Abstract
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein uses his theory of hinge commitments to attack Cartesian scepticism and Moorean realism. This chapter shows that it can also be used to leverage an argument for epistemic relativism that makes no use of the Agrippan trilemma. In addition, it examines Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s anti-relativist interpretations of On Certainty. Williams reads Wittgenstein as offering a contextualist response to Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism, while Pritchard claims that Wittgenstein attacks these positions using a Davidsonian style of coherentism. The chapter concludes that these are two more unsuccessful anti-sceptical arguments against epistemic relativism.
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Notes
- 1.
See also OC §279.
- 2.
See also OC §§460, 490, and 506.
- 3.
See also OC §§315 and 337.
- 4.
See also OC §§360–361.
- 5.
See also OC §108.
- 6.
See also OC §§166 and 403.
- 7.
See also OC §§188 and 217.
- 8.
On this point, see Chapter 4.
- 9.
Williams isn’t as clear on this point as one might like him to be. He fails to distinguish a commitment to the default and challenge model of inquiry from the additional commitment to the existence of hinge propositions.
- 10.
Williams lists the following four context-sensitive factors that determine the hinge status of a commitment:
Semantic: The factors that determine whether or not a challenge to the commitment is intelligible.
Methodological: The factors that determine whether or not a challenge to the commitment would undermine an operative epistemic practice.
Dialectical: The factors that determine whether or not a challenge to the commitment is relevant to a particular investigation.
Economic: The factors that determine whether or not a challenge to the commitment is worth addressing.
- 11.
Indeed, he notes that sections from his Unnatural Doubts (1996) appear in a section entitled “Epistemological Relativism” in Kim and Sosa (2000).
- 12.
This reading is also presented in Pritchard (2009).
- 13.
If I am correct, then the relativist will reject Pritchard’s formulation of the thesis of epistemic incommensurability : “It is possible for two agents to have opposing beliefs which are rationally justified to an equal extent where there is no rational basis by which either agent could properly persuade the other to revise their view” (Pritchard 2011, 296). She will reject it because it fails to identify the reason why such disagreements resist rational resolution, i.e., the fact that the parties subscribe to different epistemic systems . See, by contrast (R3) and (LW3), which I believe more accurately capture the relativist’s notion of epistemic incommensurability .
References
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Bland, S. (2018). The Wittgensteinian Position. In: Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_8
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