade Defence Instruments. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95306-9_2

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