Cold Wind from the East

McCann, Frank D.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_8

Frank D. McCann²

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Abstract

The Americans wanted to keep the wartime bases and negotiated an agreement for a ten-year continuance. Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes wanted to prevent Pan American Airways and its subsidiary Panair do Brasil from getting sway over the air fields that they had been so instrumental in establishing. Gomes especially long harbored a dislike of PAA and Panair. Even before the war ended in Europe, opposition to the Vargas government included resistance to continued foreign troops on Brazilian soil. Washington seemed to want both a strong bilateral relationship with Brazil and a multilateral relationship with all of Latin America. This contradiction resulted from a deep divide in the American government between the State Department, which favored multilateralism, and the War Department that was more, if not completely, inclined toward a bilateral relationship with Brazil. As a result, the messages the Brazilians received from Americans were often confusing.

The Brazilians wanted a relationship of equals that enhanced rather than diminished their nationalism. After the war the United States did not provide the arms the Brazilians expected, and, more worrisome from the perspective of Rio de Janeiro, it sought a rapprochement with Argentina. Oil was a central issue that was viewed differently in the two countries. The United States’ position was that Brazil should allow American companies to search for, develop, and basically to own the resulting oil. Free trade and free investment were the American mantras of the era. The Brazilian military was divided as to the best way to develop the crucial resource.

Those officers who opposed American involvement in petroleum tended to blame the United States for the Korean crisis and, hence, opposed any suggestion that Brazil should send troops. The elections of October 3, 1950, returned former dictator Getúlio Vargas to the presidency. He wanted positive relations with Washington, but could not agree to send troops to Korea. The Brazilians wanted assistance signed and delivered before they made a decision about sending troops.

In the United States, the McCarthy anti-communist campaign was on, and in Brazil suspicion of American “imperialism” infected politics and discussions of foreign affairs. Calm and reason were often absent. Remarkably, it was in this tense climate that the two governments successfully negotiated a military accord along the lines of their 1942 agreement. Its purpose was to keep the military alliance alive by promising the supply of arms and training, but it muddied that intent by committing Brazil to export monazite and radio-active sands to the United States for its atomic program. In the midst of an emotional political crisis in 1954, Vargas committed suicide. Vargas to Geisel years brought shifts that ultimately led to unilateral renouncement of the alliance. Even so the two militaries sought to maintain ties where possible.

The chapter follows the relationship down to 2017.

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Notes

1.
For the Moscow-sponsored and financed revolts of 1935, see McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 375–388; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Estratégias da Ilusão: A Revolução Mundial e o Brasil, 1922–1935 (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991), pp. 287–326; and Hélio Silva, 1935 – A Revolta Vermelha (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1969). For a study that shows how the Cold War mixed with relations, see Sidnei J. Munhoz, “At the Onset of the Cold War: the USA and the repression of communism in Brazil” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 128–164.
2.
MG Robert. L. Walsh (USAFSA) to Jefferson Caffery, November 28, 1943, Aviation Agreement between US and Brazil, OPD, 580.82 Brazil, NARA. This was a draft letter that Walsh sent to War Department for approval. State Department was to take the first step. It seems that all later discussions resulted from Walsh’s suggestions.
3.
Robert A. Lovett [letter] to Adolf A. Berle, Asst. Secretary of State, Washington, December 7, 1943, OPD, 580.82, NARA.
4.
On January 8, 1944, Roosevelt had written to the Secretary of State, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson commented on and quoted from a copy of the letter in Stimson to Secretary of State, January 14, 1944, OPD 580.82 Brazil, NARA.
5.
Lt. Colonel Eiseman, Memo for OPD Record, December 19, 1945, “Use of US Controlled Brazil owned real estate and buildings for Brazilian Air Force program,” OPD 336 Brazil, NARA. For a discussion of Brazilian ownership, the role of Pan American and Panair, and future maintenance, see Col. George A. Brownell to Asst. Chief of Staff, Plans, August 13, 1945, “Implementation of Air Base Agreement,” OPD 580.82 Brazil, NARA.
6.
MG Ralph H. Wooten to Adjutant General War Dept., Recife, April 15, 1945, OPD580.82 Brazil, NARA.
7.
Walter N. Walmsley, Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Brazilian Affairs, Washington, Feb. 24, 1944, 711.3227/47 as in FRUS 1944, Vol. VII, pp. 554–556.
8.
Jefferson Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 1, 1944, 711.32/206: Telegram, as in FRUS 1944, Vol. VII, p. 551. In June 1944 the Rio Embassy and the foreign ministry exchanged texts in their respective languages of a Military Aviation Agreement that would have allowed use and maintenance of the bases for ten years by civilian clothed, unarmed American personnel. See FRUS1944, Vol. VII, pp. 561–565. Caffery had been directed by President Roosevelt to pursue continued access to the bases.
9.
Caffery reported that Vargas wanted a strong tie to the United States, unconnected directly to the continued use of the bases, and going through sympathetic motions was necessary. Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, April 25, 1944, 711.3227/79: Telegram as in FRUS 1944, Vol. VII, pp. 559–560. On air officers opposition see p. 559.
10.
Cordell Hull to Oswaldo Aranha, Washington, July 17, 1944, AGV c 1944.07.17, CPDOC- FGV-Rio. It would be interesting to know why this personal letter ended up in Vargas’s archive rather than Aranha’s.
11.
Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at Chapultepec, Mexico City, March 1945: http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/chapultepec.htm.
12.
BG John Weckerling, Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff G2 to Major General Clayton Bissell, Asst. Chief of Staff G2, Washington, “Comments on … Memo on Brazil of 18 May 45,” June 6, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, NARA.
13.
Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, p. 63. The CIA report was dated Nov. 30, 1948, and is in the Truman Library.
14.
Frank D. McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria, pp. 251–258; and “The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil’s Military Situation, 1900–1945,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1983), pp. 299–324. The premise of war with Argentina persisted at least until 1977, after which both republics pursued cooperation as the basis of their relations.
15.
Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 86–87. For an excellent analysis of military relations in the post-war era, see Davis, “Brazil-United States Military Relations in the Twentieth Century,” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 291–324.
16.
The ESG is most famous for organizing a doctrine of national security that would encourage economic development while keeping society orderly. There is a big literature on the ESG. A good starting place is Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 178–183; Wayne A. Selcher, “National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government,” Military Issues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (16 July 1977); Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 93–115; Antônio de Arruda, A Escola Superior de Guerra: História de Sua Doutrina (São Paulo: Edições GRD, 1983);; Francisco César Alves Ferraz, Á Sombra dos Carvalhos: Escola Superior de Guerra e política no Brasil (1948–1955) (Londrina: Editora UEL, 1997), pp. 108–120; ESG, Departamento de Estudos, Manual Básico (Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 1975).
17.
Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 315.
18.
Quoted in Mark Gilderhus, “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S. – Latin American Relations Since the Second World War” in Michael J. Hogan, ed. America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (University of Cambridge Press, 1995), p. 442.
19.
Miscamble, George F. Kennan, pp. 317–318.
20.
The petroleum question was at the heart of the turmoil that led to Getúlio’s suicide. For an excellent account of those turbulent days, see W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) especially pp. 48–50, 71–79. And also the fine analysis in Peter S. Smith, Oil and Politics in Modern Brazil (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976).
21.
Morris L. Cooke, Brazil on the March: A Study in International Cooperation (New York: McGraw Hill, 1944).
22.
See the many newspaper clippings on the Cooke Mission in the State Department files, 832.60/52, RG59, NARA.
23.
C. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 19–21. One of the problems in Washington was uncertainty over the respective jurisdictions of the Export-Import Bank and the “International Bank” (later World Bank). Adding to the confusion was the Brazil-United States Joint Economic Development Commission, created under the authority of the International Development Act (Section 410) and the Point Four Program, could not really get underway until the banks sorted themselves out. See Dean Acheson, Memo of Conversation: “Financial Aid for Development Projects in Brazil,” October 19, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 65, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
24.
Vágner Camilo Alves, “Ilusão desfeita: a ‘aliança especial’ Brazil-Estados Unidos e o poder naval brasileiro durante e após a Segunda Guerra Mundial,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 48, No. 1, Brasília, Jan – Junho 2005, pp. 151–177. The Brazilians could not understand Washington’s equal treatment policy. Juan Perón, who had “sympathy for Germany and everything German,” denounced the Nuremberg trials; see Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931–1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 381.
25.
The instructions to the mission leader, John Abbink, from Paulo H. Nitze (Deputy to Asst. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), set out the American view of such economic assistance. See Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission, FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, pp. 364–366.
26.
Mensagem apresentada ao Congresso Nacional por occasião da abertura da Sessão Legislativa de 1950 pelo General Eurico G. Dutra, Presidente da República, (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), pp. 101–102. Paulo Fagundes Visentini, “Populism and Brazil-USA Relations (1945–64): the dialectic of alignment and autonomy” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 165–193.
27.
Berle gave a speech seemingly praising the scheduled elections, but it was seen in Brazil as placing the United States behind the opposition to Vargas. The ambassador did not have State Department approval and wounded Vargas and his supporters. In some versions of the event he read the speech to Vargas in a private meeting, but later the president said he could not understand Berle’s garbled Portuguese. As my text shows Berle said that he handed Vargas the speech to read. For the Berle affair, see Stanley Hilton, O Ditador & O Embaixador: Getúlio Vargas, Adolf Berle Jr. e a Queda do Estado Novo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1987), pp. 75–99; and Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 122–131. On his development ideas: Lira Neto, Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio (1945–1954) (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014), p. 208.
28.
Neto, Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio, p. 208.
29.
Alex Semm, “O Capitão X, Herói ou Vilão? Considerações sobre os efeitos político-militares da guerra da coreia no Brasil (1950–1953),” in Thiago Mourelle and André Fraga (Organizers), Olhares sobre o governo Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Autografia, 2017), pp. 174–206.
30.
Neto, Getúlio:Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio, p. 211.
31.
Truman to Vargas, Washington, Sept. 4, 1951, Arquivo de Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC- Rio.
32.
Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, p. 121; for a summary of the Rio treaty see Robert H. Holden & Eric Zolov, eds, Latin American and the United States: A Documentary History (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 187–189. They did convince Colombia to send an infantry battalion and a warship.
33.
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Establishment of Joint School for Senior Latin American Officers,” 28 May 1951, JCS 1976/53, CCS 352 (5-25-51), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA.
34.
Stanley Hilton, Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva, 1994), p. 463, p. 467; Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1973), pp. 327–332.
35.
Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes, eds. Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1981), note 6, p. 440.
36.
Góes Monteiro was then chief of the new Brazilian joint staff. He had heart problems and had slowed down noticeably.
37.
Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 128–129; Memo of Conversation, “Farewell Visit by General Goes Monteiro – Brazil- U.S. Military Cooperation,” October 15, 1951, 452 S/S, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 66, Harry S Truman Library.
38.
Alex Semm. “Carne pra canhão!” A imprensa e o Acordo Militar Brasil-Estados Unidos (1950–1953),” Dissertação (mestrado), Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2016, p. 49.
39.
Interesting analysis of the accord and its passage in Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Diplomacia em Alto-mar: Depoimento ao CPDOC (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 186–187, 214–215; for a discussion of the impact of the accord on the ideological debates, especially in officer ranks, see Maria Celina Soares D’Araújo, O Segunda Governo Vargas, 1951–54 (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), pp. 148–159; for text and memos commenting on the “Mutual Defense Assistance” agreement which entered into force May 19, 1953: Joint Chiefs of Staff File, 092.2 Brazil, Modern Military Branch, NARA.
40.
Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 178.
41.
Aranha to Vargas, Washington, Feb. 2, 1952, Aranha Archive, CPDOC-Rio.
42.
Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 132.
43.
The best documented study of Vargas and Perón is Moniz Bandeira, Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração na América do Sul (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2003), pp. 251–259.
44.
W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), p. 77.
45.
The crisis leading to the president’s suicide is carefully documented in Hélio Silva, 1954: Um Tiro no Coração (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1978). Ronaldo Conde Aguiar raised serious questions about the reality of the attack on Carlos Lacerda in his Vitória na Derrota: A Morte de Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: Casa da Palavra, 2004).
46.
Dense documentation on the topic can be found in Moniz Bandeira, Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil, pp. 354–376.
47.
The tracking station agreement text is in J. F. Dulles, Washington, December 22, 1956, Telegram 512, FRUS, 1955–1957, pp. 732–734.
48.
Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, p. 150.
49.
Briggs, Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1956, Telegram 619, FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. VII, pp. 731–732.
50.
National Intelligence Estimate 93–57, Washington, January 8, 1957: “Probable Developments in Brazil,” as in FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. VII, pp. 737–746. Quotation is from p. 738.
51.
Stephan G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 100–110.
52.
FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. V, 267–286. For analysis of Eisenhower’s Latin American policies, see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 64–69, 94–99,135–137.
53.
Ibid. pp. 136–137.
54.
Ambassador John Crimmins as a junior foreign service officer in the Rio Embassy had witnessed the scene. He told me about this in 1976, when he was chief of mission in Brasília. On Santos-Dumont, see http://www.smithsonianeducation.org/scitech/impacto/graphic/aviation/alberto.html.
55.
W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 161–166.
56.
BG Albino Silva (Chief of Casa Militar) to Chefe do Estado-Maior das Fórcas Armadas, Oficio # 76–2 s, Rio, 22 Outubro 1962, HL62.10.22, CPDOC -Rio and response E.M. No.337-c/57. Rio, 30 Novembro 1962, HL62.10.22, CPDOC- Rio. Both documents were stamped SECRET.
57.
“Meeting on Brazil on 30 July 1962,” Tape 1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [The Great Crises, vol. 1, ed. Timothy Naftali] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8010002.
58.
My principal source for American promises to the younger officers was Col. Luiz Paulo Macedo de Carvalho; for the coup see Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 179–183; Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 3–17; Moniz Bandeira, Brasil-Estados Unidos: A Rivalidade Emergente, 1950–1988 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileiro, 1989), pp. 103–138.
59.
The best studies of Castello’s role are Lira Neto, Castello, A Marcha para a ditadura (São Paulo: Editora Contexto,2004), especially pp. 218–245; and Elio Gaspari, A ditadura envergonhada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 45–125.
60.
The Institutional Act #2 of October 1965 expanded arbitrary powers of the executive, and Castello had no choice but to accept the succession of Minister of the Army, General Arturo Costa e Silva (1967–1969).
61.
This did not happen according to a prior plan but from a process of evolution. Symbolic of this attitude was that president-generals wore civilian clothes rather than military uniforms. Costa e Silva had a heart attack and died in 1969. He was succeeded by General Emilio Garrastazú Médici (1969–1974), General Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979), and General João Batista Figueiredo (1979–1985).
62.
See the Editorial Note (summarizing actions), FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXI, pp. 431–432; John W.F. Dulles, President Castello Branco: Brazilian Reformer (Texas A & M University Press, 1981); Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). Hélio Silva, 1964: Golpe ou Contragolpe? (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1975); René A. Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista do Estado: Ação Política, Poder e Golpe de Classe (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1981); Edgard Carone, A Quarta República (1945–1964): Documentos (São Paulo: Difel/Difusão, 1980); Daniel Drosdoff, Linha dura no Brasil: O governo Médici, 1969–1974 (São Paulo: Global, 1986); Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990).
63.
Ambassador John Hugh Crimmins, Interview, May 10, 1989, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of Congress, pp. 27–28. Http://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mssmisc/mfdip/2004/2004cri01/2004cri01.pdf Lingering irritation undid American efforts to organize a similar intervention in Nicaragua years later.
64.
Luís Vianna Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 433–435.
65.
Lira Neto, Castello: A marcha para a ditadura (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2004), pp. 330–331.
66.
The Americans apparently used several routes to request Brazilian participation. A news story had General Maxwell Taylor asking for Brazilian paratroopers. “Taylor Pede Tropas do Brasil para o Vietnã,” Folha de São Paulo, 12 de Março de 1965. Ambassador Gordon made an official plea: Geneton Moraes Neto, Entervista: “O Dia em Lincoln Falou…,” O Globo, Rio, 21/12/09: http://g1.globo.com/platb/geneton/2009/12/21/o-dia-em-lincoln-gordon-falou-sobre-dois-temas-explosivos-primeiro-os-estados-unidos-queriam-que-o-brasil-participasse-da-guerra-do-vietnam-segundo-a-cia-financiou-a-campanha-de-candidatos-simpati/. The Navy minister was ready to send his marines, but Army Minister Costa e Silva opposed sending any troops. See Orivaldo Leme Biagi, “O (Quasi) Envolvimento Militar do Brasil na Guerra do Vietnã,” http://www.historica.arquivoestado.sp.gov.br/materias/anteriores/edicao05/materia03/militar.pdf. On the Johnson-Castello correspondence, see Luís Vianna Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 442–443.
67.
Brazil Program Analysis, Washington, November 1, 1969, National Security Council, Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–49, Senior Review Group, NSC Files 12–1–70, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. The study set out three policy objectives regarding Brazil: “a pro-United States Government, economic growth, and helping to promote a more modern social structure.”
68.
This was done in the so-called Reuss amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act as an expression of the sense of Congress.
69.
Viron P. Vaky, Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, National Security Council, May 19, 1970, Subject: Brazil and Reuss Amendment to Foreign Military Sales Act; NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 1, Through August 1970, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.
70.
He wrote that instruction on a memo from Kissinger: NSC Files., Box 29, Country Files, Brazil, President’s Daily Briefing, Chronological File, December 1–15, 1970, NARA.
71.
Memorandum of Meeting, White House, Washington, Dec 14, 1970, Nixon, Ambassador William Rountree and Arnold Nachmanoff (NSC), Subject: Brazil;, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Brazil, Volume 2, September 1970–31 July 31 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.
72.
“Passeata dos Cem Mil,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2616–2619. The cautioning general was Carlos de Meira Mattos, who did a report noting numerous problems in the universities. Meira Mattos had been Mascarenhas’s aide-de-camp during the FEB.
73.
Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p. 37. http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247.
74.
Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 261–262.
75.
“Emílio Garrastazu Médici,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2159–2172.
76.
Elio Gaspari, As Ilusções Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada (São Paulo; Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 129–130.
77.
“Mas não aceito tortura, nem que se maltrate o preso, nem que se mate preso. Não aceito de jeito nenhum isso.” Oral History Interview, FONTOURA, Carlos Alberto da. Carlos Alberto da Fontoura (depoimento, 1993), (Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2005), p. 128.
78.
Richard Morse, Thomas Skidmore, Stanley Stein, Charles Wagley, and 97 others, “A Protest to the Brazilian Government,” The New York Times, March 8, 1970 (I was one of the 97);William L. Wipfler, “Repression and Terror, The Price of “Progress” in Brazil, Christianity and Crisis (NY), March 16, 1970, pp. 44–48; Brady Tyson, “Brazil Twists Thumbscrews…” The Washington Post, April 5, 1970; American Committee for Information on Brazil, “Terror in Brazil: A Dossier,” April 1970: reported that there were nearly 12,000 political prisoners; Ralph Della Cava, “Torture in Brazil,” Commonweal, Vol. XCII, No. 6, April 24, 1970, pp. 135–141; James N. Green, “Opposing the Dictatorship in the United States: Human Rights and the Organization of American States,” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 391–413.
79.
Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 154.
80.
Many officers opposed such behavior and made attempts within the armed forces to resist it. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, Estado e Oposição no Brasil (1964–1984), (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1984), pp. 166–181. In later years those opposed would publicly defend their colleagues’ behavior as lamentable but necessary. While doing research in the army headquarters in Brasília in 1976–1977, a number of field-grade officers without prompting told me they opposed the repression.
81.
Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287–288.
82.
Richard Nixon: “Toasts of the President and President Medici of Brazil,” December 7, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3247.
83.
The Brazilian Truth Commission uncovered considerable evidence of Brazilian support for the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende’s government to the extent of providing training in torture and military equipment. The Brazilian embassy was fully behind the Chilean coup. See the report: “Memória das trevas: Arquivos revelam como o Brasil ajudou a ditadura chilena,” Diário do Poder, 27 de abril de 2014. http://www.diariodopoder.com.br/noticias/arquivos-revelam-como-o-brasil-ajudou-a-ditadura-chilena/.
84.
Nixon- Médici meeting in White House, Dec 7, 1971 FRUS, 1969–1976,Vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 141 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d141.
85.
“Ernesto Geisel,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 1450–1459.
General João Batista Figueiredo was Médici’s close aide, but he also had long ties to Geisel and his close advisers. He played a role in Médici’s decision for Geisel and he would succeed Geisel as the last general-president of the military regime.
86.
Because of intense press censorship, the selection process was hidden from the Brazilian public. There are excellent reconstructions in Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress” A Political History of Brazil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 262–266; Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 149–154; Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 215–228.
87.
Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287–288. On page 322: “Os comandantes do exército estão sem um respaldo legal para esse problema. A verdade é essa. … Para a guerra externa a gente tem legislação, mas para a nossa guerra específica, não temos.”
88.
Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 167 and 364, note 18. In an interview in 1974, Geisel told Alfred Stepan that “not only did he not have a mandate for distensão but significant military opinion … opposed distensão.” Namely, the “security apparatus” was opposed. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 35–39.
89.
Between 1965 and 1968, reported cases averaged 71 per year. In Médici’s last year there had been 736; in 1974 there were 67 reported cases of torture or death. See Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), p. 403. It seems that the hard-liners tried to avoid detection and record keeping by simply eliminating suspects instead of arresting them; Brazil: Nunca Mais (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1985), p. 64. According to this report, at the time Geisel took office, some 20 individuals simply disappeared after being detained.
90.
Cládio Guerra, Memórias de um guerra suja (Rio de Janeiro: Top books Editora, 2012), pp. 151–152. Some former torturers testified about their crimes before the National Truth Commission.
91.
CIA, office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80 M01048A: Subject Files Box 1, Folder 29:B-10 Brazil. Secret memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence William Colby to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, April 11, 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E-11, Part 2 Documents on South America, 1973–1976, document 99.
92.
Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p. 49. http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247.
93.
Walder de Góes, O Brasil do General Geisel (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1978), p. 30.
94.
Jerry Dávila, Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 51 and James G. Hershberg, “‘No Longer Anyone’s Sacristan’: New Evidence on Brazil’s Surprise Recognition of the MPLA Government in Angola” (Paper at the “Southern Africa in the Cold War Era Conference” in Lisbon, Portugal, May 2009).
95.
Dani K. Nedal & Tatiana Coutto, “Brazil’s 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany,” Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Wilson Center: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/brazils-1975-nuclear-agreement-west-germany. “Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel, US Threats and Promises and Brazilian Responses,” February 25, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC), Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), Azeredo da Silveira Archive, 1974.08.15 pp. 544–549.
96.
They signed the memo in Brasilia on February 21, 1976. Frank D. McCann, “The Value of U.S.-Brazilian Consultation,” Op-Ed Page, The New York Times, March 6, 1976.
97.
Quotes from Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916, March 15, 1976, text of agreement, pp. 337–338. Brazil negotiated similar consultative agreements with France, Britain, and Germany. Hopeful observers saw it as reinforcing the traditional alliance. For more analysis, see Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 95–196.
98.
The whole paragraph is based upon Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, pp. 44–45. http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247.
99.
Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, pp. 45–46. http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247.
100.
For an internal State Department analysis of US human rights policy, there is Human Rights S/P Study—Policy Planning Vol. II, L/HR Files: Lot 80 D 275, RG 59, NARA. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve03/d264.
101.
Robert Wesson, The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence (NY: Praeger, 1981), pp. 75–89. I was then resident in Brasília and observed these events closely.
102.
Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. Ernesto Geisel (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp. 305; 340–341; Dani K. Nedal, “U.S. Diplomatic Efforts Stalled Brazil’s Nuclear Program in 1970s,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-efforts-stalled-brazils-nuclear-program-1970s.
103.
See Andre Gustavo Stumpf & Merval Pereira Filho, A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979). For Frota’s views see Sylvio Frota, Ideais Traídos: A Mais Grave Crise dos Governos Militares (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006), especially pp. 499–536.
104.
Brazilian reaction was discussed in “Impact of the US Stand on Human Rights,” Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, May 11, 1977, FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 42 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v02/d42.
105.
Elio Gaspari, As Ilusões Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 305–306; for an extensive study, see Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing: the United States and Latin America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). Of course police mistreatment of prisoners had been commonplace, what was unusual was its institutionalization by the armed forces.
106.
Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. Ernesto Geisel (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp. 336–337; Paulo Fagundes Visentini, “Brazil-USA relations during the Military Dictatorship (1964–1985)” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 195–216.
107.
“O programa nuclear secreto brasileiro (Programa nuclear paralelo)” Gamevicio, 17 Dez 2011. http://www.gamevicio.com/i/noticias/106/106426-o-programa-nuclear-secreto-brasileiro-programa-nuclear-paralelo/.
108.
Robert C. Harding, “Ergue-se Marte!A Evolução do Programa Espacial Brasileiro em Apoio à Segurança Nacional,” Air & Space Power Journal [U.S. Air Force] Vol. XXI, No. 4, December 2009; http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-p/2009/4tri09/harding.html.
109.
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/106612.pdf. It was signed in Brasília on October 14, 1997.
110.
Décio Castilho Ceballos, “The Brazilian space program: a selective strategy for space development and business” (November 16, 1999). https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/026596469592254B.
111.
Cardoso overlapped with Clinton and Bush. His goal was to make good relations the norm; see Paulo Roberto Almeida, “Brazil-USA relations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments,” Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 217–238.
112.
Even officers who had long personal history of being unequivocally pro-American were deeply angry at the American insensitivity to the point of talking about returning their coveted American medals.
113.
Ricardo Pereira Cabral, “The Foreign Policy of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Government and its relations with the USA” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 247–287. “Brazil to Say ‘No, Thanks’ to US,” Brazzil, Brazil/US, May 2003; http://www.brazzil.com/p128may03.htm.
114.
Stephan Clark, “Brazilian rocket explodes on launch pad,” Spaceflight Now, August 22, 2003. VLS stands for Veiculo Lançador de Satélites.
115.
Though investigations dismissed rumors of sabotage, they continue to circulate. Sean T. Mitchell, Constellations of Inequality: Space, Race & Utopia in Brazil (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), pp. 80–90, 159–164. Statements in the press hinted at “gradual sabotage” of the project, Edwardo Hollanda & Hélio Contreiros, “Jóia da coroa: Interesse estrangeiros pela base de Alcântara põe o Brasil mais perto do sonho de lançar seu próprio satélite,” Isto É (São Paulo) 2/25/2004, https://istoe.com.br/27183_JOIA+DA+COROA/.
116.
Likely the best example of implying sabotage is the “study” by Ronaldo Schlichting and Colonel Roberto Monteiro de Oliveira, “A sistemáteca sabotage contra a Missão Espacial Completa Brasileira (MECB) e contra o projeto VLS-1,” Curitiba, December 8, 2004, Analiíses Estrategicas: Polítical Nacional e Global. http://www.suaaltezaogato.com.br/arq/Gavetao/Ronaldo_Schlichting_(Sabotagem_Programa_Espacial Brasileiro).pdf.
117.
After the 2003 disintegration of the Columbia spacecraft, the Americans were dependent on Russian vehicles to reach the space station at the cost of $60 million per astronaut. The fee charged by Brazil was a bargain by comparison. The life and career of Colonel Pontes are laid out in http://www.marcospontes.com/$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html. “First Brazilian astronaut returns to Earth,” New Scientist, Daily News, April 10, 2006, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn8972-first-brazilian-astronaut-returns-to-earth/; Marcos C. Pontes (Lieutenant Colonel, Brazil Air Force Astronaut, Brazilian Space Agency), https://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/pontes.html.
118.
Sean T. Mitchell, Constellations of Inequality: Space, Race & Utopia in Brazil (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), p. 160.
119.
Frank D. McCann,“Brasil: Acima de Tudo!! The Brazilian Armed Forces: Remodeling for a New Era,” Diálogos vol. 21 no. 1 (2017), pp. 57–95. https://doi.org/10.4025/dialogos.v21i1.
120.
“Why Brazil signed a military agreement with the US,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2010.
121.
Lt. Colonel Lawrence T. Brown, “Restoring the ‘Unwritten Alliance’ in Brazil—United States Relations, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA) March 12, 2012, ADA 560773.pdf.
122.
The White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States and Brazil – A Mature and Multifaceted Partnership,” June 30, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/fact-sheet-united-states-and-brazil-mature-and-multi-faceted-partnership.
123.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html and https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-lula-corruption-workers-party.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FDa%20Silva%2C%20Luiz%20In%C3%A1cio%20Lula&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection.
124.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-usa-military/u-s-military-joins-brazil-army-exercises-in-amazon-idUSKBN1D8347.

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University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, USA
Frank D. McCann

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McCann, F.D. (2018). Cold Wind from the East. In: Brazil and the United States during World War II and Its Aftermath. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_8

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