Best of Both Worlds in Secure Computation, with Low Communication Overhead

  • Daniel Genkin
  • S. Dov Gordon
  • Samuel Ranellucci
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10892)


When performing a secure multiparty computation with a few hundred parties, using the best protocols known today, bandwidth constraints are the primary bottleneck. A long line of work demonstrates that n parties can compute a circuit C of depth d while communicating \(O(|C|\log |C| + \mathsf {poly}(d, n)\) field elements per party, as long as a majority of parties are honest. However, in the malicious majority setting, a lot less is known. The work of Nielsen and Ranellucci is the first to provide constant-overhead in the communication complexity when a majority of parties are malicious; their result demonstrates feasibility, but is quite complex and impractical.

In this work, we construct a new MPC protocol in the pre-processing model. We introduce a new middle-ground: our protocol has low communication and provides robustness when a majority of parties are honest, and gives security with abort (possibly with higher communication cost) when a majority of players are malicious. Robustness is impossible when a majority of parties are malicious; viewing the increased communication complexity as a form of denial of service, similar to an abort, we view our result as providing the “best of both worlds”.



This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. #1564088, #1111599, #1514261, #1652259 and #1563722. Daniel Genkin was also supported by financial assistance award 70NANB15H328 from the U.S. Department of Commerce, NIST, the 2017–2018 Rothschild Postdoctoral Fellowship, and DARPA Contract #FA8650-16-C-7622.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Genkin
    • 1
    • 3
  • S. Dov Gordon
    • 2
  • Samuel Ranellucci
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.University of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA
  2. 2.George Mason UniversityArlingtonUSA
  3. 3.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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