Abstract
This chapter examines two classic responses to the epistemic regress problem: foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists seek to avoid the regress by invoking the non-inferential justification of basic beliefs, while coherentists do so by introducing a non-linear conception of justification. While both of these positions focus on the possibility of justifying beliefs, neither of them can establish the trustworthiness of basic epistemic methods without relying on the outcomes of those same methods. On a strictly internalist view, this means that neither of them can successfully answer the Agrippan argument that motivates Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism. Furthermore, they both posit subjective, variable sources of justification—acquaintance and coherence—which reinforces the case for epistemic relativism.
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Notes
- 1.
Epistemic internalism is the view that the factors responsible for a belief’s justification are internal to the believer, such that the believer has mental access to those factors. Common internalist candidates for justifiers include: evidence, reasons, arguments, and mental states.
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It is important to note that this is not a species of relative justification for foundationalists, since experiences and intuitions are not part of our epistemic system, i.e., they are neither beliefs nor methods, and therefore, foundationalists are not claiming that the justification of basic beliefs is system-relative. Indeed, experiences and intuitions are supposed to provide an absolute justification for basic beliefs that does not depend on one’s other commitments. In the following section, I argue that strictly internalist foundationalists cannot successfully argue for this conclusion, and in Sect. 4.2.4, I argue that foundationalism collapses into epistemic relativism if experiences and intuitions are subjective and variable, as they seem to be.
- 5.
Some claim that this condition, or something akin to it, is a “core tenet” of internalism (Van Cleve 2003, 45). There are, however, self-professed internalists who reject it, such as Chisholm (1982) and Boghossian (2001). For internalists who do endorse this requirement, see BonJour (1980), Lehrer (1990), and Fumerton (1995).
- 6.
It has been argued that Descartes himself is not actually caught in the Cartesian circle because, unlike Arnault, he rejects (KC) (Van Cleve 1979). This response to the problem of the criterion will be discussed at length in the next chapter. There is a vast literature on the problem of epistemic circularity , beginning with (Alston 1986).
- 7.
On this point, see Lemos (2004, 261).
- 8.
More specifically, their being unjustified is incompatible with our knowing that a method is a source of internalist justification, such as evidence, reasons, arguments, or mental states.
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Stich (1990) makes a similar point in favour of his brand of relativism.
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Hales (2006, 79) provides the following example: “The Catholic worldview is as meticulous and all-encompassing as the most ambitious philosophical system, indicating that belief-sets resulting from revelation fare quite well by the standards of comprehensiveness, consistency, explanatoriness and similar criteria.”
- 17.
Consider also Rorty ’s point, discussed in Sect. 3.4.3, that our understanding of the epistemic values that are constitutive of coherence—scope, accuracy, fruitfulness, consistency, and simplicity—is system-relative.
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Bland, S. (2018). Foundationalism and Coherentism. In: Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_4
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