Abstract
This chapter frames Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism as meta-philosophical threats that rely on the same argument: the Agrippan trilemma. Philosophers have traditionally attempted to neutralize both threats by means of a common response to this argument. The chapter surveys a number of such responses before outlining a more promising, dialectical argument against epistemic relativism that has no anti-sceptical ambitions. In doing so, it elucidates the book’s central claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism are distinct threats that require different responses.
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Notes
- 1.
Rorty himself abjures the ‘relativist’ label in favour of ‘pragmatist’: “The charge that pragmatism is “relativistic” is simply [the traditional philosopher’s] first unthinking expression of disgust at a teaching which seems cynical about our deepest hopes” (Rorty 1980, 735). This is in no small part due to his uncharitable understanding of the relativist doctrine: “‘Relativism’ is the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any topic, is as good as every other. No one holds this view” (Ibid., 727). Whatever Rorty wants to call himself—pragmatist, epistemic behaviourist, anti-foundationalist—he does seem to be an epistemic relativist on my understanding of this term, and on others’—see Rorty (1979, 178, 182, 212, 317, 329–330, 335, 361, 364–365, 377, 379, 385), as well as Haack (1993, Ch. 9), Boghossian (2006, Ch. 5), and Seidel (2014, Ch. 3).
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- 3.
See also Rorty (1979, 179).
- 4.
Rorty goes further still, insisting that truth ought not to be the aim of inquiry (Rorty 1979, 377).
- 5.
- 6.
See also Sosa (1994).
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Bland, S. (2018). Introduction. In: Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_1
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