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German Energy and Climate Policies: A Historical Overview

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Energiewende "Made in Germany"

Abstract

The energiewende marked a major turn in German energy and climate policy in two main respects. First, with respect to the energy mix, the energiewende aims at replacing coal and nuclear power with renewable energies. Second, with respect to governance structures, the energiewende aims at restructuring the traditional energy oligopolists and actively involving other stakeholders that were previously not involved in the policy process, such as citizen cooperatives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and others. This chapter provides a survey of German energy and climate policies leading up to the important decisions on the energy mix, climate objectives, efficiency, etc. The energiewende constitutes a break between two systems, in which the incumbent electricity system—dominated by oligopolists based on fossil fuels and nuclear power—was abandoned, giving rise to a renewables-based electricity system with a significantly higher share of distributed generation. The chapter describes the main trends and characteristics of German energy and climate policies from their inception in the late nineteenth century up to the present energiewende. Section 2.2 looks broadly at over a century of German energy policy, examining the governance structures and energy mix dominant in three key periods: (1) 1880s–1945, (2) 1950s–1980s, and (3) 1980s–2010s. The second main part of this chapter, Sect. 2.3 looks in more detail at the period between the fall of 2010 and the spring and summer of 2011. A focus is on the year 2010 and the Energy Concept 2050, which was voted into law by parliament in September 2010. The concept represents a curious combination of lifetime extensions for nuclear power plants and coal-based generation technologies on the one hand, and ambitious decarbonization objectives and a strong role for renewables (over 80% by 2050) on the other. The section then focuses on Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision on the nuclear moratorium, and the subsequent passage of legislation by parliament to rapidly close down nuclear power plants following the Fukushima-Daichi accident. Another subsection provides a summary of the key objectives of the energiewende in both the electricity sector and the energy sector as a whole, including a list of policy objectives and concrete quantitative targets of the German energiewende to 2050. Section 2.4 concludes.

The events in Japan teach us that things we consider impossible according to scientific criteria can nonetheless become reality. (…) We will suspend the recent decision to extend the lifetime of the German nuclear power plants. This is a moratorium that will last 3 months. … The situation after the moratorium will be different than before. (…) We speak about nuclear energy as a “bridge technology,” which means nothing other than that we are discontinuing the use of nuclear energy and want to ensure the German energy supply through the use of renewables as quickly as possible. … The only honest response is to accelerate the path towards the age of renewable energies.

Chancellor Angela Merkel, televised press conference, March, 14, 2011

Bundesregierung (2011), authors’ translation.

The first part of this chapter draws on historical sources, such as Becker (2011), Hughes (1993), Stier (1999), and Zängl (1989). Thanks to Alexander Weber for comments and suggestions, the usual disclaimer applies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This concession, granted by the city of Berlin, included a monopoly on electricity generation, transport, and sales in this district against payment of 6% of turnover. The concessionaire, a company called Actiengesellschaft Städtische Elektrizitätswerke, was also obliged to connect all citiziens to the grid and was subjected to price control.

  2. 2.

    Some federal states also opted for more decentralized electricity generation structures, e.g., in southwest Germany (Baden-Würrttemberg). In hindsight, there was a striking continuity in both the choices of fuel (coal) and governance structures (trusts) of the German electricity industry from 1884, the year of the first private concession in Berlin, up to 1945.

  3. 3.

    Already at that time final consumers of electricity, paying a high surcharge on the true costs, cross-subsidized industrial users, who had higher negotiating power thanks to political pressures, their capacity to self-generate, etc. see Becker (2011, 23).

  4. 4.

    For details, see Boll (1969, 58 sq.).

  5. 5.

    RWE (Rhine-Ruhr region), Preussen-Elektra (Central Germany), Badenwerke, Energieversorgung Schwaben (EVS), “Interessengebiet Elektrowerke” (assembly of East German utilities), Bayrische Elektrizitätswerke (South), etc. see Stier (1999, 294 sq.).

  6. 6.

    Preambel to the 1935 law, quoted by Becker (2011, 38).

  7. 7.

    Cited in Becker (2011, 31). Note that the monopolization of the electricity market was by no means limited to Germany; on the contrary, cartelization had spread all over Europe and was coordinated by the “International Electric Association” to fix prices and quantities for power plants and other equipment (2011, 39).

  8. 8.

    One finds a long list of German energy providers, industrial energy consumers, and representatives of the energy equipment industry among the donors to the “Museum der Deutschen Kunst,” the first prestigious project of the National Socialist government under Chancellor Adolf Hitler in May 1933: Karl-Friedrich von Siemens, son of Werner von Siemens and then head of the Siemens trust, was on the governing council of the “Museum der Deutschen Kunst,” as was Fritz Thyssen (see Brantl, Sabine 2007: Haus der Kunst, München. Munich, edition monacensia).

  9. 9.

    Today the situation is quite the opposite: while the last hard coal mines are closing down (the last to be closed in 2018), the two large lignite pits (Garzweiler and Hambach) will still supply the electricity industry for about another decade or so.

  10. 10.

    Formally, a price control clause was introduced in § 104 GWB, but it little effects: All that (understaffed) price control bodies could do was to compare monopoly prices with prices of other monpolists: the Monopoly Commission, advising the Minstry of Economy, concluded in a 1958 report, that “price control has virtually remained without any effect,” cited in (Becker 2011, 46).

  11. 11.

    Badenwerk, Bayernwerk, BEWAG Berlin, EVS Schwaben, HEW Hamburg, Preussen-Elektra, RWE, and VEW.

  12. 12.

    The third German law on electritic generation (Verstromungsgesetz, 1974) made the expansion of existing or the construction of new natural gas (and mineral fuel oil) power plants de facto impossible (for details, see Matthes (2000, 126).

  13. 13.

    Radkau (1983) and Radkau and Hahn (2013) provide a full account of both the remarkable fascination with nuclear power in the post-war period—Willy Brandt, then Mayor of West Berlin, wanted to construct a nuclear power plant in the western part of the divided city—but also the resistance to a non-competitive energy technology by the incumbent energy industry.

  14. 14.

    The history of nuclear power in Japan follows the same pattern.

  15. 15.

    After Germany succeeded in building a nuclear industry from scratch, a complex process of technology transfer began, with German engineering companies being given more and more autonomy in the construction of nuclear plants. AEG obtained a license from GE to build boiling water reactors, as did Siemens for the Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (similarly to Toshiba in Japan). The merger of AEG and Siemens into one unified, monopolistic nuclear engineering firm, Kraftwerk Union (KWU), then led to the internalization of this technology competition into one firm.

  16. 16.

    Eppler (1975): Ende oder Wende. Von der Notwendigkeit des Machbaren (authors’ translation from German original).

  17. 17.

    “Energie-Wende: Wachstum und Wohlstand ohne Erdöl und Uran” (authors’ translation from German original).

  18. 18.

    In fact, Florentin Krause, the main author of “Energiewende,” had been a research associate with the Rocky Mountain Institute and was hired to develop a “soft path” concept for Germany, as a guest researcher with the Institute for Applied Ecology (Öko-Institut).

  19. 19.

    In a follow-up study, Hennicke et al. (1990) provided a detailled analysis of what needed to take place at the institutional level for the Energiewende to happen. In particular, they argued for the necessity of overcoming big corporate structures that were resistant to change.

  20. 20.

    See Hirschhausen (2017) with further references; the term “too cheap to meter” comes from a speech by Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission to the National Association of Science Writers in (1954): “our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to meter”.

  21. 21.

    Unbundling in Germany was advocated by the Ministry for Environment (then headed by SPD Minister Siegmar Gabriel), citing the slow progress of the European Directives. The idea was to impose a more sustainable energy mix on the unbundled energy companies, see: Theobald and Theobald (2013) and Federal Ministry of the Environment (2007): “Gabriel welcomes European Commission’s legislative package for the EU electricity and gas markets,” press release.

  22. 22.

    Becker (2011, Chap. 2), one of the main advocates of municipal interests, provides a detailed account of this battle.

  23. 23.

    Gesetz über die Einspeisung von Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien in das öffentliche Netz (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz) v. 7.12.1990 (StrEG), BGBl. I S. 2633).

  24. 24.

    Published as an advertisement by the big eight utilities in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1993, Nr. 152 [authors’ translation].

  25. 25.

    Danish Government. 2011. “Our Future Energy.” Copenhagen, Denmark.

  26. 26.

    For details, see the comment by Bank (2010): Der Atomdeal—Eine kleine Chronologie undemokratischer Politik.; accessed on March 14, 2014, see www.lobbycontrol.de, as well as the daily press, e.g., Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 09, 2011; a personal account of the events is provided by Tobias Münchmeyer himself, in a conference presentation given at DIW Berlin: http://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.409266.de/forschung_beratung/projekte/projekt_homepages/masmie_modellieren_fuer_die_energiewende/nbsp_nbsp_veranstaltungen/nbsp_nbsp_veranstaltungen.html, last accessed 20 September 2016.

  27. 27.

    Förderfondsvertrag: Term Sheet aus Besprechung Bund und EVUs (energy utilities).

  28. 28.

    Source https://www.lobbycontrol.de/2010/09/der-atomdeal-eine-kleine-chronologie-undemokratischer-politik/. What seems like an anecdote is important because it was the last time that the traditional nuclear lobby was able to impose its preferences on the policymaking process.

  29. 29.

    See the Symposium of Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy (EEEP), Vol. 5, No. 1 on “The Japanese Energy Policy after Fukushima”.

  30. 30.

    From North to South: Brunsbüttel, Unterweser Biblis A, Biblis B, Philippsburg 1, Neckarwestheim 1, Isar/Ohu 1. In addition, the plant at Krümmel is sometimes mentioned as part of the moratorium, although it had already been shut down in 2007 due to technical problems.

  31. 31.

    The commission, which worked from April 4 to May 28, 2011, was headed by Klaus Toepfer, former environmental minister under the Kohl administration, which had implemented the first renewables law in 1990, and by Matthias Kleiner, then head of the German Research Foundation. Other members of the ethics commission included former high-ranking politicians, scientists, representatives of the civil organizations (churches, labor unions), and one industrial enterprise (BASF). Source: http://www.bmbf.de/pubRD/2011_05_30_abschlussbericht_ethikkommission_property_publicationFile.pdf, accessed March 15, 2015.

  32. 32.

    In parallel, a “Commission on the Security of Nuclear Reactors” (Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission, RSK), was to investigate the safety of German nuclear power plants according to updated security standards and was to deliver its report by June 15, 2011, as well.

  33. 33.

    The law on the first nuclear phase-out of December 14, 2001 was voted with support by the governing parites (SPD, Greens) but against the votes of all the opposition (CDU/CSU, FDP); the October 2010 decision on the lifetime extension received 309 “yes” votes versus 280 “no” votes (with 2 abstentions) in favor of the 11th Ammendment of the Law on nuclear power. Source: http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/plenum/abstimmung/20101028_energie1.pdf download March 2013, see for a survey Matthes (2012).

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von Hirschhausen, C. (2018). German Energy and Climate Policies: A Historical Overview. In: von Hirschhausen, C., Gerbaulet, C., Kemfert, C., Lorenz, C., Oei, PY. (eds) Energiewende "Made in Germany". Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95126-3_2

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