Abstract
Discussion of moral expertise typically ask whether knowledge of moral theory allows someone to make better moral judgments than those unversed in such theories, or at least to make sound judgments more reliably. This paper challenges a common assumption that real world moral judgments can be best understood as applications of a specific area of theoretical knowledge, rather in the way that engineering can be understood as a kind of applied physics. I challenge this assumption by drawing on the work of the comparative philosopher Thomas Kasulis to argue that a) moral wisdom is best understood as embodied in practices that do not readily admit of explicit discursive analysis, and b) such practices are themselves embedded in specific cultural traditions, so that c) moral expertise is realized in expertise and familiarity with culturally embedded behaviors. Consequently, moral expertise—even in an applied setting such as bioethics—is more akin to understanding classical ballet than knowing the principles and applications of a theoretical science. As an illustration, I then consider the classical Confucian idea of li, or ritual propriety, and its role in defining moral wisdom. I end by arguing that the appeals to specific cultural practices in this account does not entail relativism or subjectivism.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See Gilbert Ryle (1949). It should be noted that Sellers was anticipated in drawing this distinction by John Dewey. See Hubert L. Dreyfus for discussion of Dewey’s early contribution to the idea that moral knowledge is a kind of knowledge-how.
- 3.
- 4.
Thomas Kasulis (2002), p. 133.
- 5.
Kasulis, (2002), pp. 59–60.
- 6.
Kasulis (2002), pg. 60.
- 7.
These cultural contrasts are heavily qualified—Kasulis stresses that no culture can be exclusively characterized using either of the orientations and that there can be subcultures that are dominated by the orientation that is less prominent among the mainstream.
- 8.
It is worth stressing that these remarks refer to broad characteristics of the more dominant theories of knowledge—traditions that arose in part in opposition to mainstream epistemology such as pragmatism and phenomenology arguably display greater affinities with an Intimacy orientation. Not surprisingly, many see points of convergence between these theories and classical Asian thought.
- 9.
Kasulis (2002), p. 72.
- 10.
Kasulis (2002), p. 78.
- 11.
Indeed, insofar as knowledge that—scientific knowledge, for example—is generated through practices requiring skills born of experience and deepening familiarity, it too reflects elements of Intimacy. One learns how to be a scientist, or how to do science. The process by which scientific results are actually generated are indeed “dark” to the uninitiated, even if those results can be presented in ways that abstract away from their origins in the labs of practitioners.
- 12.
Amy Olberding (2012), pp. 57. Olberding introduces the phrase “view of a life we should like” in contrast to an explicit and rigorous theory of human flourishing, something she concedes we do not find in early Confucian texts. The initial, intuitive idea such a theory is meant to elucidate and defend—that of a better, more satisfying and complete way of life—is what she means to capture in the idea of life we should like. A rich and compelling image of this, she argues, is what we find in text such as the Analects. Below I will also appeal to “flourishing”, but such appeals should also be understood in this pre-theoretical sense.
- 13.
The classical Confucian moral imagination recognizes a higher type, the sheng ren, or sage, but such people are exceedingly rare, and this not a status we can realistically aspire to. Though later recognized as such, Confucius denied that he was sage and claims to have never met such a person—the sages he recognizes lived long ago.
- 14.
As explained in the next paragraph, ren is translated in a variety of ways—I here defer to the more popular renderings, but there is much to be said for the alternatives introduced there.
- 15.
Rogers T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr. (1999), 6.30.
- 16.
Hence the link between ren and the virtues listed earlier. The cognitive dimension of ren points to the importance of knowledge and wisdom, or zhi, while the practical dimension points to the ability to translate such wisdom into effective action, or yi. All of this requires, in turn, a refinement of our moral sentiments: hence shu, zhong, and xin.
- 17.
- 18.
Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr. (1999) pp. 51.
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- 20.
Angle (2012) pg. 97. Angle argues this points to the need for a higher value—ren—that is distinct from and served by li. Angle concedes this is a somewhat controversial reading of Confucianism as some will argue li itself is the source of moral value in Confucianism. For reasons that will emerge in the next section, I side with Angle on this question. Angle also argues that Confucius is a bit unfair to the village worthy, as surely it is some kind of a mark of moral progress that one is willing and able to defer to moral standards even if it is for less that fully noble reasons. Indeed, a willingness to do so may be a necessary first step.
- 21.
Olberding (2016) pp. 242.
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Ames and Rosemont Jr. (1999) 2.4. Lest we think it is easy to become a junzi, Confucius notes that was not until he was 70 that he felt he had arrived. Hence the claim that it constitutes a kind of expertise.
- 23.
If this sounds a little paradoxical, consider an example such a playing piano. Knowing how to play piano is embodied and displayed in somebody’s playing piano, but this is distinct from the musical qualities that are exemplified in accomplished performances. It is in reference to these that we judge this person’s piano playing or the value of different techniques, practice regimes, and so on. Expertise in playing piano is embodied in the playing but it is, as I have put it here, in service to the aesthetic properties on display in good playing.
- 24.
Classical Confucianism itself can sometimes be criticized on these grounds as there is truth to the charge that its fondness for the social and cultural practices of the early Zhou Dynasty seems to rest on little more than its familiarity. On the other hand, the willingness to criticize practices current in the later Zhou, and the willingness of Confucius and others to embrace changes enacted since the early Zhou, suggest a recognition that that the li was not self legitimating.
- 25.
See for example H.T. Engelhardt (2012). Similar points are made by a number of the essays collected in this volume.
- 26.
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (2011).
- 27.
- 28.
For an extended argument that Confucian ethical teaching was not the most compelling available in its own historical period, see Chad Hansen (2000).
- 29.
Engelhardt (2012).
- 30.
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Arjo, D. (2018). Moral Expertise: A Comparative Philosophical Approach. In: Watson, J., Guidry-Grimes, L. (eds) Moral Expertise. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 129. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92759-6_2
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