Abstract
We offer a revised conditional deterrence agent based model applied to global and regional nuclear proliferation issues. Further extending the dyadic logic already established in the deterrence literature helps anticipate more recent 21st century challenges generated by the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and their acquisitions by dissatisfied non-state actors. Key elements include relative capabilities, risk propensity associated with the status quo, and physical exposure to preemptive-attack or retaliation. This work continues to extend our previous complex adaptive system framework to generalize insights to deterrence environments with multiple competing actors. Our preliminary analysis suggests that deterrence is stable when the capabilities of a dissatisfied challenger are inferior to that of a dominant and satisfied defender. Conversely, deterrence is tenuous when a dissatisfied challenger approaches parity in capability with a more dominant and satisfied defender, or when a violent non-state actor obtains nuclear capability or other WMDs.
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- 1.
A similar argument is made by Intriligator (1975) and Intriligator and Brito (1984), who achieve stable deterrence in their model by excluding risk, but advocate non-proliferation by including risk (Intriligator and Brito 1981). If risk were included in both models, then proliferation is dangerous and deterrence is unstable. Fearon (1995) argues that risk-acceptance is equivalent to irrationality and implies that a risk-acceptant leader such as Hitler is “a possible exception” that cannot be rationally explained (p. 388). I concur with Zagare and Kilgour (2000) and Zagare (2004), who show that such exceptions are self-serving.
- 2.
Zagare and Kilgour's (2000) perfect deterrence framework derives instability from the lack of credibility. This contrasts with the continuous variations in capability and risk used in the conditional deterrence model.
- 3.
These are conditions associated with a weak, but risk-acceptant al-Qaeda.
- 4.
This would have been the case had the USSR’s (Warsaw Pact) conventional capabilities matched those of the USA and NATO. By 2050, if China is risk-acceptant and dissatisfied, such conditions would be met.
- 5.
Situations where a nuclear umbrella is extended, as in Northeast Asia, are expected to remain stable.
- 6.
For an example of proposed nuclear weapons cooperation between France and Britain, see Marcus (2012).
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Yang, Z., Kugler, J., Abdollahian, M. (2019). Conditional Deterrence: An Agent-Based Framework of Escalation Dynamics in an Era of WMD Proliferation. In: Cassenti, D. (eds) Advances in Human Factors in Simulation and Modeling. AHFE 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 780. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94223-0_29
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