Abstract
This chapter introduces the major concepts of Tomkins’ affect-script theory and his idiosyncratic terminology, and includes an overview of his “human being theory” as a rejection of the once dominant drive theory of human motivation, which leads to defining the primary terms necessary for understanding Tomkins’ ideation, such as affect, feeling, emotion, before moving on to introduce the language of literature in the expression of human affect-feeling-emotion states. (The book includes an appended glossary of his terms to aid understanding.) Script theory traces people’s “ways of living in the world,” both individually and socially, and resonates evocatively with literary study as a mode of human expression. I formulate an axis affectus as a metaphor for affect-feeling states, which provides a hermeneutic for emotional content in four literary genres, including tragedy and comedy, romance, and irony-satire.
Two souls, alas! reside within my breast,
and each is eager for a separation:
in throes of coarse desire, one grips
the earth with all its senses;
the other struggles from the dust
to rise to high ancestral spheres.
Goethe, Faust
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Notes
- 1.
Before translation into French, “Consciousness and the unconscious in a model of the human being” was delivered at the 14th International Congress of Psychology at Montréal in 1954. Chapter one of AIC 1 is an expanded version.
- 2.
See Raymond Kurzweil, Age of Intelligent Machines (1990, 190–198).
- 3.
An analogue/digital duality is the basis for Sedgwick and Frank’s discussion of Tomkins’ unique method of theorizing through a “habit of layering digital (on/off) with analog (graduated and/or multiply differentiated) representation models” (1995, 8). Tomkins’ “alchemy of the contingent” (6) writing style, they argue, implicitly challenges the “heuristic habits and positing procedures of theory today” (1). Also, with the advent of cybernetic discourse, Tomkins began imagining possibilities for simulating human personality with a computer. In June 1962, he hosted (with Samuel Messick) a conference at Princeton University on that subject. The proceedings were published in a 1963 volume entitled Computer Simulation of Personality: Frontier of Psychological Theory. Much of Tomkins’ modelling in “human being theory” for cognition could well inform research in artificial intelligence: see, for example, Elizabeth A. Wilson’s (2010) Affect and Artificial Intelligence (Seattle: University of Washington Press).
- 4.
The issue of mobility and consciousness is now something of a “hot” research topic. See, for example, Bjorn Merker (2005), “The Liabilities of Mobility,” and R.R. Llinas (2001), I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self. See also the work of Daniel Wolpert. Yet, while relations between mobility and consciousness may not be Tomkins’ original idea, he was pointing to it as early as 1962 in AIC Chap. 1, and perhaps as early as 1954 at Montréal: “We find consciousness in animals who move about in space but not in organisms rooted in the earth. Mobility is the key” (1962, 1: 11).
- 5.
Ruth Leys fundamentally misunderstood this aspect of Tomkins’ conception. In response to critiques of her “Turn to Affect,” she writes: “The purpose of my article… was to show that the theorists [on affect] whose work I analyzed are all committed to the mistaken idea that affective processes are responses of the organism that occur independently of cognition or intention” (2012, 882). Leys could not have looked meaningfully at Tomkins’ ideas on cognitions. Had she, she might have read this passage by Tomkins:
Seen at the evolutionary nexus, both the motivational and the cognitive systems must have evolved so that together they guaranteed a viable, integrated human being. It could not have been the case that either the ‘motives’ or ‘cognitions’ should have been dominant since both halves of the total system had to be matched, not only to each other but, more important, to the environmental niche of the species. There is a nontrivial sense, then, in which the whole human being could be considered to be ‘cognitive’ (rather than being subdivided into a motivational system and a cognitive system). Because of the high degree of interpenetration and interconnectedness of each part with every other part and with the whole, the distinction we have drawn between the cognitive half and the motivational half must be considered to be a fragile distinction between transformation and amplification as a specialized type of transformation. Cognitions coassembled with affects become hot and urgent. Affect coassembled with cognitions become better informed and smarter. (1995, 432; 1992, 4: 7)
- 6.
Personology is a research and writing discipline in a psychobiographical mode and in the tradition of Tomkins’ mentor at Harvard, Henry Murray. For examples of personology as an applied discipline, see Irving Alexander’s Personology and also the work of William Todd Schultz and Alan C. Elms and Dan P. McAdams and Richard L. Ochberg.
- 7.
Damasio’s book Looking for Spinoza begins: “Feelings of pain or pleasure or some quality in between are the bedrock of our minds” (2003, 3). In Critique of Judgement, his most affect related work, Kant writes that Epicurus was essentially correct that “at bottom all gratification is bodily sensation, and only misunderstood himself in ranking intellectual and even practical delight under the head of gratification” (1952, 197); therefore, “all gratification, even when occasioned by concepts that evoke aesthetic ideas, is animal, i.e. bodily sensation” (202).
- 8.
For a pictographic representation of the relations between these six affects, see page 251 in the 1962 edition of AIC volume one, or page 139 in the 2008 edition of AIC, or page 46 of Exploring Affect, in which the vertical dimension represents the density of neural firing in response to a stimulation and the horizontal dimension represents time.
- 9.
Curiously, Ekman’s own repeated attempts to laud Tomkins and raise his mentor’s profile within the emotion research community have gone largely unnoticed or ignored. See, for example, Andrea Scarantino’s March 2014 audio interview “Paul Ekman on Basic Emotions and the Future of Affective Science” in Emotion Researcher (http://emotionresearcher.com/an-audio-interview-with-paul-ekman/), notably question 14: “Please list up to five articles of books that have had a deep influence on your thinking.” He quickly responds that Darwin’s book on the expression of emotions and Tomkins’ “two” books both impacted him greatly. That answer took ten seconds. He then “hums and hahs” and considers other possible books for 18–19 seconds before declaring that nothing else comes to mind. Even Malcolm Gladwell in his populist Blink speaks only of Tomkins’ ability to read faces and gamble on horses and thus misses Tomkins’ substantive contributions to emotions theory.
- 10.
This is confirmed by Ekman’s work on facial display of emotion, which shows that we can and do “unconsciously” display affects, though he would use the term core emotion. See, for example, his later works such as Telling Lies (2001) and Emotions Revealed (2007).
- 11.
- 12.
In The Feeling of What Happens, Damasio conceives feelings as “inwardly directed and private” and emotions as “outwardly directed and public” (1999, 36). He suggests a three-stage continuum: first is a state of emotion as triggered and executed non-consciously, then a state of feeling which can be represented non-consciously, and then a state of feeling made conscious, or “known to the organism having both emotion and feeling” (37). What Tomkins more subtly calls affects, Damasio ambiguously calls emotions in the sequence of emotion-feeling-self-aware feeling. Though apparently an inversion, Damasio’s three stages correspond with Tomkins’ affect-feeling-emotion. Damasio does, however, outline a useful schema for consciousness as self-awareness, including a “proto-self” (a non- or preconscious “coherent collection of neural patterns which map, moment by moment, the state of the physical structure of the organism in its many dimensions” (154)), “core consciousness” (feeling as first-order self-awareness), “extended consciousness,” or the “autobiographical self” (self-awareness in time). Ekman and Friesen demonstrate further ambiguity, slippage, and general lack of definitional agreement between the terms affect, feeling, and emotion by defining emotion as a “transitory feeling, such as fear, anger, surprise, etc.” (1975, 11).
- 13.
Definitions matter, of course, for the pragmatics of research and writing. To suggest that there is a lack of consensus in defining “emotion” would be a dramatic understatement. For an excellent survey of definitions for emotion up to 1981, and the types of research categories under which those varying definitions are subsumed, see Kleinginna and Kleinginna , “A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition.” I would also here point out that in Looking for Spinoza, Damasio (2003) largely reverses the relationship between emotion, feeling, and (Spinozan) affect, though he little uses the latter term. He explicitly says, “Emotions Precede Feelings” (29), and in part accounts the difference thus: “Emotions play out in the theater of the body. Feelings play out in the theater of the mind” (28). I’m not concerned with repudiating Damasio’s approached; I’m merely acknowledging the fluidity of the relevant terminology.
- 14.
Tomkins outlines ten general features in defining scripts. Scripts are (1) sets of ordering rules; (2)selective of number and types of scenes ordered; (3) incomplete rules, even when attempting order; (4) in varying degrees, accurate and inaccurate; (5) continually reordered and changing; (6) coexistent and competitive, thereby producing interscripts; (7) more self-validating than self-fulfilling; (8) incomplete, thus requiring auxiliary information (from perception, memory, motor action); (9) variable by alternatives, depending on auxiliary information, to differentiate strategies from tactics; and (10) modular . Modularity makes possible infinite combinations and permutations of personality traits and comprises nine elements: (1) general quantities, ratios, and directionality of triggered positive and negative affects; (2) specific quantities, ratios, and directionality of triggered positive and negative affects; (3) different loci of affect magnification; (4) affect salience; (5) dependent, independent, interdependent relations between origin-source-affect-response-target of affect; (6) strategies to minimize/maximize, optimize, or satisfy the related risks, costs, benefits of affect; (7) clarity of distance and direction of scripted responses; (8) monism, dualism, and pluralism as a movement from most to least interpretive clarity; and (9) interscript relations.
- 15.
For contextual purposes, this is the entire paragraph from “Scripting the Macho Male”: “In any scene, the protagonist is vicariously learning the multiple roles available in the scene as he plays his own. You can not learn to be a man without learning how to transact with women; as you learn to play one gender role, you also learn the alter’s role. Of course, we believe, apart from the biology of reproduction, there are no inherent masculine or feminine roles. Yet for the hypermasculine man, ‘feminine’ transaction and roles are considered ‘inferior’—to be avoided or else they count as evidence against hypermasculine identity. To be ‘feminine’ is to be a slave, not a warrior ” (Tomkins and Mosher 1988, 75). The US military, for example, is socializing some young women to be warriors or, in a sense, to be “men.” The infamous photographs of American soldier Lynndie England with an Iraqi prisoner on a leash at Abu Ghraib show this socialized “inversion.” Conversely, Shyam Selvadurai (1994) writes in Funny Boy of how an adolescent homosexual male begins to script scenes according to something seemingly “innate” such that he finds himself in a socially “feminine” and therefore “inferior” role as a “funny boy.”
- 16.
J. Samuel Bois’ ((1966) 1996) The Art of Awareness explores some of these issues, including an application of Tomkins’ theories , though only in reference to Affect Imagery Consciousness volumes one and two.
- 17.
See also Robert Denham’s (1978) Northrop Frye and Critical Method, notably Chap. 4.
- 18.
A “romantic tragi-comedy” is the “story of a union, separation, and ultimate reunion of lovers” (Hogan 2003, 101); a “heroic tragi-comedy” typically shows the “rightful leader of a society” being “displaced from rule or prevented from assuming rule, most often by a close relative” (109), and certainly Hamlet begins in just this way. The hero is then exiled or imprisoned, which is linked with death imagery, and during this exile “the kingdom is threatened by some outside force” (110), which the hero defeats. Then, the hero defeats the usurper and reassumes the rightful leadership. Hogan acknowledges, of course, that there are many stories across the world which do not fit these two narrative paradigms—Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, for example—but romantic and heroic tragi-comedy are universal because they occur canonically across all literary traditions. I find it unlikely that non-Western literatures, though I have limited knowledge of those canons, do not confront the “ironic” sense of life and the experience of living confinement, confusion, frustration, and persecution within a seemingly incomprehensible universal and/or social order. When we conceive of Frye’s four pregenre as a wheel as per Robert Denham’s (1978) account in Northrop Frye and Critical Method, Hogan confines himself to the top half and its corresponding emotions.
- 19.
- 20.
Even Julia Kristeva, though focused on defining the boundary between subject and object states of being in the “abject,” sees literature as a vaguely transcendental signifier: “On close inspection, all literature is probably a version of the apocalypse that seems to me rooted, no matter what its socio-historical conditions might be, on the fragile border (borderline cases) where identities (subject/object, etc.) do not exist or only barely so—double, fuzzy, heterogeneous, animal, metamorphosed, altered, abject” (1982, 207).
- 21.
Hegel understood the poet’s role in articulating transcendental ideals out of human immanence. The artist’s function is to bind the divine and human “by a finely conceived thread of relation” and the “truly poetic relation of ideality consists… in the identity of gods and men; and this must assert itself even though the universal powers are presented as independent and free from the particularity of human beings and passions. In other words, all that we attribute to the gods must at the same time establish itself as that which is essentially cognate with the spiritual life of particular men in this sense, that while the dominating powers appear as essentially personified, yet at the same time all that is thus posited in an external relation to man is none the less clearly that which is immanent in his own spirit and character.” Thus human emotional life “must reveal itself in the gods, who, in fact, are the self-subsistent and universal embodiments of that which is active and dominant in [the artist’s] own spiritual experience. Then alone are the gods at the same time gods in cognate relation with his own heart and emotions” (1962, 141).
- 22.
Fadiman (1995) translation of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy : myth is “the concentrated picture of the world… as abbreviature of phenomena…” (85).
- 23.
I first came across this quote in John Irving’s novel, A Prayer for Owen Meany, and the relevant passage reads: “I’D BEGIN WITH HIS DIARIES—HE NEVER MINCED WORDS THERE. EVEN EARLY—WHEN HE WAS TRAVELING IN FRANCE, IN 1882—HE WROTE: ‘SINCE I DISCOVERED SEVERAL YEARS AGO, THAT I WAS LIVING IN A WORLD WHERE NOTHING BEARS OUT IN PRACTICE WHAT IT PROMISES INCIPIENTLY, I HAVE TROUBLED MYSELF VERY LITTLE ABOUT THEORIES. I AM CONTENT WITH TENTATIVENESS FROM DAY TO DAY.’ YOU COULD APPLY THAT OBSERVATION TO EACH OF HIS NOVELS! THAT’S WHY I SAY HE WAS ‘ALMOST RELIGIOUS’—BECAUSE HE WASN’T A GREAT THINKER, HE WAS A GREAT FEELER!” (1989, 519, uppercase original). The italicized “feeler” is original and indicates, I think, my suggestion from the Introduction that great fiction writers accurately, if only intuitively, interpret human affect-emotional motivations.
- 24.
In perfect keeping with the current humanities milieu, Sedgwick and Frank have referred to Tomkins’ work, even while complimenting him, as “highly suspect scientism” (1995, 2). Part of the overall problem, I think, is that psychology is a broad, multidisciplinary term, many parts of which escape the testable hypothesis zone of research. On the other hand, in his early career, Tomkins did considerable work in the Henry Murray and Robert White tradition of personality research. See, for example, his books The Thematic Apperception Test (1947) and PAT Interpretation: Scope and Technique (1959). He was also the Director of Clinical Training Program at Princeton University from 1947 to 1965.
- 25.
Concerning the facial expression of affect, see part three of Tomkins’s (1995) Exploring Affect, “What and where are the primary affects? Some evidence for a theory.” See also Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen’s (1975) extensive work on display of emotion on the face, notably Unmasking the Face and his Facial Action Coding System, and Carroll Izard’s (1977) Human Emotions , Nathanson’s (1992) Shame and Pride, and Darwin’s (1872) The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals. Keep in mind, however, there are significant inconsistencies in the number of “core” emotional expressions.
- 26.
Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), for example , describe myth as a “will to explain,” as sort of incipient science, in Dialectic of Enlightenment.
- 27.
The “demon of the day” is directly related to the “enemy of the state” in current affairs. This can be seen, for example, in comparing American political “war on” rhetoric with concurrent Hollywood productions, particularly action films. In the 1950s through early 1980s, during the Cold War, most Hollywood films cast Russian Reds, the commies, or some extant species thereof, as the “bad guy” against the hero; the hero then defended the interests of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness ,” and capitalism to affirm American ideology as the “right way.” During the 1980s, US policy makers began a “war on drugs,” and the drug lord then became the antagonist in a great many films. In the 1990s, but especially since the 9/11 attacks, the ubiquitous enemy has been some species of Arab terrorist. In all cases, the American hero triumphs and thus affirms American, and more generally Western, ideologies.
- 28.
It may be that shame and damage -reparation scripts can be demonstrated to correspond with generic categories other than the four mythoi here specified, but that investigation is outside this project’s specific purview.
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Lucas, D.A. (2018). Tomkins and Literature: A Hermeneutical Model. In: Affect Theory, Genre, and the Example of Tragedy. Palgrave Studies in Affect Theory and Literary Criticism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94863-8_2
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