A Cryptographic Analysis of the WireGuard Protocol

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10892)

Abstract

WireGuard (Donenfeld, NDSS 2017) is a recently proposed secure network tunnel operating at layer 3. WireGuard aims to replace existing tunnelling solutions like IPsec and OpenVPN, while requiring less code, being more secure, more performant, and easier to use. The cryptographic design of WireGuard is based on the Noise framework. It makes use of a key exchange component which combines long-term and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values (along with optional preshared keys). This is followed by the use of the established keys in an AEAD construction to encapsulate IP packets in UDP. To date, WireGuard has received no rigorous security analysis. In this paper, we, rectify this. We first observe that, in order to prevent Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks, any analysis of WireGuard’s key exchange component must take into account the first AEAD ciphertext from initiator to responder. This message effectively acts as a key confirmation and makes the key exchange component of WireGuard a 1.5 RTT protocol. However, the fact that this ciphertext is computed using the established session key rules out a proof of session key indistinguishability for WireGuard’s key exchange component, limiting the degree of modularity that is achievable when analysing the protocol’s security. To overcome this proof barrier, and as an alternative to performing a monolithic analysis of the entire WireGuard protocol, we add an extra message to the protocol. This is done in a minimally invasive way that does not increase the number of round trips needed by the overall WireGuard protocol. This change enables us to prove strong authentication and key indistinguishability properties for the key exchange component of WireGuard under standard cryptographic assumptions.

Keywords

Authenticated key exchange Cryptographic protocols Formal analysis WireGuard 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Dowling was supported by EPSRC grant EP/L018543/1. Paterson was supported in part by a research programme funded by Huawei Technologies and delivered through the Institute for Cyber Security Innovation at Royal Holloway, University of London, and in part by EPSRC grants EP/M013472/1 and EP/L018543/1. We are grateful to Håkon Jacobsen and Benjamin Lipp as well as the anonymous reviewers for feedback on our work.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonEghamUK

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