Distributed Membership Games for Planning Sensor Networks

  • Thomas A. WettergrenEmail author
  • C. Michael Traweek
Part of the STEAM-H: Science, Technology, Engineering, Agriculture, Mathematics & Health book series (STEAM)


We consider the management of sensor networks which are organized into distinct groups that share data to improve performance. In particular, for systems where changes in individual sensors’ group membership may improve performance (in response to local conditions and/or group performance), the requirement of control by a central authority may make such adaptation prohibitive. We develop two different group membership game formulations to address this issue. The first type of game we develop is a group affiliation game that creates joining rules based on perceived maximal group size. The second type of game is a group allocation game of distributed welfare where the sensors work noncooperatively to self-organize into a beneficial distribution of group memberships. We derive group joining rules for individual sensors in each game formulation and illustrate the results with numerical calculations.


Sensor Network Problem Joint Strategy Fictitious Play Deciding Group Membership Welfare Groups Individual Agent Utilities 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© This is a U.S. government work and not under copyright protection in the U.S.; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Naval Undersea Warfare CenterNewportUSA
  2. 2.Office of Naval ResearchArlingtonUSA

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