Abstract
Legal scholarship on the unamendability of constitutional provisions tends to focus on legal systems with a strong tradition of judicial review of legislation. Legal systems such as the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, where the constitutionality of laws is a matter for the political branches and not for the courts, are routinely ignored. They do not fit existing perceptions of constitutional unamendability and arguably fall well outside the categories of either explicit or implicit constitutional unamendability. Nonetheless, these ‘politically enforced constitutions’ still contain mechanisms of unamendability, be it of an informal nature. These take the shape of judicial or institutional disobedience. The doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments thus becomes relevant to a broader range of constitutional systems. However, this type of unamendability requires a more subtle approach. It does not emerge from constitutional provisions, whether explicit or not, but rather occurs in the form of a constitutional convention of unamendability. The question whether parts of the constitution should be regarded as unamendable thus cannot be solely couched in the all-or-nothing terminology of legal rules. Instead, conventions of unamendability, due to their principle-based character, may be subject to changing circumstances and exceptions. Existing literature on constitutional conventions may be used as a model in order to build a framework of analysis for the concept of constitutional unamendability in politically enforced constitutions.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See articles 15 and 8, respectively, of the Swiss Constitution, and articles 9 en 14 of the ECHR.
- 3.
For instance from Geert Wilders who, at the time lent vital support to the ruling coalition in The Netherlands. See Green (2010), p. 642.
- 4.
Garlicki and Garlicka (2011), p. 343.
- 5.
See s 112 of the Norwegian Constitution; Smith (2011), p. 369.
- 6.
See generally Roznai (2013), pp. 657, 662.
- 7.
Ibid., p. 665.
- 8.
See e.g., Wright (1991), p. 741, O’Connell (1999), p. 48, Mazzone (2005), p. 1747, Jacobsohn (2006), p. 460, Gözler (2008), Albert (2009, 2010, p. 663), Barak (2011), p. 321, Bezemek (2011), p. 517, Cariás (2011), Roznai and Yolcu (2012), p. 175, Halmai (2012), p. 182, Roznai (2013), Colón-Ríos (2013), p. 521, (2014), p. 143) and Albert (2014a), p. 181.
- 9.
Roznai (2013).
- 10.
See the contributions of Roznai, Hoque, Olcay, Yegen and Masri.
- 11.
See e.g., the ‘Three Musketeers’ of Indian constitutional litigation: the Supreme Court judgments in I.C. Golaknath & Ors v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (27 February 1967); Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (24 April 1973); Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 (31 July 1980). For a compelling accounts, see the contribution to this volume by Satya Prateek; Jacobsohn (2006), p. 470, Albert (2014a), p. 22, and Halmai (2012), p. 186.
- 12.
- 13.
Compare e.g.: Constitutional Court of Turkey, E.2008/18, K.2008/116 (5 June 2008); Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 27/09 (10 September 2009); Constitutional Court of Hungary, no. 61/2011 (VII. 13) (13 June 2011). For commentary, see: Özbudun (2009), p. 533, Roznai and Yolcu (2012), p. 175, Roznai (2014), p. 29, and Halmai (2012), p. 182. The Turkish example is particularly informative. See on that subject, the contributions in this volume by Tarık Olcay and Oya Yegen.
- 14.
- 15.
See Otto (2007), p. 137.
- 16.
Still worse: as we will see, the Dutch Constitution even prohibits the courts to engage in procedural review of the amendment. See article 120 of the Constitution and the Van den Bergh v. The State judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court, NJ 1963/248 (27 January 1961).
- 17.
We took a leaf here from Voermans (2009), p. 84.
- 18.
The term judicial deafness was used before, see e.g., Patterson (2007), pp. 279, 280.
- 19.
Yaniv Roznai, ‘Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Formal Unamendability’; Stephan Michel and Ignacio Cofone, ‘Credible Commitment or Paternalism? The Case of Unamendability’; Konstantinos Pilpilidis, ‘A Constitution for Eternity: An Economic Theory of Explicit Unamendability’.
- 20.
See e.g., Albert (2008), p. 37.
- 21.
Voermans (2009), p. 86.
- 22.
Albert (2009), p. 16.
- 23.
Schwartzberg (2007), pp. 3–8.
- 24.
At the time of finalizing this article, the European Communities Act 1972 is still in force in the UK legal order as a ‘constitutional’ statute, since the exit of the UK out of the EU has not yet taken place in a legal sense. The Act will only lose its constitutional status as soon as Parliament repeals it.
- 25.
Compare the chapter of Yaniv Roznai, ‘Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Formal Unamendability’ (n 19), para 5A.
- 26.
We use the recently proposed classification by Albert (2014a) 188–189.
- 27.
See e.g., Garlicki and Garlicka (2011), p. 347.
- 28.
See for two such examples in Canada and the US, Albert (2014a), p. 181.
- 29.
See Schwartzberg (2007), p. 13.
- 30.
Albert (2014a), p. 191.
- 31.
- 32.
Albert (2014a), p. 191.
- 33.
See articles 193(4) and 194(2) of the Swiss Federal Constitution.
- 34.
See article 112(1) of the Norwegian Grundlov.
- 35.
See Garlicki and Garlicka (2011).
- 36.
Smith (2011), pp. 384–386.
- 37.
As Eivind Smith has conveniently shown, the way in which the role of the monarchy in Norway has developed, is probably not in line with the spirit of the Constitution as perceived in 1814. None of the political actors (including the monarchy itself) raised the issue however. The most likely scenario is that the position of the King in Norwegian constitutional law, although initially clearly part of the ‘principles embodied by the Constitution’, has—by virtue of the changing political landscape—lost this status along the way of history. See Smith (2011).
- 38.
See e.g., Barak (2011).
- 39.
Take for instance the case of Bangladesh, where unamendability was a judicially declared norm until 2011, when an eternal clause was added to the Constitution. See the chapter of Ridwanul Hoque, ‘Eternal Provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Constitution Once and for All?’.
- 40.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (24 April 1973). See also: I.C. Golaknath & Ors v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (27 February 1967); Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 (19 December 1975); Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 (31 July 1980).
- 41.
Samanta and Basu (2008), pp. 499, 501.
- 42.
See Roznai (2013).
- 43.
Ibid., p. 698.
- 44.
- 45.
See e.g., Gözler (2008).
- 46.
Barak (2011), p. 321.
- 47.
Although he does not use this kind of terminology, Colón Ríos seems to depart from a similar line of reasoning. See Colón Ríos (2014).
- 48.
Jacobsohn (2009), p. 82.
- 49.
Roznai (2013), p. 661.
- 50.
- 51.
On this trend see e.g., Hirschl (2008), p. 93.
- 52.
- 53.
- 54.
The concept may thus be antithetical to the idea of judicial supremacy as for instance defined by Whittington (2009), p. 7.
- 55.
See e.g., Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (12 September 1958); City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (25 June 1997); Tushnet (1998), p. 945.
- 56.
See e.g., BverfGE 96, 260 (15 July 1997), para 12.
- 57.
European Union law provides a possible exception in this regard: see the remarkable case of John Dalli, a European Commissioner who was forced to resign but challenged his resignation in the European Court of Justice. See Case T-562/12 (12 May 2015).
- 58.
BverfGE 106, 310 (18 December 2002).
- 59.
BverfGE 114, 121 (25 August 2005).
- 60.
395 US 486 (16 June 1969).
- 61.
Sandalow (1969) 164, 168.
- 62.
See e.g., Albert (2014b), pp. 1029, 1073, drawing attention to Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433, 454 (1939), in which the Court suggested that disputes concerning Article V of the US Constitution are non-justiciable political questions.
- 63.
Compare the so-called National Prohibition Cases, 253 US 350 (7 June 1920); Leser v Garnett, 258 US 130 (27 February 1922). See also Gözler (2008), pp. 79–80.
- 64.
Albert (2015b).
- 65.
- 66.
Dicey (1959), pp. 3–4.
- 67.
Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590 (25 January 1934).
- 68.
Goldsworthy (1999), p. 243.
- 69.
Ibid., p. 242–243.
- 70.
- 71.
Griffith (1979), p. 15.
- 72.
Bellamy (2011), pp. 86, 92.
- 73.
See also below, para 6.1.
- 74.
- 75.
X v Morgan-Grampian Publishers Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1 HL (4 April 1990) (Lord Bridge).
- 76.
See: Allan (1985).
- 77.
See Human Rights Act 1998, s 3.
- 78.
Allan (2001).
- 79.
See e.g., Anisminic v FCC [1969] 2 AC 147, HL (17 December 1968) (pre-HRA) and R v A [2001] UKHL 25, HL (17 May 2001) (under the HRA).
- 80.
Allan (1993), p. 267.
- 81.
See for a critique e.g., Goldsworthy (2008), pp. 277, 302.
- 82.
- 83.
- 84.
These global factors have been frequently described by Hirschl (2006), p. 721.
- 85.
[2005] UKHL 56 (13 October 2005), para 104, 107.
- 86.
See Young (2009), pp. 10–11.
- 87.
This is what Aruna Sathanapally calls, the ‘dual review model’ of dialogue. Interestingly, Sathanapally argues that s. 4 of the HRA did not achieve the true ‘dual review’ version of dialogue. Sathanapally (2012), pp. 48, 224.
- 88.
- 89.
Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC 765 HL (30 January 1974).
- 90.
R (Jackson) v Attorney General (2005), para 27 (Lord Bingham). Another, more recent, instance of a case in which a UK court decided on a largely political matter may be R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (24 January 2017). In the Miller case, the UK Supreme Court ruled that the UK Government was not allowed to invoke the procedure for withdrawal from the European Union (the so-called Article 50 procedure) without an Act of Parliament allowing the Government to do so. This case could also be seen as a clear example of court interference with the political process. It could be argued that this was a non-justiciable issue, since Parliament itself could also have claimed decision authority on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU through political means.
- 91.
One of the cornerstones of the constitution at large, the unwritten rule that the government depends parliamentary support is exemplary in this regard.
- 92.
Uzman et al. (2011), p. 671.
- 93.
Dicey (1959), pp. 39–40.
- 94.
Uzman et al. (2011).
- 95.
See the Court’s Harmonization Act Judgment, NJ 1989/469 (14 April 1989).
- 96.
Van den Bergh v. The State 1963/248.
- 97.
Tegelen v. Limburg, NJ 2000/160 (19 November 1999).
- 98.
Waterpakt v. The State, NJ 2003/691 (21 March 2003) para 3.5; The State v. Clara Wichmann Foundation, NJ 2010/388 (9 April 2010) para 4.6.2.
- 99.
See the proposal of Liberal MP Joost Taverne to limit the reviewing power of the courts to subordinate legislation (Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 33 359, nr 1–3).
- 100.
See e.g., the European Court’s judgment in James & Ors v United Kingdom, [1986] ECHR 2, Series A no 98 (21 February 1986): ‘Article 13 does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s laws as such to be challenged before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention’.
- 101.
The phenomenon of judicial disobedience is not exclusive to politically enforced constitutions. It may apply also to ‘judicial supremacy systems’ too. See, in the context of the United States, for instance the Slaughter-house cases, 83 US 36 (14 April 1873), in which the Supreme Court arguably exacerbated the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment. Relatedly, the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 could be seen as a reaction to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 US 439 (19 April 1988) and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 US 872 (17 April 1990), in which the Supreme Court upheld legislation that prohibited activities which were religiously prescribed.
- 102.
See e.g., Elliott (2001), p. 197.
- 103.
Feldman (2002), pp. 70–74.
- 104.
Ewing and Gearty (1990), p. 255.
- 105.
See e.g., R. v. Home Secretary Ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 (HL).
- 106.
Besson (2008), p. 40.
- 107.
- 108.
- 109.
See e.g., Hoffmann (2009).
- 110.
See e.g., Fredman (2013), p. 292.
- 111.
Arnot (2009).
- 112.
Palmer (2009).
- 113.
See Bates (2015).
- 114.
See e.g., Elliott (2013), p. 137.
- 115.
See e.g., Elliott (2015), p. 1.
- 116.
Porter and Hirsch (2010). More recently: ‘The question is, can we go back? Can we tear up the Human Rights Convention and go back? …I don’t think we can’, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers in a panel discussion at King’s College London, 24 March 2015, report at <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2015/05/15/we-cannot-go-back-debating-the-human-rights-act-eva-pils/#more-25964> accessed on 14 July 2017.
- 117.
Elliott (2015).
- 118.
Ibid.
- 119.
See: Osborn v. Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] AC 1115; Kennedy v. Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2014] 2 WLR 808; R (Evans) v. Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21.
- 120.
UKSC 20, [2014] 2 WLR 808, para 46.
- 121.
Hale (2014).
- 122.
Elliott (2014).
- 123.
See his recent remarks at a conference at King’s College London (24 March 2015).
- 124.
European law, both in the framework of the EU and the Council of Europe, might pose some obstacles, but they do not concern us here.
- 125.
See Elliott (2015).
- 126.
Meerenberg, W 4330 (13 January 1879).
- 127.
This follows from the current Article 89(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Netherlands, which stipulates: ‘Orders in council shall be established by Royal Decree.’ A Royal Decree is a decree of the government.
- 128.
Fluoridering, NJ 1973/386 (22 June 1973).
- 129.
Methadonbrief, NJ 1987/898 (27 June 1986).
- 130.
Ibid. para 3.3.
- 131.
Parliamentary Proceeding of the Second Chamber (Kamerstukken II) 1977/78, 15 047 (R 1099), nr 3, 15.
- 132.
However, some authors still believe that the government may, and perhaps should, make more use of the competence to autonomously issue Orders-in-Council. See, notably, Donner (2013).
- 133.
Albert (2014a).
- 134.
Goldsworthy (1999), pp. 302–303.
- 135.
Dicey (1959), p. 24.
- 136.
Jennings (1959), p. 136.
- 137.
Ibid.
- 138.
Jaconelli (2005), pp. 149, 168–176.
- 139.
One precedent may however be enough to constitute a convention, see Jennings (1959), p. 136.
- 140.
Compare the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘critical morality’. Those who advance the positive morality view consider conventions as a description of the applicable moral values in the arena of politics, whereas those who promote the critical morality argue that a more critical stance is needed. Only the conventions which ought to be considered as binding should be properly termed so. See Marshall (1986).
- 141.
Marshall (1986), p. 7.
- 142.
- 143.
- 144.
- 145.
Ibid., p. 165.
- 146.
This is particularly peculiar to political constitutions, see Griffith (1979), p. 20.
- 147.
Dicey (1959) 422–423.
- 148.
- 149.
Ibid., p. 169.
- 150.
Ibid., pp. 173–174.
- 151.
Ibid., p. 142.
- 152.
The definition of principle here is drawn from Dworkin (1977), 22–28.
- 153.
- 154.
Allan (2013), p. 65.
- 155.
Munro (1975).
- 156.
Feldman (2013).
- 157.
Jaconelli (2005), p. 167.
- 158.
Feldman (2005).
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder for the opportunity to present our paper at the Koç University & Boston College Law School ICON-S Workshop on unamendable constitutional provisions. We thank the participants of the workshop and an anonymous peer reviewer for their helpful advice. Naturally, the usual disclaimer applies
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Geertjes, G.J., Uzman, J. (2018). Conventions of Unamendability: Covert Constitutional Unamendability in (Two) Politically Enforced Constitutions. In: Albert, R., Oder, B. (eds) An Unamendable Constitution?. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 68. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95141-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95141-6_4
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