The Role of Central Banks and the Interbank Market in Managing Bank Liquidity During the Global Financial Crisis

  • Laura ChiaramonteEmail author
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)


Chiaramonte investigates the role of central banks and the interbank market in managing banking liquidity during the global financial crisis (GFC). Focusing on the link between monetary policy and liquidity management, the chapter analyzes the operating framework for the three main central banks involved in the crisis (the ECB, FED and Bank of England) and the exceptional instruments used to deal with the crisis. The author reviews the main theoretical contributions related to the role of the interbank market in the transmission of financial crises, and the functioning of this market during the GFC.


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and Business Administration, Faculty of EconomicsUniversità Cattolica del Sacro CuoreMilanItaly

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