Abstract
The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies fault-tolerant versions of the Hotelling game. Two fault models are studied. The first assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player’s Voronoi cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant is provided for every n. Additionally, a one-to-one correspondence is shown between equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from the game with i.i.d. probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players accordingly. It is shown that for n ≥ 3 this variant of the game has no Nash equilibria.
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Avin, C., Cohen, A., Lotker, Z., Peleg, D. (2019). Fault-Tolerant Hotelling Games. In: Song, J., Li, H., Coupechoux, M. (eds) Game Theory for Networking Applications. EAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93058-9_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93058-9_9
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